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The modern role of the law of contract imposes a duty on the state to regulate the way 
individuals treat each other in the marketplace as part of fulfilling its social role. This thesis 
investigates the situation of contractual justice under shariah and English law. It tests the 
extent to which contractual justice is protected under Shariah and English laws of contract. It 
indicates that the English law of contract is focused on the absolute sanctity of contract (in its 
classical form) and economic efficiency (in its modern form). On the other hand, the shariah 
law of contract is governed by the general principle that gain comes only from labour and 
stresses the importance of the equivalence of counter-values. It reveals that while contractual 
justice under the English law of contract is procedurally oriented, it is substantively oriented 
under the Shariah law of contract. Additionally, the thesis also discusses the role of the law of 
consumer protection in pursuing contractual justice. While the consumer is protected under 
the English law by legislative control, the Shariah law of contract, which was the product of 
the seventh and eighth centuries, does not recognise the concept of the consumer. One would 
accordingly question the legitimacy of the action of protecting consumers in those states (take 
for example Saudi Arabia) that adopt Shariah as the law of the state. Most of the states, which 
adopt shariah either alongside other normative systems or as the entire code, grant some kind 
of consumer protection measures within the law of contract. The thesis attempts to fill this 
gap by testing the viability of consumer protection derived from the Shariah law of contract. 
In doing so, attention is paid to the theoretical and practical aspects of the law. It is revealed 
that the Shariah law of contract is fit both from a theoretical and a practical perspective to 
serve the aims of consumer protection. The outcomes of the research should guide and 
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Making contracts is part of everyday activity, people contract everyday for buying goods and 
services (food, accommodation, employment etc.). The law of contract expresses individuals’ 
freedom by enforcing power on parties to create binding agreements. The most fundamental 
rules of the marketplace are stated by contract law. It serves the enforceability of transactions 
and imposes restraints on the conduct of obligations created by parties and limits its 
enforceability by means of self-help or coercion from legal institutions. 
 
Furthermore, the law of contract has the potential to enhance community welfare. The 
marketplace forms a key mechanism for the production and distribution of wealth in most 
societies.  The modern role of contract law requires the balancing of the contractual 
relationship rather than mere protection of individually acquired positions.
1
 This imposes a 
duty on the state to regulate the way individuals treat each other in the marketplace. It is 
always for the benefit of contractor to receive the maximum benefit from a contract. Yet, 
contracting is a social activity, the gain of one contractor could be earned at the expense of 
harm to the other party. It is for the law of contract to preserve justice between parties. To be 
able to have a fair and equitable deal has far reaching consequences for the level of welfare in 
a society. It has the force to determine the direction of people lives.
2
  Good morals require 
contractors to act fairly, honestly and to respect the legitimate rights of others. Exploiting 
vulnerability or weakness of position of the counter-party to yield self interest runs counter to 
accepted moral standards. This research is concerned with determining when this changes 
from being a mere moral obligation to become one that is enforced by law. 
 
Governmental intervention into the marketplace is a modern phenomenon. The development 
of a mass consumer market is a major cause of the evolution of the modern law of contract.
3
  
The law of consumer protection is taken to be an avenue for the redistribution of wealth in a 
                                                          
1
 Nagla Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited:  A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-term International 
Commercial Transactions (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 24 
2
 Mindy Wishart, Contract Law (5
th
 edn, OUP 2015) 1 
3
 Roger Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (2
nd





 This is supported by legal rules which ensure a fair, equitable and balanced deal for 
the consumer. Distributional motives of consumer regulation accord more control to the law 




1.1 Aims, objectives and scope of the study 
 
The research is conducted with two primary aims in mind. The first aim of the thesis is to 
investigate the situation of contractual justice under Shariah
6
 and English law. The first aim is 
achieved by testing the extent to which contractual justice is protected under Shariah and 
English law of contract and in doing so the following sub-objectives are addressed: (1) to test 
the extent to which parties’ autonomy is limited for the purpose of protecting fairness; (2) to 
investigate the extent to which the law of contract contributes towards achieving community 
welfare and the redistribution of wealth in society; (3) to bring light to the meaning of the 
concepts of justice under the two jurisdictions; (4) to investigate the extent to which 
consumer protection contributes to achieving contractual justice, community welfare and the 
redistribution of wealth; (5) to compare and contrast the situation of the two relevant 
jurisdictions taking into account the effect of different ideologies and principles on the 
practice of the two legal systems; (6) to evaluate the efficiency of the systems of protecting 
contractual fairness in each jurisdiction . 
 
A second aim of this research is to investigate the possibility of a consumer protection regime 
driven by Shariah law in the field of contract. Shariah law of contract was the product of the 
seventh and eighth centuries and does not recognise the concept of the consumer. One would 
accordingly question the legitimacy of the action of protecting consumers in those states (take 
for example Saudi Arabia) that adopt Shariah as the law of the state. Most of the states which 
adopt it, either along-side other normative systems or as the entire code, grant some kind of 
consumer protection measures within the law of contract. There is no evidence that those 
roles have been tested for their compatibility with Shariah principles. Protecting the 
consumer in the absence of analysis of the conformity of such rules with durational Shariah 
principles would put the legitimacy of such measures under question. The second aim is 
                                                          
4
 Ian Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulation of Consumer Market (3
rd
 edn, Hart 
Publishing 2012) 70 
5
 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (2
nd
 edn, Ashgate 2005) 11-4 
6
 In this thesis the term Shariah law refers to Shariah principles that are extracted from the primary sources 




achieved by addressing the following objectives: (1) to invoke the theoretical grounds of 
consumer protection as well as the English experience of consumer protection to illuminate 
the main characteristics and values of consumer protection; (2) to test the theoretical ground 
of consumer protection under the contract theory of the Shariah law; (3) to propose a formula 
for the protection of consumer protection that derives from the spirit of Shariah law of 
contract.  
 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Conducting the two aims of the research requires invoking many theories and legal concepts 
of contract and social justice. These are particularly related to the role of the law of contract 
in achieving fairness and social welfare as well as the function and theoretical basis of 
consumer protection. These are addressed below along with justification for choosing the two 
jurisdictions. 
 
1.2.1 Fairness as relevant to autonomy 
 
Fairness or justice is an open concept that is difficult to define or measure. Nonetheless, 
within the law of contract it might be useful to view fairness as relevant to autonomy. When 
we refer to parties’ autonomy in the context of contract we refer to ‘control’ or ‘influence’ 
over action in relation to the formation, content and performance of the contract. The law 
decides on the degree of control or influence that an individual possesses before it can be 
established that the parties have exercised autonomy. It is said that autonomy in the context 
of contract is of two types: one is in line with freedom of contract thinking and the other is in 
line with fairness-oriented thinking. From a freedom-oriented perspective, autonomy is 
concerned with maximizing self-reliant freedom. From this perspective, in order to respect 
the parties’ autonomy and expectations a strong adherence to their intention is required 
(obligations and liabilities are based on their intention).  By contrast, from a fairness-oriented 
perspective autonomy is concerned with the distinctive interests and expectations that a party 
is likely to have when entering the relationship. The pursuit of self reliance and the parties’ 
intention are given less importance in this approach. As a result, obligations and liabilities are 
15 
 





Addressing the first aim of the thesis necessitates invoking contractual theories related to 
freedom of contract and parties’ autonomy. More precisely it requires the investigation of the 
extent to which the law of contract allow public interference into parties’ autonomy for the 
purpose of ensuring contractual balance. This is done for the purpose of discovering which 
perspective of contractual autonomy is reflected by the regulation of the relevant 
jurisdictions. The research reviews the two legal systems (Shariah and English law) from 
classical to contemporary times. Emphasis is given to fairness norms under the law of 
contract and the extent those norms form limitations to parties’ autonomy. Because different 
types of autonomy underlie differences in the philosophies of contract, the thesis refers to the 
underlying ideas which have affected the development and direction of the law.  
 
Although this thesis supports the meaning of contractual justice as presented above, it 
acknowledges that there are other aspects of fairness. In contrary to the above mentioned 
meaning of fairness, there is a fairness aspect which flows from ‘utilitarian premises’.
8
 Under 
this latter aspect, justice is said to be achieved when people are left to do the best they can 
according to circumstances.  Thus, in contrast to the former position, which requires 
intervention into private contracts by limiting contractual autonomy to achieve fairness, the 
latter indicates that the role of the state is limited to ensuring that the contractual relation is 
made by consent and voluntary will. In other words, fairness as ‘utilitarian premises’ is 
focused on procedural fairness rather than substantive fairness. The thesis acknowledges this 
concept by investigating the extent to which substantive and procedural justice are reflected 
by the legal principles of both legal systems. 
 
1.2.2 Fairness norms 
 
The thesis is concerned with the role of the law of contract in promoting social welfare as 
well as the distributive function of the law of contract. This requires the invocation of justice 
                                                          
7
 See Chris Willett ‘Autonomy and Fairness: The Case of Public Statements’ in Geraint Howells, Andre Janssen 
and Reiner Schulze (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for Party Autonomy and 
Transactional Fairness (2
nd 
edn, Routledge, 2016) 1-16 
8
 Alan Schwartz ‘Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach’ (1986) 9 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 107 
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norms; most modern debates on the normative justice of contract theories uphold either 
corrective justice (based on right) or distributive justice (welfare distribution). The two 
Aristotelian norms (corrective and distributive) are defined and measured against the 
regulation of the two legal systems. Special attention is given to the distributive function of 
the law of contract. This includes analysis of distributive norms and the way they function. In 
this regard, the thesis proposed by Hassan that the Shariah law of contract is bound by 
corrective (or commutative justice) is contested.
 
He argues that distributive concerns are 
served under Shariah legal traditions only by social institutions and not the law of contract.
9
 
On the contrary, this thesis argues that the Shariah law of contract promotes the distributive 
function of the law of contract. 
 
1.2.3 The consumer case 
 
Consumer protection is fulfilled when theories of fairness, consumer welfarism and fair 
distribution are implemented.  Modern laws of consumer protection intervene into the 
marketplace in order to fix the balance of the consumer/supplier relationship. Protecting the 
consumer is a form of social responsibility that aims at achieving fairness. In other words, 
consumer protection is bound by fairness-oriented autonomy rather than freedom-oriented 
autonomy. The English experience of consumer protection is introduced to this research in 
order to demonstrate the role of the law of contract in bringing fairness and equity to society. 
Without introducing the consumer experience the discussion of the level of contractual justice 
of English law is not complete. Consumer transactions currently constitute a large proportion 
of contractual relations. Consumer contracting is closely regulated by the English law for the 
purpose of ensuring a balanced contractual scheme. The research outlines the rationales 
behind the regulation of consumer contracts and illustrates the extent to which intervention is 
made into parties’ autonomy by exploring the major regulation techniques of consumer 
protection. While the English law of consumer protection is regulated closely by multiple 
acts, Shariah law of contract does not recognise the concept of the consumer. Thus, the thesis 
attempts to examine this lacunae by testing the viability of consumer protection driven from 
the Shariah law of contract.  
 
                                                          
9
 Hussein Hassan ‘Contracts in Islamic Law: The Principles of Commutative Justice and Liberality’ (2002) 13 
Journal of Islamic Studies 257 
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1.2.4 The viability of consumer protection under Shariah law of contract 
 
In order to pursue the second aim of the thesis, theoretical grounds of consumer protection as 
well as the English experience of consumer protection is invoked to bring to light the 
characteristics of consumer protection. The established characteristics are subsequently 
(chapter six) tested for their compatibility with Shariah law of contract. Any legal system 
must be consistent in theory and technical rules. Thus, to introduce a suitable legal solution 
requires ensuring that is compatible with both theory and rules of law. This thesis therefore 
tests the capability of the Shariah law of contract for protecting the consumer from theoretical 
and practical points of view. 
 
In terms of theory, three factors constitute the theoretical ground of consumer protection. The 
first requires intervention into private contracts by public authority. Thus, a law system that 
promotes consumer protection necessarily allows public intervention into private contracts 
(government paternalism).  Second, the legal rules of consumer protection are of special 
nature that are set to balance the contractual relation for the benefit of the consumer rather 
than for the benefit of both contracting parties.  This is because it derives from the idea that 
consumer contracts
10
 tend to be imbalanced (the distributive function of contract). Third, 
consumer protection involves the promotion and enforcement of ideas of cooperation and 
fairness in society by the law of contract (community values and social responsibility). These 
three factors are tested for their compatibility with the general theory of Shariah law of 
contract.  
 
From a practical perspective, there are certain values that need to be protected by the law of 
consumer protection to offer satisfactory protection to consumers. These are: (1) consumers’ 
expectations; (2) informed consent; (3) voluntary will and; (4) fair and balanced contract 
terms. The thesis proposes a formula for the protection of these values through rules that are 
taken from the Shariah contract traditions which reflect the spirit of Shariah law.  
 
1.2.5 Justification for choosing the jurisdictions  
 
                                                          
10
 For the purposes of this thesis the term ‘consumer contract’ is used as defined by the Consumer Rights Act 
2015, as explained in section 5.5 below. 
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The thesis compares two jurisdictions that generally stand on distinct ideologies and come 
from very distinct law sources.  Such comparison produces interesting results that indicate 
that difference in contract ideologies does not necessarily mean that a certain issue is treated 





The English law of consumer protection, along with being a classical example of a legal 
system of strict contractual liberty, reflects the modern needs of consumer protection and has 
the ability to change the notation of contract. Indeed, it is interesting to follow how the 
English law has changed from being entirely based on the ideologies of laissez faire and 
caveat emptor to become a system that promote values of fairness and cooperation.  
 
It needs to be kept in mind that the English experience is invoked for guidance; it is by no 
mean an attempt to enforce the English rules blindly onto the Shariah legal system. It rather 
serves the comparison aim and offers guidance in terms of the basic requirements of 
consumer protection in the contemporary era. Applying rules that do not reflect the general 
theory of the legal system is exactly what this research rejects. It was mentioned earlier that 
consumer protection is somehow granted to consumers in Shariah-ruled countries. However, 
there is no evidence that these rules have been carefully tested by Shariah principles. It rather 
seems like a blind application of the Western experience. Applying an experience of one 
legal system uncritically to another that is bound by different ideologies and background, is 
likely to produce issues of inconsistency, illegitimacy, fragmentation and conflict. For this 
exact reason, a state that follows Shariah as the formal law needs to protect consumers by 
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means that are driven by the overall spirit of Shariah. The outcomes of the research should 





This study is undertaken by multiple methods, but is mainly conducted through doctrinal and 
comparative research methods. Interpretation is the core aspect of any legal study and this is 
why doctrinal research forms the basis of most legal research projects.
12
 A comparative 
method is employed in order to offer a critical perspective on the two jurisdictions as well as 
to support the legal reform suggested by this research.  Following this two legal methods are 
addressed. 
 
1.3.1 A doctrinal research   
 
A legal researcher is usually required to identify, analyse, and synthesise the content of the 
law. Furthermore, the researcher is required to verify the authority and status of the legal 
doctrine being examined. The way to accomplish this is by using a doctrinal legal research 
method.  A researcher would not be able to embark on critiques of the law or empirical study 
of the law in operation unless she is familiar with the status of the legal doctrine at 
hand.
13
The essence of doctrinal research is explained by Van Gestel and Micklitz, in three 
points: 
 
First, the arguments of doctrinal work are ‘derived from authoritative sources, such as 
existing rules, principles, precedent and scholarly publications’. Second since ‘the law 
somehow represents a system. Through the production general and defendable theories, legal 
doctrines aims to present the law as a coherent net of principles, rules, meta-rules and 
exceptions at different level of abstraction’. Third ‘decisions in individual cases are supposed 
to exceed arbitrariness because they have to (be) fit into the system. Deciding in hard cases 
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impels that existing rules will be stretched or even replaced but always in such a way that in 




The process of doctrinal research typically consists of two parts. The first step involves 
locating the sources of the law and then in a second step analysing the texts.
15
 In the first 
stage of legal doctrine research the relevant materials need to be collected. These could be 
normative sources such as statuary texts, general principles of the law or binding precedents 
or authoritative sources such as non-binding case law and scholarly legal writing.  The 
discussion of legal sources is one of relevance: a binding precedent is more relevant than 
non-binding one. A publication of a scholar who is considered an authority in his field is 
more accepted than the publication of a young academic. In relation to normative sources the 
relevance is based on validity. The relevance of an authoritative source is always a matter of 





In a further step of doctrinal research, the located sources need to be interpreted and 
synthesised. This thesis employs deductive logic, inductive reasoning and analogy where 
appropriate. Deductive logic is used when the research is examining the situation of law in 
order to decide if the situation comes within the given rules.
17
 This thesis invokes deductive 
reasoning for the investigation of the situation of contractual justice under the relevant 
jurisdictions. The situation of contractual justice in the two legal systems is compared to the 
given rules and principles of the law and tested for its agreement with the general theory of 
the law. Inductive reasoning uses a process of arguing from specific cases to a more general 
rule.
18
 Such reasoning is used in this thesis extensively. For example, in relation to 
generalising the doctrine of unfair exploitation of Shariah law of contract to create theoretical 
grounds for consumer protection. Analogical reasoning involves locating similar situations, 
and then arguing that similar cases should be governed by the same principle and have 
similar outcomes.
19
 Such reasoning is employed in relation to the purposed formula of 
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consumer protection under Shariah law of contract. Many existing rules of Shariah are 
suggested in the research for the regulation of consumer issues. 
 
1.3.2 A comparative research   
 
In addition to the doctrinal method the research adopts a comparative approach. The purpose 
of comparative study goes beyond the listing of differences and similarities and critical 
analysis of their causes. It is rather a way to show a superior mastery of legal material and 
deeper insight into the law in order to contribute to its development.  Legal comparative study 
is invoked for many purposes including guidance for legislation, law reform, a tool of 




Comparative law has the intrinsic purpose of developing legal research and education. 
Comparing ones’ national law with a foreign legal system aids reflection and offers a deeper 
and more critical perspective on this national law. It also broadens the understanding of the 
roots and context of legal rules. This comes as a natural result to comparative studies; when a 
researcher is faced with differences or similarities she would want to refer to their historical 
development, recent globalising trends, and political, cultural or economic reasons in order to 
explain the similarities or differences.
21
 Furthermore, comparative research gives more 
weight to legal research; it offer a way for the law to become international and therefore, 




Comparative study is not limited to comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
legal systems, but it also acknowledges the background by which these are sustained, along 
with the values and origins of the legal institutions. It gives special attention to the causes of 
defects and suggests solutions through critical evaluation and legal reasoning.  It is held that 
the comparison between legal systems of different traditions can be made either on a large 
scale or a small scale. The small scale is invoked when the study is aimed at the legal rules 
and institutions used to solve the relevant issue (referred to as microcomparison).
23
 The large 
scale is used in studies that compare the spirit and style of the relevant legal systems, the 
method of thought and procedures used (referred to as macrocomparison). In this thesis, the 
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comparative study of the selected legal systems is made through a macrocomparison 
approach; it exceeds the comparison of relevant rules and institutions by comparing the spirit 
and style of the relevant legal systems, the method of thought and procedures used. 
 
Comparative law is an important tool for the development of the law. Foreign law can 
provide model of how different sets of legal rules can work in addressing a given legal issue 
or promoting particular policy. It is particularly important for the purpose of law reform, 
which this research proposes in relation to consumer protection in Shariah-ruled countries. 
This thesis compares the proposed consumer protection model of Shariah to the established 
English model. Yet, any reform project must consider the limitation of transplanting a foreign 
model.
24
 Particularly, two points must be considered when the adoption of a foreign solution, 
which is said to be superior, is proposed: first, whether it has proved satisfactory in its 
country of origin; second, whether it will work in the country where its adoption is 
proposed.
25
 The English model of consumer protection is chosen for its good reputation as a 
successful model of consumer protection which reflects the European experience. The 
question of whether the borrowed rules have the potential to be successful under the Shariah 
legal system is considered by invoking two points.  First, testing the computability of the 
proposed measure with the underlying principles of Shariah. Second, modification to the 
proposed measures is suggested where needed, in order that they can be passed under Shariah 
traditions.
26
 This step is highly important to avoid the proposal of misguided or superficial 
legal reform. 
 
The understanding of the two legal systems is a key factor leading to a successful 
comparative study. Particularly one needs to understand the relevant piece of the law to be 
borrowed. A comprehensive understanding of a legal rule requires the understanding of its 
meaning, underlying principles, values, implementation and extension within their relevant 
circumstances.
27
 A basic principle for a successful comparative methodology is the 
functionality principle, which seeks to avoid all limitations and restraints. According to this 
principle, ‘only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same function’. The 
principle of functionality rests on the assumption that ‘every legal system of every society 
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faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means 
though very often with similar results’. Therefore, any comparative study must rest entirely 
on functional terms; the problem must be stated without any reference to the concepts of 
one’s legal system.
28
 Thus, instead of questioning ‘the extent to which the law reflects good 
faith and reasonableness in contracting’ this thesis investigates the ‘extent the law observes 
contractual fairness’ and asks ‘how does the law response to perceived unfairness’. 
 
The principle of functionality applies to the sources of the law. The researcher ‘must treat as 
a source of law whatever moulds or affect the living law in the chosen system, whatever the 
lawyers in there would treat as a source of law, and must accord those sources the same 
relative weight and value as they do’.
29
 This thesis considers two different legal traditions; 
each tradition adopts a different approach in resolving legal questions. Thus, the results may 
not always be inconsistent but the way the two laws came into existence and the strength of 
the legal sources will be different. In relation to English law, the sources of data for this 
research include legislation, case law and commentaries made by public bodies or individuals 
in the form of books, reports or articles. Common law was predominantly founded on a 
system of case law or judicial precedent. Thus, as derived from the common law tradition, 
precedent case law counts as an authoritative source of English law. On the other hand, the 
law under the Shariah tradition of Shariah law is based on sources of lex diva and comes from 
the sacred sources of the Quran and Sunna, rather than legislation or litigation or by 
discovery through a specific judicial methodology.
30
 Unlike common law, case law under the 
Shariah tradition is not responsible for the creation of the law or law reform. Case law used in 
the study comes from the Saudi Arabian judicial system and it is merely invoked for the 
purpose of explaining the application of the law rather than stating the law. 
 
Furthermore, the principles of Shariah are believed to be based on revelation and therefore, 
are immutable. Once the main principles of law become settled, the role of the subsequent 
scholars is limited to developing the rules that flow from the settled principles.  This brings 
about an important consequence that the researcher can discuss a legal thought from the 
eighth or tenth century without needing to acknowledge a historical development. This is true 
to what is referred to as the classical period of Shariah law in this research. By contrast, when 
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referring to the classical period of the English law of contract of the nineteenth century one 
needs to acknowledge the historical development and the transformation of the law. 
 
1.4 Chapter outlines  
 
In order to satisfy the aims and objectives of the study, the research is articulated in the 
following manner: 
 
Chapter Two: Contractual justice under the English law of contract  
 
This chapter is concerned with the general law of English contract. It tests the extent to which 
the general law of contract serves contractual justice. It investigates the extent to which it 
allows for public intervention into parties’ autonomy for the purpose of setting contractual 
balance. In the first part of the chapter, the study goes back to the roots of the English law of 
contract in the nineteenth century. The concept and meanings of contractual justice under 
such classical law is illustrated. The notions of sanctity and freedom of contract are explored 
as being dominant in that period. The second part of the chapter explores the modern 
transformation of the law of contract. The transformation is presented by the introduction of 
some elements of fairness and cooperation to the law of contract. This includes the notions of 
inequality of bargaining power, reasonableness, unconscionability and good faith into the law 
of contract. The discussion is focused on the evolution, meaning, effect and scope of these 
doctrines.   
 
Chapter Three: Contractual justice under Shariah law of contract 
 
This chapter is devoted to distinguishing the situation of contractual justice under the general 
theory of Shariah law of contract. Given the distinct nature of the Shariah law of contract the 
first part of this chapter provides an overview of the law.  It explores the evolution of the law 
in the seventh and eighth centuries, the sources of the law and the nature of the law. It further 
illustrates the general theory of contract. It then addresses the ongoing debate over the 
existence of a general theory that binds the Shariah law of contract. The major limitations to 
contractual autonomy are presented by invoking the doctrine of shurut (ancillary condition). 
The second part of the chapter deals with the doctrines of contractual fairness of Shariah. It 
explores the meaning, affect and scope of the doctrines of duress, riba, gharar, unfair 
25 
 
exploitation and just price. The discussion is focused on the scope, meaning, function and 
effect of these doctrines.   
 
Chapter Four: Theoretical grounds for consumer protection 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical basis of consumer protection. It explores the rationales of 
consumer protection from economic and social perspectives. The two major grounds for 
consumer protection, economic grounds (market failure) and social grounds (distributive 
justice, paternalism and community values), are discussed. Furthermore, it offers a critical 
perspective on the necessity, efficiency and chosen level of consumer protection. This is done 
with the overall aim of the research in mind, that is, with respect to the viability of consumer 
protection under the Shariah law of contract. 
 
Chapter Five: Consumer protection under English law  
 
The chapter begins by presenting the evolution of consumer protection in the late nineteenth 
century. It illustrates that consumer law departs from the general theory of contract by 
making substantive fairness a relevant consideration to contract validation. The major legal 
techniques of consumer regulations are mentioned, including the test of fairness, the imposed 
conditions, information remedies and the cooling-off period. It finally summarises the lessons 
that could be learned to guide the evolution of Shariah law of consumer protection.  
 
Chapter Six: The viability of consumer protection under Shariah law of contract 
 
This chapter investigates the viability of consumer protection driven by Shariah law of 
contract. The question is approached by testing both the theoretical and practical aspects of 
the law. From a theoretical perspective, it analyses the three grounds of distributive justice, 
paternalism and community values in Shariah legal thought. In the second section some 
general rules of Shariah contract law are introduced for employment in the consumer 
protection field. These rules have the ability to protect consumer expectations, informed will, 
voluntary consent and fairness of the contract. 
 
Chapter Seven: Contractual justice and consumer protection: a critical approach to 




This chapter offers final remarks as to where the two relevant legal systems stand in relation 
to contractual justice. A comparative method is invoked in the light of all that has been 
discussed throughout the research in relation to the general law of contract and consumer 
theory in both Shariah and English law.  It outlines the extent to which the legal doctrines of 
both legal systems reflect the concepts of either substantive or procedural justice. Some 
issues that are related to contractual justice and consumer protection under the relevant 
jurisdictions that call for explanation are addressed in this chapter. These issues include: the 
requirement of good faith under the Shariah law of contract; commercial and consumer 
separation under the Shariah law of contract; the effect of the rejection of a general doctrine 
of substantive fairness under English law; the European influence on English law and the 
regulation of just price under English law. Finally, justice norms reflected by the Shariah and 
English law are outlined.  
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
In this conclusion chapter, a summary of the whole research is presented. The major issues 
that have been discussed throughout the thesis are outlined. The outcomes of the research are 
illustrated along with recommendations for development and reform. Finally, several avenues 























This chapter is concerned with the general English law of contract. It investigates the extent 
to which the law promotes public intervention into parties’ autonomy for the purpose of 
setting contractual balance. In the first part of the chapter, the study goes back to the roots of 
the English law of contract in the classical period of the nineteenth century. The concept and 
meanings of contractual justice under classical law is illustrated. The notions of sanctity and 
freedom of contract are explored as being dominant in that period. The second part of the 
chapter explores the modern transformation of the law of contract. The transformation 
involves the introduction of elements of fairness and cooperation to the law of contract. This 
includes the notions of inequality of bargaining power, reasonableness, unconscionability and 
good faith into the law of contract. Additionally, the modern development of the traditional 
doctrines of equity of duress and undue influence is outlined. The discussion is focused on 
the evolution, meaning, effect and scope of these doctrines. The main purpose of the 
discussion is to explore the extent to which these notions influenced the law of contract 
particularly in relation to the promotion of contractual fairness by the contemporary law of 
English contract. 
 
2.1 Classical law of contact 
 
The English law of contract extends back to the middle ages.
31
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
be certain about the law of that time given the controversy that surrounded the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century laws of contract. Furthermore, most legal doctrines and principles of the 
modern law of English contract were developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The period from 1770 to 1870 is the most important time in the history of English law. At 
this time theories of natural law and the philosophy of laissez-faire flourished.
32
   
Understanding the situation of the classical period is essential for understanding the current 
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laws. The idea of freedom of contract lies at the heart of the classical law of contract, which 




The period before the classical is surrounded with controversy; no one is really certain about 
the law of contract of the sixteenth and seventeenth century laws of contract. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to mention the point made by Horwitz that pre-industrial contract law was based 
on fairness which was later replaced by a law of contract that is based on the meeting of the 
wills of the parties. He puts forwards an argument based on the doctrinal shifts that occurred 
at that time. He explains that executory contracts and the requirement of consideration (which 
used to be of equivalent value to the performance received in exchange) were widely 
recognised in pre-industrial contract law.  Additionally, the expectation of interest and the 
award of expectation damages were protected.  However, the law was shifted by the effort of 
judges who attempted to transform the law to favour commercial interests. Their effort was to 




The argument of Horwitz, along with its evidence, was tested by Simpson. Simpson explains 
that the doctrines Horwitz identified to indicate the transformation of the new law are traced 
back to the seventeenth century and even earlier. Thus Simpson notes that the argument that 
contract law was based on fairness lacks evidence. According to him, what actually happened 
in late eighteenth and early  nineteenth century is that new doctrines were created that had not 
existed before.
35
     
 
Atiyah on the other hand, accepts to some extent that a general theory of fairness existed. His 
argument is based on the fact that courts did on many occasions refuse to enforce grossly 
unfair contracts.
36
 Other scholars disagree with Atiyah’s argument; they claim that courts in 
the eighteenth century were not concerned with the fairness of exchange.
37
 In any case, the 
pre-industrial law of contract does not have a substantial effect on the current law of contract. 
By contrast, most of the current principles of the English law of contract do have their roots 
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in the classical period of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The following analysis is 
conducted with the classical law of contract as a theoretical construct. 
 
2.1.1 The theoretical construct of the classical law 
 
Under the classical conception, the existence of contract relies on the mutual intention of its 
parties to enter into an agreement. An important implication is that the interpretation, 
construction and implication of a contract are isolated from external standards of fairness, 
justice or reasonableness.  It is rather governed by the parties’ common intention. This means 
that the parties are completely free to set every aspect related to the contract (its terms, 
content, price and subject matter). The dominant assumption of the classical law is that 
parties are more aware of their own interests.  Parties are expected to calculate all the relevant 
risks and future contingencies before entering into an agreement. However, once an 
agreement has been made, it is then binding and it becomes entirely irrelevant if it turns out 




Atiyah points out that there are underlying presuppositions of the classical law of contract 
that are usually not made explicit but are of great significance. First, there is the assumption 
that the law of contract is based on the intention of the parties rather than their actions. 
Second, the court role is assumed to be limited to encouraging parties to perform their 
contracts rather than settling disputes. Third, contract law is conceived as a general law of 
contract rather than a fragmented law of contracts; all sorts of transactions are governed by 




Overall, contracts in the nineteenth century were used as a vehicle to jointly promote 
autonomy and rational planning. This is done by respecting the parties’ free choices and by 
channelling the parties towards performance (parties in breach are held responsible for letting 
down their fellow contractors). To put this in place, classical contract law serves autonomy 
by adapting the principle of the freedom of contract and promotes rational planning by 
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2.1.1.1 Freedom of contract 
 
The slogan of freedom of contract was attached with significance importance in the 
nineteenth century law of contract.  This is illustrated by the famous quote of Sir George 
Jessel in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson: 
 
‘If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider that you 




The concept of freedom of contract is said to have a double meaning. It contains a positive 
element in the sense that contractors have the right to act as private legislators.  They possess 
the power to make contracts binding upon themselves and to choose the terms and conditions 
of their agreement.
42
 Consequently, compulsory contract and other imposed duties are ruled 
out.
43
 It also contains a negative element in that parties are free from any obligation unless 
they have consented to it. The idea of consent was often extended to mean no liability 
without contract.
44




The concept of freedom of contract is said to rest on two key ideologies. The first is the 
economic model of the free market ideology. The intellectual setting of this idea is associated 
with Adam Smith and David Ricardo and other market economists.
46
  Certainly, the evolution 
of the classical model of contract was significantly influenced by classical economists and 
philosophical radicals.
47
 The market individualism ideology facilitates competitive exchange 
rather than simple exchange. As a result, restraints on the market are kept to the minimal 
level. Bargains on the market are only subject to practices such as fraud, mistakes and 
coercion. As a result of the market being a competitive place, parties are not expected to 
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The second ideology is liberalism, which is thought to be closely related to the freedom of 
contract. The freedom of contract is part of a reform movement that was linked to the 
political movement towards democracy. The reforms of the 1830s proclaimed a belief that 
people could be trusted to look after their own interests.
49
 Parties are held to be the best 
judges of their own interests, thus, they must be left free to choose contract terms that suit 




In a libertarian state the law is meant to maximise the liberty of individual citizens and 
encourage self-reliance. Contract law is an effective way to ensure these aims through 
facilitating legal agreements without intervening with regard to terms that have been freely 
chosen by individuals.
51
 Parties who agree on a contact are in fact exercising the lawmaking 
power delegated to them by parliament to make a private legislation that binds them. 
Therefore, the only reason parties become bound by a contract is that they consented to it, 
which makes it sacrosanct in the eyes of the law.
52
 In addition, by limiting the power of the 
state under the banner of freedom of contract, the law of contract represents the theory of the 
legitimacy of state power. Generally, the classical conceptual framework of the law of 
contract is focused on individuals’ voluntary choices. Accordingly, the law of contract is 




2.1.1.2 Sanctity of contract  
 
The principle of sanctity of contract is highly related to the freedom of contract. The two 
principles complement each other, where the core idea of freedom of contract is there to 
assert not imposing any unnecessary restraints on trade, sanctity of contact asserts that parties 
are held to their bargains. The application of the principle of sanctity of contract in a legal 
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system stands against paternalistic relief of contract by the court when the party is trying to 
avoid the consequences of his bargain. Relief from performance is highly restrained by the 




Regarding contracts as sacred was a normal consequence of the special attention placed on 
them by the classical philosophers and jurists’ manifestation and extension of an individual’s 
freedom through contract. Contract in the classical period gained a prominent place due to its 
role in promoting individual freedom with which the nineteenth-century jurists and political 




2.1.1.3 The classical concept of contractual justice 
 
Judges in the classical period were only concerned with the individualist nature of contracts. 
The role of the law was limited to protecting and enforcing bargains that have been freely 
agreed upon. Therefore, the fairness of a bargain that has been freely made would not be 
questioned by courts. As long as an agreement is represented by an agreed exchange judges 
will have no interest in its substance.  
56
Consent is the only way to create contractual 
obligation, thus, it is not for the courts to impose terms in a contract that parties never agreed 
upon.
57
 Thus, in classical theory contractual fairness is procedurally oriented rather than 
substantively oriented.
58
  As a result, intervention into parties’ autonomy is strict and limited 
to procedural doctrines of duress and undue influence.
59
 Such intervention is justified as 
correcting a lack of contractual freedom. Traditional equity doctrines of duress and undue 
influence are designed for the purpose of correcting lack of contractual freedom rather than 




As a result, plain foolishness or a remarkably low or high price would not be a basis for 
judicial intervention, yet deception would be. Parties are trusted according to the classical 
view to take care of their own interests and they are expected to know what is best for them. 
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This is known as Caveat emptor - let the buyer beware, which asserts individual 
responsibility.
61
 This approach has resulted in keeping supervision over contract terms to a 
minimal level. Grounds of unreasonableness and unfairness would never be invoked to claim 




Being governed by liberal ideas does not necessarily mean that contractual fairness is 
irrelevant to the classical conception of contract. The classical law of the nineteenth century 
proclaimed its fairness. It is rather that it follows a special kind of thinking.
63
 Classical law of 
contract is, according to Lord Devlin, based on the assumption that free dealing is fair 
dealing.
64
 This must not be taken to mean that judges in the classical period were indifferent 
to public interest. But rather they simply thought that, in nearly all cases, it was in the public 
interest to enforce private contracts.  Their assumption was based on the economic thinking 
that prevailed in the nineteenth century.
65
 Nineteenth-century economists saw in classical 
contract model what they felt was both admirable and applicable far beyond the commercial 
sphere. They believed this model to be desirable in that it encourages individuals to take 
control over their lives. People are encouraged to make definite plans and aim for particular 
goals. It is a natural right for mankind to develop their skill and ambitions and an accepted 




Furthermore, contracts are regarded to be a fundamental social regulator rather than being 
merely a tool to arrange short-term relations.
67
 Freedom of contract is an element that is 
embedded in the Victorian interpretation of market order. It is a result of a deep faith in the 
justice of an order of wealth and power established through exchange relations. This stems 
from the belief that the market order establishes equality in place of social hierarchy and 
reciprocity instead of exploitation. The idea of equality is respected by the market order. The 




                                                          
61
 Howells and Weatherill (n 5) 15 
62
 Beatson and Friedman (n 42)  3-24 
63
 Collins, The Law of Contract (n 43) 23 
64
 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Liberty Fund Edition 1965) 47 
65
 Atiyah and Smith (n 35) 9-20 
66
 Atiyah ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (n 39) 10-56 
67
 Atiyah, The Rise and Fall (n 32) 292-304 
68
 Baker (n 47) 
34 
 
This is different from social orders that distribute wealth and power by reference to social 
status, political power, physical force or moral wealth. Being dependent on the success in 
trading, the regime of contract law that is based on market order imposes a great social 
levelling. Equality within the conception of market order is concerned with formal equality 
and a narrow view of equality of opportunity rather than equal distribution of wealth. 
According to the narrow view of equality each individual is permitted the same set of rights 
to enter an agreement and to own property. Apart from some exceptions related to children, 
the insane, and more controversially married women, the equality within the ideology insists 




Concerns in relation to monopoly or superior technical knowledge were not addressed within 
the classical ideology. The common belief was that, so long as the terms of an agreement 
have been freely agreed upon there is no danger that unjust positions of power would arise. 
Similarly, questions about the effects of equality of bargaining powers upon the terms of 
contracts and consequently, the nature of social relations created by them are ignored by the 
ideology. The position taken was that unjust power cannot arise within the framework of 
freely chosen agreement. Distribution of wealth, poverty and hardship were never a concern 





2.1.1.4 Classical intervention into parties’ autonomy 
 
While the general rule of the classical conception is that people must be bound by their free 
agreement, classical thinkers acknowledge this could occasionally result in unfairness and 
harshness. However, direct interference into parties’ autonomy is against the conceptual ideas 
of classical law.  In their search for a solution courts developed very interesting techniques. 
The most common technique was ‘implied terms’ whereby courts in very extreme cases 
would imply terms that were not expressed by the parties.
71
 Contractors could enter into a 
contract and fail to expressly state their terms. They could be relying on a background of 
previous dealings between the party in question, or common trade usage, local custom, or 
conveyancing practice. When a dispute arose between them regarding rights and duties, 
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courts were willing to consider implied terms by giving effect to the understood, but 




It is significant that the terms were not understood to be implied in the contract to promote 
standards of justice or fairness. It was rather meant to reflect the parties’ consent. Thus, in 
situation such as when terms are implied based on trade customs, this had to be strictly 
proved. The custom must be consistent and had to be more than a course of conduct or habit. 
Furthermore, it had to be shown that it was recognised as binding and intended to affect the 




Another technique used was the doctrine of ‘public policy’, which was restrictively applied.
74
 
Being harsh or grossly unfair was not sufficient to rule out a contract based on public 
policy.
75
 In addition, the doctrine of consideration was occasionally invoked to invalidate 
unfair contracts. An agreement is not enforced unless it has involved exchange; an exchange 
of counter-values must happen. The doctrine of consideration distinguishes between 
enforceable market transactions (resulting from bargain or exchange) and instances of 
expropriation, domination and exploitation. Nevertheless, the doctrine of consideration does 
not ensure an exact equivalent in the value of the exchanged. This comes from the idea that 
value depends on subjective appreciation. Thus, setting the value of consideration is 





In some situations a very limited intervention was allowed in order to ensure a competitive 
market. Legislations against combinations cartels and allied with the development of the 
doctrine of restraint of trade by the courts aimed to ensure a competitive market.
77
 However, 
the effectiveness of these techniques was very limited as they were highly restricted.
78
 
Therefore, instances of injustice resulting from foolishness and carelessness were tolerated, in 
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2.1.1.5 The process of transformation  
 
Before moving on to the modern period of the English law of contract it is necessary to look 
at the process of transformation. The transformation of the law is mainly effected by the level 
of commitment to the liberal approach presented by the principles of freedom and sanctity of 
contract. Atiyah devoted one of his major works The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract to 
describe the fluctuations in the belief in the freedom of contract that controlled the 
development of the English law of contract.
80
 The transformation of the law is linked to the 
social and economic developments as well as political movements that have underpinned the 
changes in legal thought. This section attempts to provide an overview of the social, political 
and economic changes that have affected the transformation of the law of contract, 
particularly in relation to the statue of freedom of contract. Understanding the factors that 
influenced the transformation of the law is essential to an understanding of how the current 
law of contract is shaped.  
 
2.1.1.5.1 Classical Period (1770-1870) 
 
This period is commonly described as the time when the classical law of contract and 
freedom of contract flourished.
81
 The spirit of individualism and of laissez faire were 
dominant in matters of contract.
82
 It is regarded as the classical period because it witnessed 
extensive development of legal doctrines and in the structure of contract law, which still 
underpin the modern law of contract. It involved change in the attitude of lawyers, and 
voluntary social cooperation was encouraged through the institution of contract law. The 





                                                          
79
 Collins, The Law of Contract (n 43) 24 
80
 See generally Atiyah, The Rise and Fall (n 31) 
81
 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) 35; Atiyah, The Rise and Fall (n 32) 219 
82
 Friedrich Kessler ‘The Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract Role of 
Compulsion in Economic Transactions’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629 
83
 See Furmston, Cheshire and Fifoot (n 31) 12; Kessler (n 82) 
37 
 
Additionally, most judges who were responsible for the creation of law during the classical 
period were influenced by contemporary thought more broadly.
84
 Theories of natural law 
were interpreted to mean that individuals possess unconditional rights to own property and 
consequently to make arrangements to deal with that property. The laissez-faire philosophy 
was interpreted to limit state interference in an individual’s activities as much as possible.  
The function of private law was limited to enforcing private arrangements upon which  
contracting parties had agreed.
85
 One of the most important features of the classical period is 
that contract law was governed by a general body of rules applicable to all contract types.
86
 
This era in the law of contract tended to be highly stable and predictable because parties were 




2.1.1.5.2 The period from 1870 to 1980  
 
In this period the freedom of contract started to decline gradually. The decline was associated 
with a reversion to paternalist thought led by parliament. The level of legislative interference 
into contracts by parliament grew in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
intellectual changes that occurred in this period of time can be summarised into three 
changes.  The first change is the decline of the idea that economic prosperity is brought about 
through free and voluntary exchange. The recognition of the issue of externalities in the 
market affected the way contract law was perceived,
88
 where externalities refers to the cost of 
exchange imposed on third parties.
89
 The problem of externalities was particularly relevant in 
relation to issues arising from England’s industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. 
Issues such as pollution, disease and dirty urban environments were commonly seen as 




The second change is a challenge to the idea that free and voluntary exchange brings about 
just results. In other words the perception of what constitutes justice of exchange changed. 
Particularly, an argument started to be made that having the choice to enter or not enter a 
contract does not provide any guarantee that contracts are free and voluntary in any 
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meaningful sense. This was associated with the emergence of the magnitude of consumer as a 
contracting party. Freedom of contract would become meaningless for an individual who 
lacks the skills to make basic contracts for food, clothing and employment. Furthermore, it 
began to be recognised that even if a contract was made freely and voluntarily this does not 
necessarily mean it is fair and just. The increased need for services which started to be 
regarded as essential, such as railways and public utilities, limited peoples’ freedom in 
choosing their contracting party. As a result, on many occasions, individuals as well as 
businesses had no real choice with respect to choosing their parties. In fact it has been 
suggested that in the period from 1870 to 1950 the British economy was characterised by 




The introduction of the standard-form contract had a significant role in the transformation of 
the law in the twentieth century. Businesses started to formulate contracts that could be used 
in every bargain dealing with the same product or service.
92
 The extensive use of standard-
form contracts raised concern over lack of choice due to the lack of consent within 
individually negotiated or custom-made terms.
93
 The lack of choice was not because people 
were forced to enter into an agreement but because if they wanted to do so they had no choice 
but to accept the standard-form terms that were often made on a take-it-or-leave it basis. For 
example, passengers were not forced to buy a train ticket, but if they wanted to do so they had 
no choice but to accept the terms and conditions imposed by the railways.
94
 This was 
applicable in many situations even if the sector was not controlled by a monopoly because 
terms and conditions offered by suppliers were in most cases identical. The situation in 
commercial relations was no different; standard contracts were used in most transactions, for 




In addition to this lack of choice, the problem of lack of understanding was recognised. Many 
individuals would have had a degree of choice that they could not benefit from due to their 
lack of understanding of the legal implications related to their choice. Standard-form 
contracts tended to impose exemptions and limitations clauses that aimed to protect suppliers 
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from any responsibilities that might arise.
96
 These clauses tended to be sophisticated and 





The above described changes of market operation have resulted in the creation of new legal 
doctrines and the introduction of new statutory rules within the law of contract. As a 
consequence of courts and tribunals being active in striking out anti-competitive practices 
such as cartels and exclusive trading arrangements, the doctrine of the restraint of trade was 
created. In response to the unfairness created by exclusion clauses courts developed the dual 
doctrines of fundamental term and fundamental breach.
98
 The intention of these two doctrines 
is to make a non-excludable liability for essential contractual obligations, not merely as a rule 
of construction but as a sustainable rule of law.
99
 Additionally, statutory competition laws 
were introduced in the long-term. In many situations public policy concerns were prioritised 
over freedom of contract. For instance, the House of Lords in Johnson v Moreton held, based 
on public policy, that agriculture tenants should remain bound by the protections conferred on 




More generally from an ideological prospective, outside the private law the most important 
change to occur in this period with regard to the decline in the freedom of contract was the 
rise of various institutions associated with the welfare state (e.g. government-funded 
education and medical care). This represented an obvious rejection of the idea that social 




The tendency towards protecting fairness and justice of contract resulted in three main 
developments. Firstly, on many occasions legislation interfered in order to specify the 
substance of parties ‘obligations. This legislation was primarily intended to protect the 
perceived weaker party. Hire-purchase legislation, for instance, passed rules to protect hirers 
from unfair treatments. Legislation was mainly passed to protect employees against 
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, tenant against landlords
103
and consumers against suppliers
104
. These rules 
focused on one party in the agreement and resulted in the creation of specific laws rather than 
general rules applicable to all contracts.   
 
Secondly, rules that aimed to protect contracting parties’ in general regardless of their 
positions were developed. This helped the creation of general rules, which in itself shaped the 
nature of contract law.
105
 This movement was spearheaded by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
of 1977. Although the Act mainly targeted consumer interests, it also gives judges the general 
authority to strike down unreasonable exemption clauses regardless of the category of 
contract. It contains a wide range of exclusory provisions and considers others under a 
reasonableness test.
106




Additionally, in this period the use of defences such as duress, undue influence and mistake 
were expanded. (e.g the concept of ‘economic duress’ was created along with the defence of 
‘mistake at equality’).
108
 However, despite the significant changes that occurred in this period 
they did not manage to satisfy all hopes. A duty to act in good faith and a general defence of 
unconscionability, for instance, were never created.
109
 It was even held that what 
distinguishes the twentieth century law of contract is the tendency to reject the nineteenth 





The third change is related to the way the law is undertaken. Many rules that in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries were explained as resting on the implied intention of the parties have 
subsequently been understood to be based on public policy that aims to reflect the interests of 
all parties. For example, the quality guarantee as set in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 that was 
held to rest on the implied intention of the parties in the eighteenth century, is believed in the 
twentieth century to ensure the fairness of the parties’ bargain. This is applicable to other 
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rules such as relief for frustration or mistake. The change in the way such rules are 
understood has consequently affected the way the rules are perceived by judges; they have 





2.1.1.5.3 The Contemporary period 
 
Two opposing trends characterise the period from 1980 onwards. The first to arise was a 
revival of the freedom of contract as known in the nineteenth century.
112
 This trend was part 
of a wider move in most Western democratic countries towards the resurgence of support for 
classical ideas of freedom of contract. The dissolution of the Soviet empire was one factor to 
contribute to this shift. More importantly, at the level of contract law, the new generation of 
pro-market economists and economist-lawyers were highly influential in driving this trend.
113
 
The ideas of this group were focused on the relationship between rules and their economic 





The widespread appearance of anti-competitive practices in the period around 1900-50 is 
specifically seen to be a major concern. The monopoly power enjoyed by the advantaged 
party was thought to be the underlying source of unfairness. Standard-form contracts on the 
other hand, were intended to avoid costly negotiated individualised terms. However, a 
problem arises when potential parties are forced to accept these terms because there is no 
other provider for the service or goods contracted for due to monopolistic power. Similarly, 




Competition is held to be the answer to the issue of lack of understanding of the exemption 
clauses and the issue of complexity of contractual terms. The logic followed is that profit 
margins in a competitive market are narrow, therefore, vendors are encouraged to not lose 
even small percentage of their customers, which makes them more worried about their 
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reputation. The concern about their reputation makes traders reluctant to impose unfair terms, 





Nevertheless, supporters of the liberal approach to the law of contract ignore the fact that 
many opportunities in the market are only available to a wealthy minority.
117
 Even those who 
acknowledge the problem share the belief that the best way to deal with it is away from the 
law of contracts through taxes or subsidy programmes. The general belief is that ‘contract 
law should focus on increasing the size of pie available for redistribution, and that is done by 




The second trend in the contemporary period is a continuation of the late nineteenth-century 
departure from the freedom of contract. Yet, new arguments were introduced to explain this 
position, which differ from those previously introduced. For example, the argument that 
consumers and small businesses usually suffer from inequality of bargaining powers when 
contracting with large commercial entities especially if the deal is done on the basis of 
standard-form contract, is replaced by new ideas. These new ideas offer a defence of market 




Economic justification of market intervention based on the idea of market failure has gained 
popularity in recent years. Economists have argued that the idea of the perfect market is 
unrealistic as a phenomenon rather than a theoretical or abstract ideal. The government thus 
should intervene into the market only to the extent of rectifying the failure.
120
 This stands 
against classical economic ideas that a free market is the perfect market. 
 
Furthermore, market intervention is linked to contract facilitation. The idea is that regulation 
can be used to increase the size of the market rather than protecting weaker parties. Law is 
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used as a tool to make contracts easier for people to conclude. For example, based on this 
logic, terms implied into contracts by legislation
121
 are explained on the grounds that it is 
more time and cost efficient then writing lengthy contracts. The same logic is true for other 
rules that intervene in the market. The ultimate aim of prohibiting unfair terms in modern 




A point of significant importance to the transformation of the law is related to the effect of 
European contract law. Since 1980 the most important regulatory legislation to be introduced 
has originated not from England but from the European Union (EU), most of which deals 
with consumer contracts. Consequently, English judges are forced to deal with principles 
novel to the English law and in contradiction to classical ideas of freedom of contract. 
Together all these trends have resulted in complex changes to the law of contract.
123
 The 
effect of opposing trends on the development of modern law will become clearer when the 
controversy surrounding the introduction of the notion of fairness into the law of contract is 
discussed, as it is below.  
 
2.1.1.6 The classical roots of modern law 
 
The Modern approach to contract is commonly defined as a counter point to the so-called 
‘classical law’ of contract. The classical law of contract is a body of doctrines, 
presuppositions and ideologies. Modern law of contract is different from classical law in its 
motivating ideals, its methods of legal reasoning and its sources of law. Nevertheless, the 
evolution in contract law was not driven by the invention of new principles of law but rather 
through reinterpretation and differentiation. Reinterpretation served to change the law either 
by redefining some of the basic concepts or by giving more value to classical principles. For 
instance, consideration, which is known as a classical concept, is given a new meaning. Also, 
legal doctrines such as estoppels or undue influence are given much more significant strength 
in order to override classical rules.
124
 Differentiation is done by excluding innovations from 
the canon of contract law, for example hiving off development in consumer law or 
employment contracts. The change in the law of contract can only be understood when the 
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2.2 Summary  
 
The first part of this chapter was devoted to the classical law of contract.  The classical 
English law of contract is bound by two primary principles; the freedom of contract and the 
sanctity of contract. The classical law of contract is of an individualist nature; the role of the 
law is limited to protecting and enforcing bargains that have been freely agreed upon. 
Contractual fairness under the classical conception is procedurally oriented. Classical law of 
contract is based on the assumption that free dealing is fair dealing. The court had no 
incentive to evaluate the substantive fairness of a contractual relation that had been freely 
concluded. The process of the transformation of the law of contract from its classical to the 
contemporary form was mainly affected effected by the level of commitment to the liberal 
approach. At one historical moment, the idea that the liberal approach is the best way to 
facilitates contract was dominant over legal thinking. The decline of this idea was the start of 
the transformation of the law in the nineteenth century when the efficiency of the liberal 
theory of contract started to be questioned. The acknowledgment of the classical period of the 
English law is essential for the understanding of the law of the modern law of contract as it 
represents its cornerstone. The modern law of contract is not driven by novel principles but 
rather through reinterpretation and differentiation of classical principles. Modern 
development of the law of contract is distinguished by the introduction of some elements of 
fairness and cooperation to the law of contract. The following discussion will be devoted to 
the analysis of the innovative notions of inequality of bargaining power, reasonableness, 
unconscionability and good faith into the law of contract. The discussion is focused on the 
evolution, meaning, effect and scope of these doctrines. This is done for the purpose of 
testing the extent to which the modern law of contract serves contractual justice.  
 
2.3 Modern law of contract 
 
The untraditional concepts of fairness and cooperation are understood to be a central theme 
for the changes in the modern law of contract.
126
 Novel notions of reasonableness and 
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fairness have been introduced to the law, and have brought about changes within it.  
However, the transformation of the law of contract is a matter of controversy both in relation 
to its occurrence and to its detail. Many legal texts deny changes in contract law. Their denial 
is supported by the methodology of economic analysis of law, which provides a new rationale 
for traditional principles of law in relation to efficiency and supplies reasoning for modern 




The transformation of the law is also a matter of controversy between those who 
acknowledge it, in relation to themes that underlay this evolution. Some scholars attribute the 
changes merely to increased concerns for consumer protection.
128
 Others see it in the 
differentiation between private agreements and commercial transactions.
129
 A third group 
claim that the transformation is presented by the shift in the values expressed by the law; the 





In tracing the transformation of the law of contract the focus will here be paid to fairness of 
exchange and control of contracting powers. Particularly, the extent to which the modern law 
of contract intervenes into parties’ autonomy will be emphasised. In doing so, the modern 
development of the traditional doctrines of duress and undue influence, including the 
establishment of the doctrine of economic duress, will be discussed. Furthermore, the 
introduction of fairness into the law of contract (inequality of bargaining power, 
unconscionability, reasonableness and good faith) will be reviewed. The discussion is 
focused on the evolution, meaning, effect and scope of these doctrines. The overall purpose is 
to evaluate the extent to which the English law of contract has succeeded in regulating 




Historically duress was recognised by the common law as involving actual or threatened 
violence to the person. It was closely associated with the legal control of criminal and 
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tortuous conduct. The operation of the doctrine was later restricted by the pressure 
requirement. Accordingly, the focus of the doctrine turned to the wrongfulness of the 
threatened conduct from the consequences to the coerced party.
131
 The essential elements of 
duress were established as early as the mid-thirteenth century.
132
 Early analysis of duress 
centred on the act of coercion itself and its effect on the victim in inducing fear. Common law 
required a ‘wrongful’ or an ‘unlawful’ act before it would provide redress for duress, but the 
presence of fear in the victim was relatively less important.
133
 The concept of duress in 
common law used to be a very narrow one that was restricted to actual or threatened physical 
violence to the person.
134
 English courts have had little difficulty in setting aside a contract on 
the ground of duress to person. Yet, they have had more difficulty in recognising the 




In the context of economic pressure, the doctrine of consideration was historically employed 
to regulate duress-type situations. In the sense that if somebody forces somebody else to pay 
him an amount of money, the promise is then unenforceable due to the absence of 
consideration. However, the role played by the doctrine of consideration in such situations is 
limited because of the rule that consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate.
136
 
Thus, the role of consideration in regulating duress-type has diminished.
137
 Duress in the 
common law of contract has the power of rendering the contract voidable.
138
 Coercion in the 
making of contract results in the victim of coercion being offered the remedy of setting the 




2.3.1.1Types of duress in common law  
 
Today, common law acknowledges three types of duress. The first type of duress is duress to 
person, which is fairly settled and of little controversy. It consists of actual violence or threat 
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to the claimant or to members of his family.
140
 It also includes creating threading 
environment, 
141
 or threat of imprisonment.
142
  To set an agreement aside on the basis of 
duress to person it only needs to be proved that threat was one reason why the contract was 
entered into.
143
 The number of cases of duress to person in English courts has been very 




The second type of duress is duress to goods (or duress to property). It consists of a threat to 
seize another’s property or to damage it.
145
 The development of duress to goods was 
hampered in 1840 by the case of Skeate v Beale,
146
 when it was held that an unlawful 
takeover of another’s property does not amount to duress. This decision was heavily criticised 
in the literature.
147
 Occidental Worldwide Investment v Skibs also refused to follow it.
148
 
Mckendrick confidently predicts that Skeate v Beale will not be followed today and that 
duress to goods can, in an appropriate situation, form the basis of claim for relief.
149
 The 
development of economic duress (discussed below) and in the statement of Lord Goff in 
Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation, the Evia Luck
150
, 
when he explained that the limitation in Steate v Beale was that only coercion to the person 
amounts to relief under duress had been ‘discarded’ and as such there is ‘evidence that duress 
to goods still form a basis for claim to relief.
151
 Treitel suggests that duress of goods is now 
seen as a particular instance of the border concept of economic duress so the test is the same 




The third type of duress is economic duress; it consists of using superior power in an 
‘illegitimate’ way in order to coerce the other contracting party to agree to a particular set of 
terms.
153
 The doctrine was formally applied for the first time in England in the case of 
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Occidental Worldwide Investment v Skibs.
154
 In relation to this case, Kerr J canvassed the 
idea that mere economic duress might render a contract voidable, and this has consequently 
been affirmed in many cases.
155
 The most common instance of economic duress is the threat 
by one party to break a contract unless the other party agrees to its variation, or 
compromise.
156
 In the following section the doctrine of economic duress will be examined on 
account of its significance in the modern law of contract, and in acknowledgement of the fact 
that the doctrine is a late development in common law, which makes it subject to change. 
 
2.3.1.2 Economic duress establishment 
 
Lord Scarman attempted to establish the essential requirements of economic duress in Pao 
On v Lau Yiu Long. He identified two essential conditions for the operation of the doctrine. 
There needs to be (1) ‘coercion of the will that vitiates consent’ and; (2) ‘illegitimate’ 
pressure or threat.
 157
 These requirements have subsequently been developed by case-law; in 
the Evia Luck case Lord Goff pointed out that the claimant needs to prove that the pressure 
applied was a ‘significant cause’ inducing him to enter into the contract.
158
 The three 
requirements of economic duress (compulsion, pressure and causation) will be discussed 
below. 
 
2.3.1.2.1 The requirement of compulsion 
 
Typically the first point to be established by the court in an economic duress claim is whether 
or not the agreement was compelled.  In doing so courts rely on the absence of consent by the 
victim of duress. In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long Lord Scarman stated that economic duress 
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However, the traditional formula that there must have been ‘coercion to the will of the 
victim’ has long been recognized as being technically incorrect.  Atiyah explains that the 
main difficulty in the ‘coercion of the will’ theory is that duress does not deprive a person of 
all choice. A victim of duress is rather left with a choice between evils.
160
  It is even held that 
in some sense the more extreme the threatened wrong and the concomitant desire of the 




Lord Goff in Evia Luck expressed similar doubts, pointing out that victims of duress know 
exactly what they are doing and submit intentionally.
 162
  Furthermore, in criminal law, the 
House of Lords has clearly indicated that the defence of duress does not depend on the 
absence of a voluntary act, but rather upon an intentional action in the face of no other 
practical alternative.
163
 It is suggested that the same must be true in contract; and thus release 
on the grounds of duress must not be made on the absence of consent but rather on the fact 
that victim had no other realistic option available other than to agree. This line of reasoning is 




Lords Diplock and Scrman submitted in Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, that duress in contract law does not involve the destruction 
of will but intentional submission of the inventible.
165
 In the light of this debate Poole 
observes that the first requirement of duress has been reformulated to be ‘no realistic choice’ 




This is evident in case law. For example in Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd it was 
held that threats to withhold deliveries when under a contractual obligation to use best 
endeavours to prevent delay, amounted to illegitimate threats and that it was unrealistic to 
expect the other party to seek a mandatory injunction.
167
 Thus, it seems the focus of duress 
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2.3.1.2.2 The legitimacy of pressure 
 
In a claim of economic duress it is necessary to prove the existence of pressure or threat. 
However, there could be some sense in saying that all contracts have been entered into under 
pressure. A party to a contract could threaten to withhold the contracted goods unless the 
contract price is paid. The right to withhold from another the goods he desires until she pays 
the price demanded is usually described as ‘freedom of contract’ but yet nevertheless 
amounts to pressure. It is submitted that pressure in contract has always existed, especially in 
commercial relations. Thus, the question is not simply whether the agreement was entered 




Therefore, the role of the court is not to search for pressure but to distinguish between 
agreements that are the result of mere ‘commercial pressure’ and those which are the 
consequence of unfair exploitation.
170
 In DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA 
Dyson J stated that ‘illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from the rough and tumble of 
the pressures of normal commercial bargaining’.
171
 It is of great significance to the doctrine 




Nevertheless, in the context of economic duress, there seems to be no definitive test of 
legitimacy of the pressure produced by the court. Generally, courts tend to consider unlawful 
act threats as being illegitimate.
173
 In R v A-G for England and Wales Lard Hoffman stated 
that: 
 
‘Generally speaking, the threat of any form of unlawful action will be regarded as 
illegitimate. On the other hand, the fact that the threat is lawful does not necessarily make the 
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pressure legitimate. As Lord Atkin said in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797, 
806:  
The ordinary blackmailer normally threatens to do what he has a perfect right to do-namely, 
communicate some compromising conduct to a person whose knowledge is likely to affect 





Accordingly, there seems to be two approaches to illegitimate pressure. First, unlawful 
threats, which generally amount to duress, such as the threat to commit a crime, a tort or a 
breach of contract. Second, there could be duress in cases where lawful threat is used to 
support unlawful demands.
175
 So, the general rule is that a person who threatens to do what 
he is entitled to do will not be held to have applied illegitimate pressure. 
 
Thus, in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (GB) Ltd the refusal to waive existing 
contractual obligations was not taken to constitute duress because of the absence of wrongful 
threat.
176
 Also, in Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd v Royscot Trust plc the demand for payment by the 
owner of goods (who has validly terminated a hire-purchase contract) as the price for not 
exercising his right to repossess the goods has also been held not to constitute duress.
177
 
Hence, in the same sense a threat to refuse to contract should not accordingly constitute 
duress, because the absence of obligation to enter into contract means that no wrongful threat 
is made in refusing to contract.
178
 Yet, Lord Hoffmann observes that it is necessary to extend 
the category of illegitimacy to include the case of blackmail (as an exception), where the 
threat is lawful but used to attain unlawful goals.
179
 However, although there are cases where 
the pressure is said to take the form of a threatened breach of contract, not all cases amount to 
the application of illegitimate pressure. It is concluded that only breaches of contract in bad 




An important point to be made here is that English courts in the context of economic duress 
are shifting away from the consent test (explained above), and are putting more emphasis on 
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the nature of the pressure. This has led to the conclusion that a threat to break a contract can 
constitute duress, whereas a refusal to waive an existing contractual obligation cannot. 
Although this sounds conceptually perfect it could on occasion be difficult to apply in 
practice. One of the most difficult examples identified is related to the question of whether or 
not the party applying the pressure is threatening to break the contract, or whether he is 




Burrows suggests that bad faith must be taken into consideration when deciding on the 
legitimacy of a threat.
182
 A ‘threatened breach of contract should be regarded as illegitimate if 
concerned to exploit the claimant’s weakness rather than solving financial or other problems 
of the deferent’ threat must not be considered illegitimate (made in bad faith) if the threat is a 
reaction to circumstances that almost constitute frustration or if it merely correct what was 






In the Evia Luck case Lord Goff pointed out that in claims of economic duress the claimant 
needs to prove that the pressure applied was a ‘significant cause’ inducing him to enter into 
the contract.
184
 So, in economic duress the test applied is a restricted one; it needs to be 
proved that the agreement would not have been made at all on the terms it was in fact 
made.
185
 By contrast, in duress to person, it only needs to be proved that the threat was one 
reason why the contract was entered into.
186
 The test applied by the court for the purpose of 
ensuring that there is a sufficient causal link between the pressure applied by the defendant 




A claimant must overcome a serious hurdle to prove a claim of economic duress, however, it 
is held that the significance of this hurdle is not entirely clear. A point that it is likely to be 
considered by the court in distinguishing the causation is whether or not there was an 
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alternative open to the claimant.
188
 In  Huyton SA v Peter Cremer Gmb H & Co Inc, Mance J 
stated that while it was ‘not necessary to go so far to say that it is an inflexible third essential 
ingredient of economic duress that there should be no practical alternative course open to the 
innocent party’, it seems…‘self-evident that  relief may not be appropriate, if the innocent 
party decides, as a matter of choice not to peruse an alternative remedy which any and 
possibly some other reasonable persons in his circumstances would have pursued’.
189
 It is for 




2.3.2 Undue influence 
 
The doctrine of undue influence is said be an equitable doctrine that emerged separately from 
common law duress. It functions to release parties from a contract that they have entered into 
as a result of being influenced by the other party. The difficulty of identifying the limits of 
legitimate persuasion has always been associated with the doctrine of undue influence. For 
instance, saying that persuading, cajoling or encouraging people to enter into an agreement is 
impermissible would result in the job of sale representative jobs’ being unlawful. Thus, 





2.3.2.1 The nature of undue influence  
 
The word undue has two potential meanings. It can be used to indicate some impropriety on 
the part of the influencer or as an indication of the level of influence, in the sense that 
influence has reached a level where the influenced party has lost his contractual autonomy.
192
 
There are two main approaches to this matter. The first approach views the doctrine as being 
claimant-sided. So, the focus is placed upon the claimant’s position. The court will give 
release based on undue influence if the claimant’s decision was made by excessive reliance or 
dependence on the defendant.
193
 By contrast, the defendant-sided approach requires wrongful 
conduct on the part of the defendant. A court that follows this approach will base its decision 
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on the existence of ‘abuse’ of a position of confidence, the ‘exploitation’ of the weaker party 




Courts do not seem, yet, to be committed to one approach over the other. Generally, it is 
observed that most cases of undue influence contain an element of ‘wrongful’ conduct on the 
part of the defendant, which takes the form of an act of exploitation or taking advantage of 
the claimant’s vulnerability. In the House of Lord’s decision on Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge, a defendant-focused approach was adopted, with emphasis placed on the abuse of 
position of influence.
195
 In R v A-G for England and Wales Lord Hoffmann has given the 
analysis of undue influence a strong defendant-focus by drawing an analogy with duress and 
emphasising the need for ‘unacceptable means’ and ‘unfair exploitation’.
196
 Similarly, Lord 
Millett in National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) Ltd v Hew stated that:  
 
‘Undue influence is one of the grounds on which equity intervenes to give redress where 
there has been some unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant … the doctrine 
involves two elements. First, there must be a relationship capable of giving rise to the 





Furthermore, in Davies v AIB Group (UK) plc Norris J stated that undue influence ‘does not 
protect against folly, but against victimisation’ and that it has a ‘connection of 
impropriety’.
198





However, the courts’ position is not consistent and in some instances a mixed approach that 
gives rise to both positions (defendant and claimant-sided) has been adopted.
200
 More 
importantly, according to Briks the fact that courts, in most cases of undue influence, have 
established an element of wrongful doing on the part of the defendant does not rule out the 
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possibility of establishing undue influence without having to establish such conduct.
201
 He 
cites the Court of Appeal decision in Hammond v Osborn, where it was enough to render the 
gift voidable as not being ‘the product of full, free and independent violation.’
202
 This falls in 
line with the statement of Mummery LJ in Pesticcio v Huet: 
 
‘Although undue influence is sometimes described as “equitable wrong” or even as species of 
equitable fraud, the basis of the court’s intervention is not the commission of a dishonest or 
wrongful act by the defendant, but that, as a matter of public policy, the presumed influence 
arising from the relationship of trust and confidence should not operate to the disadvantage of 
the victim, if the transaction is not satisfactorily explained by ordinary motive: Allcard v 
Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 171. The court scrutinises the circumstances in which the 
transaction, under which benefits where conferred on the recipients, took place and the nature 
of the continuing relationship between the parties, rather than any specific act or conduct on 
the part of the recipient. A transaction may be set aside by the court, even though the action 
and the conduct of the person who benefits from it could not be criticised as wrongful.’
203
     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2.3.2.2 Undue influence classification 
 
The essential classifications of undue influence were distinguished by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien. He explained that the doctrine of undue influence 
consist of two classes. Class 1 (actual undue influence) includes cases where the claimant 
must prove the exercise of actual undue influence by the defendant, which resulted in him 
(the claimant) entering into the transaction. In class 2 (presumed undue influence) a 
relationship of trust and confidence is required. Class 2 is subdivided into class 2A cases, 
where it has been authoritatively decided that a certain relationship raises the presumption of 
confidence (such as solicitor/client, trustee/beneficiary, and doctor/patient). Class 2B 
involves other relationships where the claimant must prove on the facts that the necessary 
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2.3.2.2.1 Actual undue influence 
 
This consists of cases where one party has induced the other to enter into a contract by actual 
pressure that equity regards as improper but which did not involve an element of violence to 
person, and was formally thought not to amount for duress at common law. For example, a 
party could agree to pay money because he was threatened by the other party to be or by one 
of his close relatives, or his spouse prosecuted for a criminal offence. Today such case would 
now constitute duress. Thus, there is an overlap between cases of undue influence and 
common law duress.
205
 Lord Nicholls in Etridge
206
 illustrated that actual undue influence 
cases ‘comprise overt acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats’ which 
results in ‘much overlap with the principle of duress as this principle has subsequently 
developed.’  
 
To make a claim of actual undue influence the existence and exercise of such influence needs 
to be proved, along with evidence that the transaction was a consequence of that influence. 
Yet, it need not to be proved that the transaction is of obvious disadvantage to the claimant
207
 
or be one which ‘calls for explanation’ by the other party.
208
 In distinguishing the causation 
link the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody applied 
a ‘but-for’ test, which means it is not sufficient to prove the existence of undue influence to 
set a transaction aside but rather it needs to be proved that the victim of influence ‘on balance 




The ‘but-for’ test was subsequently rejected by the Court of Appeal in UCB Coaprate 
Services v Williams
210
 as being inconsistent with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement of 
principle in the CIBC Mortgages v Pitt case that the victim of the influence is entitled to have 
the transaction set aside ‘as of right’.
211
 So, it needs to be proved only that the undue 
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In CIBC  Mortgages v Pitt it was held that it is not a requirement in cases of actual undue 
influence that the transaction is disadvantageous to the victim;  a person is entitled to have a 
contract set aside if they have been bullied into making it, even if the contract was in 
somehow beneficial for him.
213
 This brings the causation test of actual undue influence in line 
with duress to person. As a result, the burden of proof is on the stronger party to show that 




2.3.2.2.2 Presumed undue influence  
 
There are three stages within a case of presumed undue influence.
215
 First, it needs to be 
proved that trust and confidence were placed by the plaintiff in the defendant in relation to 
the management of the affair. In the case of some relationships the law presumes the 
existence of a relationship of trust and confidence (class 2A), and the relationships that give 
raise to influence were identified by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge. 
It takes the form of a relationship ‘where one party is legally presumed to repose trust and 
confidence in the other’. As Lord Nicholls put it:  
 
‘the law has adopted a sternly protective attitude towards certain types of relationship in 
which one party acquires influence over who is vulnerable and dependent […] In these cases 
the law presumes, irrebuttably, that one party had influence over the other. The complainant 
need not prove he actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party. It is sufficient for 




This category of relationship includes parent/child, guardian/ward, trustee/beneficiary, 
doctor/patient, solicitor/client and religious adviser/disciple. Yet, the relationship of   
husband/wife is not included. These relationships are ones in which the party has placed  
confidence and trust in the other party, to the level that he/she acts on the other’s suggestions 
without thinking that they should seek independent advice.  It is said that other relationships 
(except for that of husband/wife), which have these characteristics could be added to the list 
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  In cases of relationships outside this category (class 2B), the claimant must 
prove that she placed trust and confidence in the defendant. If this was proven than any 
disadvantageous transaction entered into through the influence of the dominant party will 
constitute prima facie evidence of abuse to the claimant’s trust and confidence. This shifts the 




In the second stage, the claimant must prove that the contract ‘calls for explanation’. This 
concept was formerly referred to as ‘manifest disadvantage’
219
 but Lord Nicholls in Etridge 
illustrated that ‘experience […] has shown that this expression [i.e manifest disadvantage] 
can give raise to misunderstanding’ and has been ‘causing difficulty’.
 220
 He returned to the 
original test adopted by Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner to point out that a small gift made for 
a person falling within one of the presumed category of influence would not be enough in 
itself to set the contract aside: 
 
It ‘would be absurd for the law to presume that every gift by a child to a parent, or every 
transaction between a client and his solicitor or between a patient and his doctor, was brought 
about by undue influence unless the contrary is affirmatively proved. Such a presumption 
would be too far-reaching. The law would be out of touch with everyday life if the 
presumption were to apply to every Christmas or birthday gift by a child to a parent, or to an 
agreement whereby a client or a patient agrees to be responsible for the reasonable fees or his 
legal or medical adviser. The law would be rightly open to ridicule, for transactions such as 
these are unexceptionable. They do not suggest that something may be amiss. So something 




Accordingly, transactions that amount to undue influence are the sort of transaction that the 
claimant would not have entered into in normal circumstances. One indication would be 
when the transaction provides no benefit to the victim of undue influence. Therefore, when 
there is a relationship that falls within the categories of presumed undue influence and the 
transaction happened to be not one that falls within the range of normal incident of such a 
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relationship, there will be held to be an interference of undue influence. It will be then up to 




In the third stage of presumed undue influence the defendant usually attempt to disapprove 
the assumption of undue influence that has arisen on the grounds of proof by the claimant of 
the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence and a transaction which requires 
explanation.
223
 There is no specific way to prove that the claimant entered the transaction 
independently.  But this is usually done by showing that the claimant received independent 
legal advice before entering into the transaction.
224
 Yet, this may not be sufficient to dismiss 
the assumption of undue influence, as explained by the Privy Council in Attorney General v 
R,
225
 which established that the adequacy of the advice needs to be considered. It is not 
sufficient for the defendant to show that there had been no wrongdoing on her part
226
 nor to 




2.3.3 Inequality of bargaining power 
 
The concept of inequality of bargaining power as a legal doctrine is a relatively new 
invention. The disparities of bargaining power were first noticed in the late nineteenth 
century in relation to the perceived abuses of laissez faire economic regulation and Lochner-
era freedom of contract doctrine. The notion of inequality of bargaining power was first 
invoked in relation to labour disputes; it was not until the 1930s that it was recognised as a 
legal doctrine applicable to contract in general.
228
 Modern law of contract, unlike classical 
law, recognises that dealers in the marketplace do not always enjoy the same bargaining 
strength.
229
 Thus, the relative bargaining strength of the contracting parties is made relevant 
in many situations by modern law of contract.  However, no general doctrine of inequality of 
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2.3.3.1 The rise of concerns 
  
In the 1960s concerns rose about the increased use of standard form contract especially in 
consumer relations.
231
 Particularly, the validity of exemption clauses was questioned by 
courts. The main concern about the exemption clause was related to its effect on the freedom 
of contract and the lack of choice imposed by it.
232
 The effect of the recognition of the idea of 
inequality of bargaining power on the doctrinal development of contract law can be 
summarised under three headings: (1) the differentiation between rules regulating consumer 
contracts and those regulating commercial relations; (2) the regulation of exclusion clauses; 
(3) other employments of the idea. 
 
2.3.3.1.1 Commercial and consumer contract separation 
 
In modern England as well as across Europe,
233
 contract law is typically classified into 
commercial and consumer contracts. Although distinct ideas have been introduced recently to 
explain such a classification,
234
 it is traditionally made on the basis of the relative bargaining 
strength of the parties.
235
 The disparity of contractors’ bargaining strength is widely accepted 
as justification for the separation of the two types of contracts.
236
 Parties to commercial 
contracts
237
 tend to be of an equal bargaining position. By contrast, parties to consumer 
relations negotiate from unequal bargaining positions. This disparity in power between the 
producer and consumer is due to the disparity of bargaining power, knowledge and resources 
between the two sides.
238
   
 
This differentiation between rules applicable to commercial and consumer relations is 
evidential in adjudication as well as in legislation.239 Regarding judicial recognition it is 
useful to consider the different positions taken by be the Court of Appeal regarding the 
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incorporation of standard form contracts in the commercial case of British Carne Hire Corpn 
v Ipswish Plant Hire Ltd240 and in the consumer case of Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) 
Ltd.241 Lord Denning stated in the former case that ‘The plaintiff [in Hollier] was not of equal 
bargaining power with the garage company which repaired the car. The conditions were not 
incorporated. But here the parties were both in the trade and were of equal bargaining 
power.’242  
 
In subsequent years, such a distinction gained legislative recognition through the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA 1977) and the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. These 
legislations have two streams: one deals with consumer relations and the other deals with 
commercial relations (the consumer part is now regulated by the Consumer Rights Act 2015). 
Moreover, there is legislation that is completely dedicated to the regulation of consumer 
relations such as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
243
(now replaced 
by the Consumer Rights Act 2015). 
 
2.3.3.1.2 Exclusion clauses regulation 
 
In addition to differentiation between commercial and consumer relations, the idea of relative 
bargaining power is employed in the statutory regimes, especially in relation to the regulation 
of exclusion clauses.
244
 Exclusion clauses started to appear in the nineteenth century, in 
association with concerns about its effect on the freedom of contract and the lack of choice 
imposed by it.
245
 Such clauses are usually included in standard form contracts that are made 
on a take-it-or-leave it basis, leaving the other party with very little choice. Parties who rely 
on exclusion clauses are typically given exemption from liabilities (in contract or tort) that 
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The first reaction of the contract law to improve the common law rules to address imbalance 
in bargaining power was taken by courts.
247
 When the use of exclusion and limitation clauses 
started to become widespread courts decided to deal with the lack of consent they imposed. 
However, to avoid clashes with the freedom of contract, courts adopted techniques that 
consisted mostly of ‘heightened’ application of those used for constructing and interpreting 
contracts.
248
 Formal rules related to the determination of the content of the contract and the 
scope of the clauses contained in it were used directly to police exclusion and limitation 




The issue of exclusion clauses was subsequently acknowledged by legislations in the 
twentieth century. This was primarily done through the Reasonableness test of the UCTA 
1977.
250
 The relative bargaining strength of the parties was made a relative consideration 
when reviewing the validity of exclusion clauses.  A in Schedule 2 of the UCTA 1977 makes 
the bargaining positions of the parties a relative consideration: ‘the strength of the bargaining 
positions of the parties relative to each other, taking into account (among other things) 
alternative means by which the customer’s requirements could have been met.’  
 
However, the purpose of the legislator requires explanation in relation to perceived inequality 
under the UCTA 1977. In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Lt Lord Wilberforce’s 
comments on the UCTA 1977 pointed out that ‘After this Act [ie UCTA], in commercial 
matters generally, when the parties are not of unequal bargaining power, and when risks are 
normally borne by insurance, not only is the case for judicial intervention undemonstrated, 
but there is everything to be said, and this seems to have been Parliament’s intention, for 
leaving the parties free to apportion the risk as they think fit and for respecting their 
decisions.’
251
 This statement could be understood, according to Brownsword, to uphold the 
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statement in the UCTA 1977 guidelines should not be taken as an invitation to discriminate 




On the contrary, a case-by-case approach was taken by the House of Lords in George 
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. It was acknowledged that commercial 
contractors generally negotiate from equal bargaining positions. Thus, the purpose of 
statutory guidance is to view the bargaining position in each particular case.
253
 The 
reasonableness test of the UCTA 1977 supports the view that in situations where parties are 
faced by take-it-or-leave-it sort of contracts, the bargaining positions of the parties become a 





2.3.3.1.3 Other employments of the idea of inequality of bargaining powers 
 
There is evidence that the notion of inequality of bargaining power has been stretched beyond 
consumer contracts and exclusion clauses. In Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v 
Macaulay, a young songwriter contracted on a standard form contract with a music 
publishing house, the agreement gave the publishing house the exclusive benefit of his 
compositions. It was to last for five years, during which time the music publishing house 
would have the right to terminate or assign the contract, but the claimant could not. 
According to the agreement the defendant is under no obligation to publish or promote any of 
the claimant’s songs. Macaulay claimed that the agreement was contrary to public policy. In 





Lord Reid’s response to the defendant’s argument was that in the relevant case there was no 
evidence that the contract was made freely by parties ‘bargaining on equal terms’ or 
‘moulded under the pressure of negotiation’.
256
 Lord Diplock pointed out that a distinction 
needs to be made between standard form contracts that have been negotiated by parties of 
relatively equal bargaining powers and on the other hand, standard forms that have not been 
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negotiated between parties but rather have been dictated by the party in superior bargaining 
position. The party in the strong position could be an exercised by one entity or unification 
with other provider of similar goods or services. In other words, when one party is able to 
say: ‘If you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are 
obtainable. Take it or leave it’, such a position clearly illustrates a classic situation of unequal 
bargaining powers.
257
 The approach of the case indicates that when a contract is an outcome 
of two-side negotiation, it is presumed that its terms are fair and reasonable. By contrast, 
when the contract is put to one side, the fairness and reasonableness of its terms are 
questioned. 
 
In Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy a security was taken from a father to secure his son’s 
indebtedness to the bank. The bank did not fully disclose the state of the son’s affairs. The 
contract was invalidated by the court; Lord Denning took the position that the case involves 
an obvious abuse of bargaining power. He made his famous statement suggesting a wider 
basis of inequality of bargaining power as the dispositive principle. He stated that it applies 
when a person's ‘bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or 
desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or pressures 




2.3.3.2 A general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power? 
 
In recent years there has been some controversy about the question of whether a doctrine of 
inequality of bargaining power exists in the English law of contract.
259
  The primary source of 
this controversy is the statement made by Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank v Bundy.
260
 He 
suggested that many of the traditional defences to contract enforcement, such as duress, 
undue influence, and breach of fiduciary duty are merely exemplary of a general doctrine of 
inequality of bargaining power. Trebilcock has also generalised the House of Lords’ 
reasoning in Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay to argue for a general principle 
of protection for the weaker parties in unequal bargains.
261
 However, scholars are now almost 
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in agreement that even if there has been a tendency towards the creation of a doctrine of 




Two cases have been cited to support this view: Pao On v Lau Yiu Long
263
 and National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan.
264
 In the former case, the parties entered into a contract 
under which the claimant sold a building for a share in the defendant’s company (as a 
consideration). It was agreed that the claimant is under obligation not to sell at least 60% of 
the share obtained in the first year to avoid loss in share value. The parties entered into a 
subsidiary agreement to cover the risk of the shares falling in the period of sale bar. The 
subsidiary agreement requires the defendant to buy back the share at the indemnity price in 
case the value of the share falls down. But it also allowed the latter to buy the shares at the 




The claimant had threatened not to complete the main contract for the purchase of shares 
unless the subsidiary agreement was cancelled and replaced by simple indemnity. The 
defendant was anxious to complete the main contract as there had been a public 
announcement of the acquisition of shares and he did not want to undermine public 
confidence in the company with the consequent effect on share prices. The claimant then 
sought to enforce the guarantee and the defendant sought to have the agreement set aside for 
economic duress. The argument was rejected, and the court concluded that ‘where 
businessmen are negotiating at arm’s length it is unnecessary for the achievement of justice, 
and unhelpful in the development of the law, to invoke such a rule of public policy, it would 
also create unacceptable anomaly’. Furthermore, ‘It is unnecessary because justice requires 
that men, who have negotiated at arm’s length, be held to their bargains unless it can be 
shown that their consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress. If promise is induced by 
coercion of man’s will, the doctrine of duress suffices to do justice.’ Thus the doctrine would 
be unhelpful ‘because it renders the law uncertain’ and ‘it would become question of fact and 
degree to determine in each case whether there had been, short of duress, unfair use of strong 
bargaining position’. The adaptation of a doctrine of inequality of barging powers would also 
create an unacceptable anomaly because such a doctrine would render a contract void: ‘it 
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would be strange if conduct less than duress could render a contract void, whereas duress 




The situation in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan is very similar to the one in Lloyds 
Bank v Bundy mentioned before. A bank manager came to Mrs Morgan’s house to get her to 
sign a charge, which was going to refinance Mr Morgan’s business. She had no independent 
advice. Mrs Morgan argued that the agreement had been obtained by undue influence.  Lord 
Scarman, rejecting a general principle, held that ‘the doctrine of undue influence has been 
sufficiently developed not to need the support of a principle which by its formulation in the 
language of the law of contract is not appropriate to cover transactions of gift where there is 
no bargain […] and even in the field of contract I question whether there is any need in the 
modern law to erect a general principle of relief against inequality of bargaining power. 
Parliament has undertaken the task - and it is essentially a legislative task - of enacting such 
restrictions open freedom of contract as are in its judgement necessary to relief against the 
mischief: for example the hire-purchase and consumer legislation of which the Supply of 
Goods (Imply Terms) Act 1973, Consumer Credit Act and Companies Act 1982 are 





2.3.3.3 The current approach 
 
It has been illustrated that the ideas of relative bargaining strength and inequality are 
employed in many situations in modern contract law. Although its emergence in English 
contract law was in the context of a coalescence of concerns about standard form contracts, 
exemption and limitation clauses, it has subsequently moved towards creating a general 
doctrine of inequality of bargaining powers to cover all sorts of contractual situations, 
including commercial relations. 
 
Rejecting a general doctrine of inequality of bargaining powers, Lord Scarman in National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan pointed out that contractual reliefs against equality of 
bargaining powers are best left to Parliament.
268
 But the question to be raised here is whether 
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a modern stream of modern consumer protection legislation is an adequate response to the 
lack of balance between contractors? Here Lord Scarman is assuming that the legislation has 
dealt with all potential situations of inequality of bargaining power. This is based on an 
assumption that outside of the legislative scheme parties are negotiating at arm’s length. 
However, the truth is that there are many situations of inequality of contractual power that are 
not regulated by the Parliament: for example, the situation of small companies contracting 
with a large and powerful company. Such situations are left without solution in the absence of 




2.3.4 Unconscionability  
 
Unconscionability as a doctrine has long been known in the common law of contract. As 
early as the mid-seventeenth century, the common law recognized the courts’ power to refuse 
to enforce contracts that overstep accepted bounds of public policy. However, the call for 
bringing unconscionability away from public policy analysis is relatively new.
270
 
Unconscionability is recognised as a general legal doctrine in other jurisdictions within the 
common law.
271
 Nevertheless, the development of such principle under English law is faced 
by the hurdle of traditional doctrines of freedom and sanctity of contract. The common law 
traditional principle that ‘consideration need not to be adequate’ reflects the fact that courts 
are not concerned about the ‘comparative values of exchange.’ Yet, such an attitude has 
changed in the contemporary law.
272
 However, does the principle of unconscionability in 
itself constitute grounds for intervention in the English law of contract? 
 
2.3.4.1 The recognition of the doctrine of unconscionability   
 
The first instance where an English court recognised the principle of unconscionability was in 
Fry v Lane. The case involved setting aside a contract that was made on the basis of a 
considerable undervaluation and without independent advice against a ‘poor and ignorant 
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. The principle was subsequently expanded in Cresswell v Potter to involve old 
age.
274
  In Credit Lyonnais Bank v Burch, the principle was expanded to junior employees 




Nevertheless, as pointed out in Boustany v Pigott, the key element of the unconscionability 
principle is not the agreement being unreasonable or unfair but rather the abuse of the 
position in the relationship. In other words, unconscionability is not yet in itself a ground for 
intervention in the English law of contract.
276
 On this basis, to be able to rule out a contract 





Indeed, in Kalsep Ltd v X-Flow it was explained that in order to set a contract aside on the 
basis of unconscionability, more than just improvidence needs to be proved. Pumferey J 
stated that ‘it is necessary to prove impropriety, and that is to say not merely harshness but 
impropriety, both in the terms of the agreement and in the manner in which the agreement 
was arrived at.’
278
 In Greenwood Forest Products (UK) v Ltd v Roberts it was held that in 
order to set an agreement aside on the basis of unconscionability three requirements need to 
be satisfied: (1) one party has to suffer from disability or serious disadvantage; (2) the 
agreement has to be ‘overreaching or oppressive’; (3) the stronger party must have acted in 
an unconscionable manner.
279
 Therefore, it seems that unlike in other jurisdiction it is not 
enough to prove that a claim is unfair or unreasonable to set an agreement aside by the 
doctrine of unconscionability, ‘there must be procedural and substantive ‘impropriety’ which 
extend beyond mere unfairness.’
280
 Unconscionability is only one factor among others 
required to set an agreement aside. 
 
2.3.4.2 The link between unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power 
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The doctrine of unconscionability is closely linked to the inequality of bargaining power 
simply because bargaining power disparities are taken to be an indication of 
unconscionability.
281
 In other words, intervention is not based on the imbalance in a 
relationship but on the abuse and advantage-taking of that imbalance.
282
 In Director General 
of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc, under the former regulation of Unfair Terms of 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, unfairness was assessed by reference to procedural 
and substantive unfairness. It was linked with the concept of inequality of bargaining power 
and taking advantage of a superior position.
283
 However, as indicated above, unfairness or 
inequality of bargaining power is not sufficient to set an agreement aside, there needs also to 
be an element of ‘abuse.’  
 
2.3.4.3 Undue influence and unconscionability  
 
The doctrine of undue influence has been linked with unconscionability in many cases. The 
heavy requirements imposed on the doctrine of unconscionability, along with the fact that 
courts, as explained before, tend to emphasise the ‘wrongdoing’ of the stronger party in cases 
of undue influence, has led to a linking of the two doctrines in a number of cases.
284
 Various 
theses have been proposed in this regard. Capper argues that the two doctrines are sufficiently 
similar in their objectives and effects to the extent that they can be merged into one doctrine. 
According to him, a proper understanding of the doctrine of unconscionability leads to the 
conclusion that the doctrine of undue influence could be subsumed under it.
285
 A similar 




On the other hand, Birks and Chin have indicated that the two doctrines are very distinct. 
Undue influence is a claimant-sided doctrine concerned with the weakness in the claimant’s 
consent as a result of an excessive dependence upon the defendant. Unconscionability is 
defendant-sided and is concerned with the defendant’s exploitation of the claimant’s 
vulnerability.
287
 The difference between the two doctrines was emphasised in Portman 
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Building Society v Dusangh. It was held that the focus of the unconscionability principle is 
the abuse of position by the defendant, and as such no trust relationship is required. Undue 
influence, on the other hand, focuses on the reason why the claimant entered a contract and 
the relationship between parties.
288
 The statement of Mason J in the High Court of Australia 
in Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio was cited: 
 
‘Although unconscionable conduct in this narrow sense bears in resemblance to the doctrine 
of undue influence, there is a difference between the two. In the latter the will of the innocent 
party is not independent and voluntary because it is overborne. In the former, the will of the 
innocent party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous 





Nonetheless, according to Poole, the doctrine of unconscionability is likely to face 
difficulties. This is due to the fact that the courts’ requirement for unconscionability is 
difficult to satisfy and courts are more likely to find claims based on undue influence more 
conceptually certain and thus easier to satisfy.
290
 In supporting her argument she cites two 
cases. In Credit Lyonnais Bank v Burch, despite the fact that there was no plea of 
unconscionable bargain, the court set the agreement aside on the doctrine of undue 
influence.
291
 In Portman v Dusangh, there was no evidence of undue influence and the 
requirement of unconscionability was also missing.
292
 Indeed, the doctrine of 
unconscionability hardly forms a doctrinal limitation to contract formation. The heavy 
requirements of unconscionability make the court very unlikely to accept a claim based on 
unconscionability. Furthermore, as a result of the development of the doctrine of undue 
influence with respect to establishment of wrongdoing in undue influence, judges tend to base 
judgment on the better established doctrine of undue influence rather than unconscionability. 
 
2.3.5 Reasonableness  
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The idea of reasonableness was first introduced to the English common law as a 
supplementary principle. It was employed to fill the gap where the express terms of the 
contract fail to indicate parties’ intention:  for example, when the terms of the contract are 
vague or ambiguous, when the implication of terms is contested, or the contract is salient in 
some matters. Today reasonableness exceeded its initially status as a supplementary principle 




2.3.5.1 Reasonableness in modern law 
 
The principle of reasonableness is widely employed in the contemporary law of contract. It is 
imposed by legislation on several occasions and has a great effect on the rules and doctrinal 
formation of the modern law. A test of reasonableness is imposed by legislation through the 
UCTA 1977.
294
 It is set out under  section 11 (1) of UCTA 1977, that the test investigates in 
relation to exemption clauses if a certain clause is ‘fair and reasonable to be included, having 
regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made’. Moreover, in relation to the 
exercise of remedies, the innocent party’s rights are qualified by considerations of 
reasonableness, for example reasonable steps in mitigation are required and, under section 4 
of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, a commercial buyer’s right to withdraw for 
breach of statutory implied terms is lost if ‘the breach is so slight that it would be 
unreasonable […] to reject’. 
 
Reasonableness is also made a relevant qualification to rule formation, for example, some 
terms need to be incorporated by a reasonableness notice.
295
 Even in doctrine formation, 
reasonableness is a relevant qualification for a number of legal doctrines. It is introduced to 
the doctrine of restraint of trade as an avenue to soften its effect.
296
 Under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppels, binding adjustments to contracts are required to be reasonable.
297
 To 
plead the doctrine of economic duress, it needs to be shown that no reasonable alternative 
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other than to accede to the demand made, and steps of avoidance must be taken within 
reasonable time.
298
 Recourse to reasonable men abounds in disputes involving implied terms 
and frustration.
299
 However, the law of contract does not impose a general duty on contractors 




It seems that reasonableness notions have become the core of the modern law of contract. The 
law of contract has evolved from being intention-based, where the law endeavours to force 
contracts that have been freely made, to one that enforces only bargains that have been willed 
by reasonable contractors and those having reasonable characteristics.
301
 The contract law has 
passed through many stages in acknowledging reasonableness. Yet, the role of  
reasonableness in modern law  remains  limited simply because it is not imposed as a general 
principle, meaning that parties are not expected to act reasonably towards each other and 
prices need not be reasonable.
302
 In other words, the notion of reasonableness is by no means 
employed as a general limitation to the freedom of contract. 
 
2.3.5.2 Whose standards of reasonableness? 
  
The extensive employment of reasonableness in the modern law of contract raises a question 
about the sources of the standard of reasonableness. In other words, whether the notion in 
modern law reflects faith in the parties’ expectations or the courts’ standards of 
reasonableness. The answer to this question is that it probably differs according to the 
situation. In some situations, the incorporation of reasonableness is merely a reflection of the 
intention of the parties’. For example, the incorporation of terms by reasonable notice is a 
rule that is clearly articulated to make sure that the contractual rules reflect the parties’ 
understating. Another example of reasonableness reflecting parties’ expectations is found in 
section 3(2) (b) (i) of the UCTA 1977.  It states regarding voidable terms that when a party 
claims to be entitled ‘to render a contractual performance substantially different from that 
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which was reasonably expected of him.’ This approach is a merely an enforcement the 
contract as understood by the party. 
 
Conversely, the role played by reasonableness in some situations is no doubt a reflection of 
the court’s own standards of reasonableness, for example, when the court declares that a 
certain covenant in restraint of trade is reasonable or unreasonable. Moreover, Treitel points 
out in relation to the reasonableness test of the UCTA 1977, that reasonableness is not merely 
an exercise of judicial discretion. The process involves the application of statutory and judge-
made guidelines.
303
 He cites Lord Bridge’s statement in the George Mitchell case which 





In other situations more than one interpretation is possible. For example in Ruxley Electronics 
and Construction Ltd v Forsyth, the construction company was in breach by building a 
swimming pool that did not meet the agreed depth specification. Damages were entitled; the 
House of Lords awarded Mr Forsyth £2500 for ostensibly the loss of amenity rather than the 
cost of cure, which was worth approximately £21560. The House of Lords emphasised the 
role of reasonableness in deciding the appropriate measure of damages. It was held that the 
cost of cure was wholly unreasonable because the shortfall in the depth of the pool did not 
decrease its value. The award of difference in value was not reasonable in this particular case 




More than one interpretation could be given to the court approach of reasonableness in 
Ruxley. One could be that when approaching reasonableness the court was merely reflecting 
the parties’ expectations of damages at the time of contracting. By contrast, another would be 
that the court is imposing its own standards of reasonableness, and that the court applied its 
own concern with maintaining a degree of balance between breach and remedy.
306
 Obviously, 
even if could be said in some situations that the reasonableness is merely a reflection of 
parties’ standards of reasonableness, such an argument is hard to claim in other situations. In 
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most cases, in exercising reasonableness the court is likely to impose its own standards of 
reasonableness, which necessarily raises the question of legitimacy of such practice.  
 
Additionally, there are certain situations where the law is imposing its own canons of 
reasonableness on the parties. For example, when legislation sets down certain terms as being 
void, irrespective of the expressed terms of the contract, a buyer is not allowed to reject 
goods where the breach is trivial. Here in the last case one would question the legitimacy of 
the imposition of standards of reasonableness other than those of the parties. The legitimacy 
of such an imposition could be justified if it were to protect third party interests or when it 
somehow supports the autonomy of the parties. Moreover, the legislative imposition of 
reasonableness is justified as reflecting ‘a collective community judgment that certain 
transactional practices should not be supported because they are thought to be unreasonable.’ 
The real legitimacy challenge is related to the imposition of reasonableness by the court; why 
should one regard judges’ understanding of reasonableness to be superior to the 




2.3.6 Good Faith  
 
Good faith is relatively a new concept in the English law of contract. Until recently it was not 
addressed by legislation and English textbooks of contract did not cover good faith as a 
subject.
308
 The violation of good faith was also not an issue pleaded in court.  Judicial 
opinions, however, did make occasional references to ‘bad faith.’
309
 The only exception to 
this was in relation to insurance contracts, which was governed by the uberrima fides (utmost 
good faith) principle.
310
 In the well known case of Intterfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto 
Visual Programmes Ltd, Sir Thomas Bingham made his famous statement on the principle: 
 
‘In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law 
world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making 
and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply mean that 
they should not deceive each other [...] its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such 
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metaphorical colloquialism as ‘playing fair,’ ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face 
upwards on the table.’ It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing [...] English law 
has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed 




The English common law attitude towards the principle of good faith has dramatically 
changed since 1989. This is mainly due to the effect of European Directives.
312
 Under 
regulations 3(1) and 4(2) of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993
313
, 
the principal and agent are under a duty to ‘act dutifully and in good faith’. Section 62(4) of 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015) provides that ‘A term is unfair if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.’ A large body of literature 




2.3.6.1 The adaptation of a general doctrine of good faith 
 
In recent years, good faith has frequently been invoked and wide range of literature has 
discussed the principle of good faith. Yet, despite the fact that jurisprudence of good faith is 
now quite well developed,
315
 English lawyers remain ‘suspicious’ of the idea that parties 
should act in good faith.
316
 Thus, it is a mistake to think that there is general agreement on the 
adaptation of a general principle of good faith. The arguments of the supporters and 
opponents of adopting a general doctrine of good faith are outlined below. 
 
2.3.6.1.1 Arguments for adopting a good faith requirement 
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The first attempt to argue for the introduction of good faith in the law of contract was made 
by Powell.
317
 According to him, bad faith is already regulated by the law of contract, thus, 
nothing in principle prevents the creation of such a principle. Telling a lie, using illegitimate 
pressure, exploiting the weakness of others and abusing the position of confidence are all 
examples of bad faith.
318
Adopting a requirement of good faith would bring clarity in dispute 
settlement. Judges would be saved the effort of finding indirect ways to give effect to their 
own sense of justice in the case. It makes more sense to address an issue directly and openly 
rather than indirectly and covertly. Besides, trying to achieve fairness in the absence of a 





On the contrary, adopting a general doctrine of good faith achieves a coherent regime that 
enables judges to deal effectively with unfair manners.
320
 Furthermore, there is an argument 
that the adaptation of good faith requirements moves the law towards the protection of 
reasonable expectations. Lord Steyn illustrates that the protection of reasonable expectation is 
a principal task for the modern law of contract.
321
 Finally, it is arguable that the benefits of 
the good faith doctrine exceed dispute settlement. It contributes to a culture of trust and 
cooperation, which enhances the autonomy of contractors.  Consequently, contractors are 
given great flexibility in doing business. On a larger scale, trust and cooperation are basic 




2.3.6.1.2 Argument against adopting a good faith requirement 
 
The first objection is particularly related to contract negotiation. Arguably, a principle of 
good faith is inconsistent with the position of negotiating in the common law of contract. As 
long as no deception or mispresintation is committed, a party is entitled to pursue his own 
interests.  Thus, the requirements of good faith, that contractors are obligated to consider the 
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legitimate interests and expectations of one another, does not cohere with the ‘individually 
based’ ethics of the English law of contract.
323
 This point of objection was pointed out in the 
Walford v Miles case. Where the House of Lords held that there could be no binding 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. Such a position was felt to be ‘repugnant to the 




A second point of objection is that a general duty of good faith would impose vagueness and 
uncertainty on the contractual relation. Contractors and law makers are likely to have a 
different understanding of good faith. Moreover, honesty and fairness are of those values that 
vary from one individual to another. The likelihood of disagreement over the way the 
contractors need to act is accordingly increased.
325
 Indeed, what constitutes good faith is a 
matter of sophisticated and lively discussion. This reflects the fact that the meaning of good 
faith changes over time and according to context.
326
 Different attempts have been made to 
formulate workable good faith standards, most famously the ‘excluder analysis’ by Robert 
Summers
327
 and the ‘forgone opportunities’ approach by Steven Burton.
328
 However, these 
attempts are usually made with different goals in mind.
329
   
  
The former point leads to another point issue in relation to the legitimacy of the court in the 
imposition of its own conceptions of decency and fairness, namely that judges lack 
knowledge about market and factors that influence contractors.
330
 Another closely related 
issue is that implementing a doctrine of good faith would require inquiry into the contractors’ 
state of mind. This clearly raises the question of the difficulty of identifying motives behind 
contractors’ actions.
331
 Motives are generally difficult to prove and tend to be mixed (there 
could be more than one reason for one action). But a good faith requirement would 
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nonetheless involve regulating substantial matters within the process of contracting. This 




A final objection is that a general doctrine of good faith does not acknowledge that different 
contexts need different treatment. Whereas it would seem appropriate to impose a duty of 
good faith in some situations, such as consumer relations, it does not seem appropriate in 
other situations. For instance, dealing in commodities markets is highly competitive; 
accordingly one would consider opportunistic behaviour perfectly accepted. These variations 




Overall, it seems that concerns regarding individualism and vagueness are the major 
arguments against the development of good faith requirements. However, the issue of 
vagueness can be overestimated. The issue of vagueness as Gillette describes it is ‘marginal’ 
because it is temporally limited; it only exists because there has not been a sufficient body of 
case-law to verify the requirement of good faith. Yet, over time, when the familiarity with the 
notion of good faith grows, courts will be able to create a standard definition of it.
334
 In this 
way the issue will dissolve on case-by-case basis when the English courts become more 
familiar with the good faith concept.  The issue of vagueness is also likely to diminish in the 
light of the application of the requirement of good faith by statuary regimes especially in a 
consumer context. Indeed, there is a growing body of jurisprudence associated with the 
application of the good faith requirement in just this setting.
335
 In support of this view, in Yam 
Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited, Leggatt J expressed his opinion 
that the recognition of a duty of good faith ‘involves no more uncertainty than is inherent in 
the process of contractual interpretation’.
336
 Furthermore, the court has recently shown 
willingness to enforce requirements of good faith by giving effect to an express term without 
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Thus, it seems that the argument of vagueness against the notion of good faith is misplaced. 
Over time imposing a good faith requirement would bring clarity since it will help courts to 
deal with substantive fairness directly, thereby enhancing judicial expectations. This was the 
intimated when the House of Lords was first faced with one of the provisions that introduced 





‘Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing 
no concealed pitfalls or traps…Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether 
deliberately or unconsciously, take advantageous of consumer’s necessity, indigence, lack of 
experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, week bargaining position…’ 
 
However, the real obstacle facing the development of good faith requirements comes from 
individualistic concerns. Indeed, the critical question is whether the English court is willing 
to accommodate such a development even though it runs counter to the individualistic 
thinking of contract. The next section is concerned with the position of the English court 
towards the adoption of a general doctrine of good faith.  
 
2.3.6.2 The position of the English courts of good faith  
 
The English law of contract does not impose a general duty to act in good faith. Nevertheless, 
courts do occasionally uphold the good faith requirement.
339
 A major decision in this context 
is Walford v Miles, in which the House of Lords appeared to exclude the duty of good faith. 
The House of Lords stated that there could be no binding obligation to negotiate in good faith 
in the law of contract. Such a position was felt to be ‘repugnant to the adversarial position of 
the parties when involved in negotiations’.
340
 The same position was taken by the Court of 
Appeal even where the contract in hand was of co-operative nature. In the case of Baird 
Textile Holding Limited v Marks and Spencer plc, Baird relied on the co-operative nature of 
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his relationship with Marks & Spencer, but the Court of Appeal remained consistent with 




However, the position of the English court seems to have changed somewhat since then. 
Recent development of case law indicates more willingness to recognise a duty of good faith. 
Perhaps the most significant development in this area was the court decision in Yam Seng Pte 
Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited. Pte Limited v International Trade 
Corporation Limited.  Here Leggatt J doubted ‘that English law has reached the stage, 
however, where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, 
even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts.’ Nevertheless, he expressed the position 
that traditional reasons for the rejection of the doctrine of good faith under the English law of 
contract are ‘misplaced’. He suggested that there are types of commercial contract that imply 
a good faith requirement, including ‘relational agreements’. According to him, a duty of good 
faith can be enforced into a relational contract as a matter of implication. In this regard he 
stated that ‘there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established methodology of 
English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary 




The decision of Leggatt J in Yam Seng seems thus far to have been well received. In Emirates 
Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd Teare J described Judge Leggatt's 
judgment as ‘masterly’, and approved the reasoning about the circumstances in which a term 
of good faith could be implied.
343
 Similarly in Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data 
Capture Ltd, the finding of Yam Seng was affirmed. It was held that a duty of good faith shall 
be implied in a relational contract for the production and distribution of training materials for 
pilots.  Nevertheless, Jackson J has asserted that this does not mean that the law of contract 
imposes a general duty of good faith. He has held the following: 
 
‘I start by reminding myself that there is no general doctrine of “good faith” in English 
contract law, although a duty of good faith is implied by law as an incident of certain 
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In this light it is possible to say that a standard of good faith exists in English contract law. 
The latest court decisions suggest signs of a genuine paradigm shift. In the light of Yam Seng 
Paterson explains that the English common law is now prepared to imply a duty of good 
faith. He indicates that the recognition of a good faith requirement is not causing any issues 
of uncertainty or disruption to the law of contract. She, however, explains that it is not yet 
certain whether the court is willing to take the idea of good any further by enacting a general 
duty of good faith.
345
 Zhou expresses similar concerns, explaining that although the English 
law has made a steady improvement towards the adoption of a general duty of good faith, it is 




 Furthermore, the English law of contract might be pressurised to adopt a general principle of 
good faith.
347
 This pressure may come from the worlds of common law and civilian law 
where good faith dealing is the basis of any system of regime of contract law.
348
 Also, the 
development of regional markets along with the growing importance of international 
contracts, make it difficult to maintain an incommodious doctrinal attitude. In fact, the 
greatest degree of pressure is likely to come from European law. As mentioned above, the 




However, all of this does not change the fact that there remains considerable scepticism about 
adopting a general doctrine of good faith. Market-individualists will continue resisting a 
general doctrine of good faith ‘so long as good faith is perceived to be a blank cheque for 
judicial discretion’.
350
 Brownsword suggests that good faith needs to be adopted as a 
‘requirement’ in the sense that courts need to act simply ‘on standards of fair dealing that 
already recognised in particular contracting context’ rather than adopting a good faith 
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‘regime’ by attempting to prescribe ‘the co-operative ground rules’.
351
 Ultimately, this will 
make even market-individualists more willing to accept such a doctrine.  
 
2.3.7 The effect of adverse ideologies on the development of contractual justice notions 
of the English law  
 
It should have become clear by now that the English law of contract is no longer bound by a 
single ideology.  Conflicting ideological movements have controlled the law of contract since 
the late nineteenth century. The European influence and other causes including the 
development of social values have resulted in different ideological bases of the law of 
contract. As mentioned earlier, two trends continue to dominate the contemporary period in 
England.
352
 One trend is towards a revival of the freedom of contract as known in the 
nineteenth century. The second trend is a continuation of the late nineteenth-century 
departure from the freedom of contract.
353
 These opposing trends have resulted in complex 




Recognising this fight within the law of contract brings about a much clearer understanding 
of the current situation. The four ideologies controlling the English law of contract have been 
identified by Adams and Brownsword as:
355
 These are: formalism, realism, market 




The first ideology of contract is formalism. Formalists regard the law as a closed logical 
system. Judicial power must be exercised within the existing concepts of contract. Conceptual 
purity and the integrity of the law must be maintained, which manifests in doctrinal 
conservatism and limited innovation. Formalist judges always base their judgments on the 
best established rules. Moreover, they tend to comply with rules and doctrines mechanically 
and ‘without critical reflection to their doctrinal purpose or social context in which they are to 
be applied’ For example, the principles of the freedom of contract and sanctity of contract 
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tend to be cited blindly by formalists. In other word, formalists avoid responsibility for major 




2.3.7.2 Realism  
 
In opposition to formalism there is realism, and against each formalist tendency there seems 
to be a realist tendency that pushes in the opposite direction. To realists legal rules are not 
always definite. Decisions are the most important fact, and legal rules are a secondary 
consideration. As Lord Devilin states ‘the true nature of common law is to override 
theoretical distinctions when they stand in the way of doing practical justice’
357
 The ideology 
of realism acknowledges that justice sometimes requires changing the rules. A judge should 
never be deprived of his role in creating ground for new legal doctrines. Realist judges show 
a tendency towards innovation and the creation of new doctrines and principles of law. From 
a realist perspective, for judges to succeed in their role of keeping the code, they must act as 
custodians of practical justice and convenience. Rules are created for the purpose of either 
defending a principle or supporting a policy. Thus, rules that no longer serve their intended 
purpose should no longer be followed. The movement towards consumer protection is the 





2.3.7.3 Market individualism  
 
Market individualism supports individualistic standards. It promotes self-interested 
competitive trading rather than charity or gifts. Thus, only minimum restrictions must be 
placed on trade. The purpose of this ideology is to create a marketplace where contracting 
parties can deal securely and confidentially.  As a result, the facilitation of market operation 
is the primary concern of the law of contract. It is the law that should accommodate 
commercial practice not the other way around. Therefore, predictability and calculability are 
major concerns for the law of contract.
359
 The doctrines of ‘freedom of contract’ and ‘sanctity 
of contract’ lie at the heart of the individualistic ideology. Individuals are free to make 
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whatever agreement they wish and by the same means once the agreement is made they are 






The ideology of consumer welfarism arose in the late nineteenth century. It supports the view 
that legal rules must reflect social and cultural currents.  Great welfare responsibilities are 
assumed for the government, which inevitably shows through in contract law.  The principles 
of fairness and reasonableness in contract are encouraged in both commercial and consumer 
contracting. The notions of paternalism, reasonableness, good faith and unconscionability are 
promoted. Under the consumer-welfarism ideology the consumer’s interests are taken 
seriously. While consumer contracts should be closely regulated, commercial contracts are 





The fight between these ideologies is an essential reason for the inconsistency that can be 
observed at times in the creation of common law by the courts. For the same reason, the issue 
of substantive fairness of contractual relations is not, yet, a finished business. Whenever 
realism or consumer-welfarism movements towards the enhancement of substantive fairness 
are created the supporters of formalism and market-individualism will oppose them. This 
clearly is the situation of the modern law of English contract since the twentieth century. 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Traditionally the English law of contract was strictly regulated by liberal ideas of non-
intervention and freedom of contract. The classical conception of contract assumes that a 
contract that has been concluded freely is necessarily fair. However, in modern times, there a 
tendency towards the promotion of cooperation and fairness by the law of contract has been 
observed. Such a tendency is evident in the development of traditional doctrines of equity 
(duress and undue influence) as well as the introduction of novel notions of fairness and 
justice (inequality of bargaining power, unconscionability, reasonableness and good faith). 
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The discussion of this chapter indicates that the English court has paid attention to enhancing 
and regulating procedural justice rather than substantive justice.  
 
On the one hand, English courts have gone long way in developing common law duress and 
undue influence to create more limitations on contractual autonomy. There is an obvious 
tendency of the English courts to emphasise the ‘wrongdoing’ of the stronger party in duress 
and undue influence cases by requiring an act of exploitation and advantage taking. However, 
the courts’ approach, according to Stone and Devenney, is inconsistent, as there are cases of 
undue influence which indicate that wrongdoing is not an essential element. More 
fundamentally, the starting point for the law in cases of undue influence and duress is ‘not the 
substance, but rather the process by which it came about.’
362
 As a result, in cases of undue 
influence English courts will intervene only where there is some relationship between the 
parties, either contracting or in relation to a particular transaction, which leads to inequality 





On the other hand, the novel notions that have been added to the law have not fulfilled hopes 
of a general limitation to the freedom of contract. The law has not gone very far in regulating 
the fairness of contractual relations. The novel notions of substantive fairness are best 
described as supplementary notions, which soften the rigidity of law rather than limit 
doctrines. This indicates that the sanctity freedom of contract is softened but still dominant. 
The liberal notions of contract seem to be still dominant, and the notion of freedom of 
contract particularly stands as a serious obstacle to the development of any general doctrine 
of substantive fairness. 
 
It seems that whenever a general doctrine of fairness starts to be formulated, individualistic 
ideas are brought into service to hamper the process of formulation. As Adams and 
Brownsword put it, ‘even in a co-operative context […] we find individualistic doctrinal 
thinking continuing to assert itself.’
364
 This is because the idea that fairness should be a 
condition of the validity of contract represents a challenge to the notion of freedom of 
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contract.  Howells and Weatherill observe that ‘it would be misleading to assume that the 
connected themes of individualism, freedom of contract and judicial non-intervention in the 
parties’ bargain have lost their relevance to twentieth-century commerce. The rationales 





Indeed, English judges still to great extent insist that contracts are governed by freedom of 
contract.
366
 This appears clear from the statement made by Lord Diplock in 1980 in the 
House of Lords: ‘A basic principle of the law of contract […] is that parties are free to 
determine for themselves what primary obligations they will accept.’
367
 The fear of clashing 
with the individualistic theory of contract is probably what has made the English courts avoid 
adopting a general doctrine of substantive fairness.
368
 In this light one might conclude that the 
inconsistency in the English law of contract is not going to disappear until the adversarial 
ethics of English contract law is abandoned. 
 
The rejection of a general doctrine of substantive fairness by the English courts could be 
taken as rejection of the idea that fairness is relevant to contract validity.
369
  While this is the 
general rule, one needs to keep in mind that the fragmentation of the law makes itself a theme 
of the modern law of contract, meaning that a complete picture cannot be gained by looking 
at the general rules of contract. Fragmentation of the law of contract has resulted in 
distinguishing some contractual relations that have been given special consideration. The 
most significant departure from the general rules of contract is the consumer/supplier 
relationship. It represents the largest scale of contracts in the modern period. Thus, giving the 
issue of contractual fairness a proper acknowledgment is not complete without including the 
situation of consumer contracting, as will be addressed in chapter four. However, for the 
comparative purpose of this research, the next chapter will turn to the issue of contractual 
justice under the general principle of the Shariah law of contract. 
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This chapter investigates the extent to which contractual justice is promoted by the general 
theory of Shariah contract law. Given the distinct nature of the Shariah law of contract, the 
first part of this chapter is devoted to an overview of the law.  It explores the evolution of the 
law in the seventh and eighth centuries, and the sources and nature of the law, and it further 
illustrates the general theory of contract. The ongoing debate over the existence of a general 
theory that binds the Shariah law of contract is addressed. Major limitations to contractual 
autonomy are presented by invoking the doctrine of shurut (ancillary condition). The second 
part of the chapter deals with the doctrines of contractual fairness in Shariah law. It explores 
the meaning, effect and scope of the doctrines of duress, riba, gharar, unfair exploitation and 
just price. By doing so, the meaning and concepts of contractual justice under Shariah law are 
determined. Furthermore, the extent to which contractors are legally bound to act fairly and 
justly towards each others is examined.  
 
3.1The evolution of the law 
 
Shariah law of contract, as part of the code of behaviour known as Shariah, took its shape as 
early as the seventh century. The starting point of Shariah law and its doctrinal basis is linked 
to the Quranic revelation.
370
 According to classical Shariah theory, law is a divinely 
orientated system which reflects the revealed will of God. Thus, being a God-given system 
rather than man-made one, it does not follow the idea that the law itself can evolve as a 
historical phenomenon closely tied with the progress of society.
371
 Yet, a close look at the 
development of the Shariah law reveals that although the task of jurisprudence is one of 
discovery (to discover the precise terms of the Shariah or to reveals the precise will of God) 
customary practices were always made relevant to the process of discovery. The law has 
undergone four major stages which will be briefly discussed below. 
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3.1.1 The primary stage 
 
The first stage covers the lifetime of the Prophet and the early Caliphas. During this stage the 
Islamic community was small in size. The traditions of the Prophet and the decisions of the 
Caliphas were available to resolve all legal problems that occurred at this point in time. The 
mission of the Prophet was to set the general principle of the law. Regulating trade practices 
was a prime concern and this was done by redressing the unconscionable and abusive 
commercial practices of pre-Islamic Arabia.
372
 In doing so all transactions were required to 
comply with the evolving principles of Shariah, and particularly with the two cardinal 




3.1.2 The classical period  
 
The second stage is what could be called the classical period of Shariah law. It starts from the 
eighth century and extends to the twelfth century. Changes in this period affected all aspects 
of life and originated with the political shift generated by the creation of the first political 
dynasty of Islam (the Umayyad). The significance of this period centres on the beginning of 
what is called Islamic jurisprudence.  This consisted of the activities of pious scholars 
grouped together in the loose studious fraternities known as early schools of law. The effort 
of the jurists at this stage resulted in the construction of a large fragmentary scheme of 
contractual rights and obligations which characterise this as the most significant stage in the 




3.1.3 The modern period  
 
Modern times have witnessed a general decline in the Shariah law but especially in relation to 
the role of human reasoning in the development of the law.
375
  Modern scholars generally 
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assume that by the 1850s the door of ijtihad (human reasoning) was closed. Schacht describes 
the situation thus: 
 
‘By the beginning of the fourth century of hijra (about A.D. 900), however, the point had 
been reached when scholars of all schools felt that the essential questions had been 
thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself to the 
effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary 
qualifications for independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be 
confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it 




This concurred with the replacement of Shariah law in many Middle-Eastern Muslim 
countries with Western-style laws.
377
 Until the 1850s Shariah law was the only basic law in 
Muslim countries but since then, the law has seen major reform. Two countries played a 
major role in spreading western law styles into other countries in the area: Egypt and the 
Ottoman Empire. Colonisation was a major cause that led to law reformation, and 
additionally, some countries were under pressure to keep up with the modern world by 




Shariah law however, was never completely deserted in relation to commercial and contract 
law, even in those countries that adopted western styles of law.
379
 In fact the first attempt to 
codify Shariah law were made in this period through the introduction of Majallat Alahkam 
Aladliyyah in 1877 by the Ottoman Empire. Although the Majallat was never adopted as 
formal law it is considered to be a successful attempt and has been heavily referred to by 
judges. Kourides claims that Shariah law had an influence on the formation and binding force 
of contract in many countries in the Middle East. He indicates that Shariah legal principles 
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In the twentieth century Shariah law was put under pressure to keep up with modern laws. 
Whereas common law was reshaped in the wake of the industrial revolution of the eighteenth 
century, the Muslim world generally did not experience the challenge of industrial revolution. 
However, the oil-based prosperity of some Islamic countries has put the law under 
pressure.
381
 Restatement of the law to fit the contemporary needs of the market has become a 
necessity. The decline in Shariah law in the nineteenth century has left the law with a gap, in 
that it has essentially remained the same as when it was developed in medieval times. 
Although the jurists of the classical period produced a wealth of material that covers every 
aspect of the law of contract, their work represented their times. 
 
To most Muslims Shariah is wider than any Western definition of law; it is a system of duties 
that covers matters of morality as well as jurisprudence.
382
 Arguably, the law of contract has 
gone through a major development in the field of Islamic banking. The middle of the 
twentieth century witnessed the evolution of Islamic banking.
383
 What makes Islamic banking 
different from conventional banking is that it is interest free and is based on profit and loss 
sharing. In Islamic banking profits and losses from the physical investment are shared 
between the creditor and the borrower according to a formula that reflects their respective 
levels of participation.
384
 Thus, unlike conventional banks that deal with money only, trading 
is one of the common activities of Islamic banks.
385
 This means banking is closely linked to 
contract law especially because many of the contracts that were discussed by classical jurists 
are technically employed by Islamic banking as financing modes. Still, such development is 
limited due to its special nature. 
  
The role of Shariah courts in the modern development of the law is however limited due to a 
number of factors. The role of Shariah courts (in Saudi Arabia), unlike Common law courts, 
is limited to the application of rather than creation of the law. Shariah judges, when faced 
with a legal issue, typically search for the most reliable jurisprudence opinion on which to 
base the judgment. These judicial opinions are found in a range of sources of Shariah 
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literature rather than one specific source. Most of the Shariah literature was, however, written 
in the classical period from the eighth to the twelfth century. The law of contract remained to 
large extent the same as it was developed in the classical period. Due to the significance of 
the classical period in shaping the Shariah law of contract, it will be the subject of most of the 
analysis of this research. Reference is made to the modern application of the Shariah law of 
contract by the Saudi court where applicable. The next section considers the jurisprudence 
method of discovering the Shariah law. This method of discovery was developed in the 




3.2 Shariah jurisprudence method 
 
The eighth century is the start of what we know today as Shariah jurisprudence. The need for 
such development appeared as a result of the Quran verses being general in nature. The 
Quran is indeed not a code of law; it provides in relation to contractual obligations guidelines 
of contractual ethics, such as a general injunction to honour agreements and observe good 
faith in commercial dealing. Thus, the scholar-jurists grouped together to begin to give their 





In the early stages of the classical period, the method of the jurists was to review the local 
practices (legal and popular) in light of principles of behaviour enshrined in the divine 
revelation of the Quran. Jurists reviewed institutions and activities on a case by case basis, 





Legal jurisprudence has become increasingly more sophisticated and includes divergence in 
legal doctrine. This divergence arose as a result of the existence of four schools of Shariah 
law (as far as Sunni Islam is concerned). The four schools of Hanfi, Maliki, Safiai and 
Hanbali, did not have the same circumstances of origin, and they existed in different 
geographical areas and in different periods of time. Their formation was linked to the 
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The Hanfi and the Maliki schools were the first two schools to be established, they both came 
into existence as the representatives of the legal tradition of particular geographical locality. 
In this stage, jurists dealt with cases that were not textually regulated by the Quran or a 
decision of the Prophet by referring to their own personal reasoning. As a result, the 
divergence between the two oldest schools of Hanfi and Maliki doctrine appeared as a natural 




On the other hand, the establishment of the doctrines of the other two schools were affected 
by the jurisprudential controversy that arose during the ninth century in the subject of the 
sources of the law. The Shafi school attempted to formulate a systematic theory of law. 
According to this theory the law is derived from the Quran, the Sunna and reasoning. This 
was adopted later on by all school as the tri-partite sources of the law. The Hanbali school, 
which happened to be the last school to be established, adopted a doctrine that gives 
particular authority to the Prophet Sunna that was undermined by the forms of jurist 




The legal theory according to Hallaq, which was the product of the ninth and tenth century 
had a changing effect on the law. The primary aim of legal theory was to rationalise the 
positive law of God and to discover the law of God. The legal theory was meant in the first 
place to ensure that Shariah law in general is based on a solid judicial methodology 
‘providing that the positive conclusions were sound was in fact providing that community 
was not in error’. As a result, the positive law formulated in the eighth and the ninth centuries 
(before the evolution of legal theory) was tested and then classified into two groups. The first 
group included the rules that were structured on a solid and systematic basis by 
acknowledging the four sources of the law. The second group included the rules which were 
considered dubious by many jurists on account of being based on loose analogy, these were 
subject to reformulation and rationalisation.
392
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Accordingly, the divergence in doctrine between schools which had derived from the 
recognition of different customary practices changed with the development of legal theory 
and the doctrinal sources of law.  At a certain point, it was generally accepted that the proper 
law of Shariah is derived from the divine command of God and that the basic principles 




As a result, it became generally accepted that each rule or institution had to be tested 
exclusively by the accepted criteria, which are now known as the sources of Shariah.  In 
many cases, the controversy among the schools centered on the degree to which analogical 
reasoning might properly be applied. The effort of the jurists has gradually resulted in 
building a fragmentary and fertile scheme of contractual rights and obligations. The accepted 
sources of the law are explained below. 
 
3.3 Sources of Shariah law 
 
An understanding of the nature of the law and its development is not complete without 
understanding the sources of the law. The sources of the law are of particular importance to 
any study of Shariah law.  It is the sources of law that make Shariah law generally different 
from secular legal systems. Secular laws are mainly based on reasoning, which means that 
changes in social and economic conditions may result in the over-ruling of some previously 
rational doctrines. In England, Parliament has an absolute power to enact legal rules.
394
 
Furthermore, being a common law system, the law is shaped by judicial creativity. Thus, one 




By contrast, Shariah law is based on sources of lex diva, which make the law permanent in 
principle and not subject to overruling on the grounds of reasoning or changed socio-
economic circumstances. This means that a state that adopts the Shariah law cannot override 
its legal principles even with the power of its Parliament. All legal rules enacted by states’ 
authority need to be compatible with the principles of Shariah to pass the legitimacy 
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 The law is discovered through a specific judicial methodology (the sources 
of the law). 
 
In principle, Shariah scholars are under the common belief that Shariah and its sources cannot 
be abrogated or subjected to limitations of time, space or circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
following discussion of sources of the law of Shariah will illustrate that the rigidity of 
Shariah is sometimes overestimated. While it is true that the  primary sources of Shariah 
(Quran and Sunna) cannot be abrogated or subjected to limitation under any circumstances, 
the secondary sources of Shariah are based on ijtihad (human reasoning), which respond to 
social changes. 
 
Due to the vital importance of the sources of the law to Shariah, the study of sources of the 
law and judicial methodology is made a science in itself and separate from jurisprudence or 
the rules of law. The methods applied to the deduction of the rules from their sources are 
studied under the science of usual alfiqah (the judicial methodology).
397
 The science of 
judicial methodology is central to any discussion of any legal issue in Shariah. It is devoted to 
ensuring that the law is grounded on authoritative sources; usual alfiqah is founded on divine 
ordinances and the acknowledgment of God’s authority over the conduct of man.
398
 At the 
same time it secures an avenue by which Shariah can adopt any necessary adjustment in the 
law to accommodate social changes. Next, the primary sources (Quran and Sunna) and the 
secondary sources (ijma, qias, the public interest and urf) of Shariah will be outlined. 
 
3.3.1 Primary sources 
 
The rules of Shariah are derived from two primary sources: Quran and Sunna. The rules 
included in the Quran and Sunna are of a rigid character, under no circumstances can they be 
abrogated or subjected to any limitation. Nevertheless, the two primary sources are not law 
books or statutory texts. Thus, a process of interpretation is needed in order to distinguish 
rules and principles of law. 
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3.3.1.1 Quran  
 
The term Quran refers to the book embodying the revelation from God to the Prophet 
Mohammed.
399
 There is only one book of Quran; it forms the foundation of all aspects of 
Islamic religion comprised in 114 surah (chapters), 6,666 ayah (verses) and 86,430 words.  
Over the texts of the Quran a capricious freedom of individuals in determining their ethical 
course is recorded along with a stress on the absolute control of God. Many Quranic verses, 
either directly or by implication, hold a general theoretical significance. Although the largest 
theoretical category included in the Quran is concerned with divine revelation, there are a 
total of five hundred additional injunctions.
400
 The Quranic injunctions can be categorised as 
criminal, business, transactions, domestic relations, inheritance, and international relations.
401
 
Although the Quran is the cornerstone upon which Shariah law and its primary principles and 
some specific injunctions are based, it does not form a code of law and is not a law book.
402
 
This is what makes the text of the Quran not always accessible for individuals without the 
help of experts, and thus gives significant value to the science of Quranic interpretation 
(tafsir), which will be discussed below. 
 
3.3.1.2 Sunna  
 
The terms Sunna or Hadith are commonly used interchangeably to refer to the practice and 
sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.
403
 The Sunna, like the Quran communicates a divinely 
revealed message, yet, unlike the Quran, the articulation of the content is made by the 
Prophet himself. From a theoretical perspective, the most telling texts are those that deal 
explicitly with a variety of attitudes and values underlying the countless rituals and other 
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The Sunna is the ‘verbalized accounts of what Muhammad said and did as reported by his 
contemporary followers (companions or sahba) and which have been reduced to writing.’
405
 
While there is only one Quran, scores of scholars compiled the Sunna over a period of three 
hundred years using various methodologies. Most of the books of the Sunna available today 
were the result of the movement between 850 and 915. During that time, certain scholars 
devoted themselves to authenticate each Hadith. Six books of the Sunna were the result of 
this movement and were complied by recognised scholars of high character. Those compilers 
are Al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, Al-Termidhi, Al-Nasai and Ibn-Majah. The first two of 
the six are the most highly regarded; Al-Bukahri’s work contains authentic 7,397 selected out 




Generally, Al-bukhari’s work is preferred over Muslim’s because he would only accept a 
Hadith as authentic if there was evidence that the transmitter actually met his or her teacher 
of Hadith. Muslim, known for the enhanced arrangement of Hadith, would accept a Hadith as 
authentic if the transmitter and teacher were contemporaries, even if he could not find actual 




The relation of the Sunna with the Quran and whether it is a source itself or a supplement to 
the Quran, is treated by Al-Shafi. According to him, the Sunna is of three types: (1) texts of 
the Sunna that prescribe what is revealed in Quran, (2) texts of the Sunna that explain the 
general principles of Quran and clarify the will of God; (3) where, in the Sunna, the 
Messenger of God has ruled on a matter about which nothing can be found in the Book of 





3.3.1.3 Interpretation of sacred sources 
 
The sacred texts of Quran and Sunna are by no means law books or statutory texts. Thus, 
injunction and legal principles need to be distinguished. Ordinary people normally lack the 
relevant skills to distinguish the legal rules within the texts.  Thus, tafsir (since of 
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interpretation) and commentary on the Quran is of significant importance to Shariah 
jurisprudence.
409
 Interpretation of the texts of the Quran is done by one of several methods. 
The interpretation of the Quran by Quran itself is the most commonly invoked method of 
interpretation. This is to say that the Quran expounds upon many of its own principles at 
different places throughout the Quran. Another method of interpretation of the Quran is by 
Sunna, which, as mentioned before, refers to the view of Al-Shafi that some texts of Sunna 




The exercise of Quran interpretation must be practised with adherence to a complex set of 
rules of interpretation explained in depth by the four schools of jurisprudence.
411
 The sense of 
exegesis evolved and Islamic scholars established standards for individuals engaged in the 
interpretation of the sacred sources. Any person who attempts to interpret a text of the Quran 
or Sunna must have the following characteristics: she must be ‘(a) an accomplished linguist 
familiar with Quranic (classical) Arabic; (b) have a thorough understanding of the message of 
Islam; (C) have the ability to perceive meanings, abstract relations and generalising principles 
apparent in the various passages of the Quran; and (d) take into consideration the report of 





The interpretation of the Sunna follows the same standards as the interpretation of the Quran. 
Nevertheless, along with the need for interpretation, the authenticity of the Sunna is a matter 
of the highest importance.
413
 Before basing a legal rule on a text of the Sunna, the 
authenticity of the text needs to be checked. Out of the six well known books of the Sunna 





                                                          
409
 M.Th.Houtsma, T.W.Arnold, R.Basset and R.Hartmann ‘Encyclopaedia of Islam’, E.J. Brill's First VII 
(1913-1936) 320 
410
 Al-Shafi (n 408) 64-105 
411
 Abdal-Haqq (n 405) 14-5 
412
 Ismail R.Al-Faruqi and Lois L.Al-Faruqi, The Cultural Atlas of Islam (Free Press 1986) 244-6 
413
 Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: According to The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafih and 
Hanbali Schools (Kitab Bhavan 2006) 67 
98 
 
3.3.2 Secondary sources 
 
The primary sources of Shariah, the Quran and Sunna, do not always provide detailed 
principles for legal rules. As Rensrd puts it ‘the fundamental sacred texts are not theoretical 
manuals or treatises, but they are in essential and too seldom and acknowledged ways the 
inspirational wellsprings of theological themes in works of all subsequent generations of 
Muslims.’
414
 Since there are many issues in which no clear judgments are to be found in the 
Quran or Sunna, ijtihad (human reasoning) is needed to discover what God had ordained for 
each question. All secondary sources of Shariah consist of a form of ijtihad. The practice of 
ijtihad is regulated by usul al-fiqah (jurisprudence methodology), which provides the criteria 
for the deduction of the rules of law from the sources of Shariah. It provides a systematic 





A central purpose of the jurisprudence methodology is to guide the jurist in his efforts to 
deduce the law from its sources.  It arose out of the need to remove unwanted risks of error 
and confusion in the development of Shariah, to avoid confusion and to ensure that ijtihad is 
carried out by qualified people. Ijtihad is the avenue by which Shariah responds to changes in 
society, and to the difficulties of finding the right balance of values and finding better 
solutions and alternatives when needed. The development of the law by human reasoning 
under Shariah is encouraged by the fact that ‘ijtihad is a collective obligation of the Muslim 
community and its scholars to exert themselves to find solutions to new problems and to 
provide the necessary guidance in a matters of law and religion.’
416
 The obligatory nature of 
ijtihad is reinforced by the encouragement given to mujtahid (a person who practice ijtihad) 
by rewarding him in the hereafter whether he arrives at the correct result or not.  
 
Under Shariah’s science of jurisprudence methodology, the mujtahid needs to follow specific 
rules and steps to reach a conclusion in any legal issue. Under the general rules of ijtihad one 
would need to first refer to the Quran for clearly articulated principles of law. This requires 
extensive study and the application of highly refined interpretive skill. In a further step, the 
mujtahid is required to look at the texts of the Sunna in the same manner. If neither texts 
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appear not to contain explicit or implicit guidance on the issue in question, human reasoning 
then needs to be exercised to reach a determination. Several classes of reasoning are accepted 
for applying and deducing the principles of Shariah.
417
 Those that are most agreed upon are: 
collective reasoning by consensus (ijma), analogical deduction (qias), the public interest and 
local custom (urf). 
 
3.3.2.1 Collective reasoning by consensus (ijma)  
 
A Shariah rule can be generated by the consensus of the learned scholars of Islam and/or the 
learned community of Muslims of a particular era.
418
 The leading Quranic authority for ijma 
stems from the following verses of the Quran: ‘O ye who believe, Obey Allah, and obey the 
messenger, and those who are charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything 
among yourselves, refer it to Allah and his messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last 
Day; that is best and most suitable for final determination.’
419
 The authority of ijma is also 
found in the Sunna in several contexts, the most commonly cited text of the Sunna is the 




The practice of ijma, which was established by the Prophet companions, needs to go through 
three stages. To start with, each participant is required to resort to individual reasoning 
(ijtihad) in his own right.  Second, the relevant issue needs to go through mutual consultation 
(shura) before reaching a decision on the issue.
421
 A person who participates in ijma 




Ijma as a source of the law reflects the natural evolution and development of society. It is said 
to have a crucial role in developing Shariah.  Ijma is regarded as an instrument of tolerance 
and evolution of ideas in a way that reflects the vision of scholars in the light of new 
education and cultural achievements of the community. Goldhizer describes the ijma as 
following:  ‘This principle (i.e. ijma) provides Islam with potential for freedom of movement 
and a capacity for evolution. It furnishes a desirable corrective against the dead letter of 
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Once an ijma is established it constitutes a strong authority; it is an independent source in the 
sense that it is capable of quoting the law without reference to the primary sources.
424
 An 
existing ijma is binding and not open to amendment or abrogation. Only the constituents of 
ijma themselves are entitled to their own ijma or enact another one in their place.
425
 
Nevertheless, although ijma potentially could be of significant weight to Shariah 
jurisprudence, its role is displaced by the fact that ijma has not been used successfully for a 
very long time. The different political power in Muslims countries, the great distance and 
circumstances separating Muslims, has for a significant period generated a serious obstacle 




3.3.2.2 Analogical deduction (qias) 
 
Qias literally means ‘measuring’ or ‘ascertaining’ something. It could also mean comparison 
with a view to suggesting equality or similarity between two things.  Under Shariah 
jurisprudence, it means expanding Shariah value from asl (original case) to fra (new case), 
where the asl is regulated by a giving and qias seeks to extend to the fra the same textual 
ruling. In other words, it is the practice of the application of a ruling of a case on a similar 
case where the law is silent.  Qias does not amount to the establishment of a new rule of law 
but rather extends an existing rule. It is though more than an interpretation of the primary 
sources. A person practicing qias is required to exert himself intellectually in trying to 
discover the effective cause in qias. The purpose of qias is to create an avenue for the 




The authority of qias is found in the following verse of Quran: ‘should you dispute over 
something, refer it to God, and to the Messenger, if you believe in God.’
428
 The former verse 
is interpreted to mean the dispute should be referred to God and the Prophet by allowing the 
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signs found in the Quran and the Sunna. This is exactly what qias does; it is the method by 
which the rationale of an existing rule is sought and then applied to a new issue which shares 
the same rational.
429
 Further authority for qias is found in the Sunna when the Prophet 
directed his compatriot Muadh bin Jabal to resort to his own ijtihad (qias is a form of ijtihad) 




Schacht argues that the concept and method of qias are derived from the Jewish exegetical 
term hiqqish, which is taken from the Aramaic root naqsh meaning ‘to beat together’. He 
further infers from the similarity of technique of discussion by Al-Shafi that the doctrine of 
qias in Shariah jurisprudence has been influenced by Greek logic and Roman law.
431
 He 
however, did not provide any evidence of actual borrowing or influence. And, ultimately, 
similarity of doctrines and concepts, and resemblance in discursive techniques does not 
amount to proof that one has necessarily been borrowed from the other. 
 
3.3.2.3 The public interest 
 
The concept of public interest has been referred to in different terms by the schools of 
Shariah jurisprudence. The Hanbali school refers to it as istislah, while it is called istihsan by 
the Hanfi school and al-masalih al-mursalah by the Maliki school. It involves the practice of 
‘selecting one acceptable alternative solution over another because the former appears more 
suitable for the situation at hand, even though the selected solution may be technically 
weaker than the rejected one.’
432
 It certainly involves a form of ijtihad or independent 
reasoning in deciding what is best for the general public. It is an alternative recourse where 
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3.3.2.4 Local custom (urf) 
 
Prevailing customs may be given recognition only where they do not contravene Shariah 
principles.
434
 A consideration of the purpose and consequences of the custom must be 
measured against the Quran and Sunna. Custom is given different values to urf as a source of 
law, but they all recognise it as legitimate method for formulating law. The authority of local 
custom as source of law is traced to the practice of the Prophet who was silent on many 





3.4 The nature of the Shariah law of contract 
 
The employment of the judicial method explained above has resulted in the construction of a 
fragmentary and fertile scheme of legal rights and obligations. Legal thought in the field of 
contract is bound by two characteristics, the nature of which makes them different from most 
contract laws. This because the Shariah law of contract was first made on the basis of 
nominative contract and developed away from the authority of a certain state. The two major 
characteristics that describe the nature of the Shariah law of contract are outlined below. 
 
3.4.1 Based on nominative contracts 
 
Classical jurists who built the cornerstone of the Shariah law of contract approached the law 
systematically, they preferred classification and tidiness. Accordingly, the contractual scheme 
rested upon a quartet of basic contracts. By doing so, the jurists meant to deal with the two 
primary issues related to the purpose of the contract; whether the contract is made for the 
transfer of the corpus or the usufruct and; whether it is made for a consideration.
436
 The law 
of contract was formulated by creating specific rules for nominative contracts.   The four 
primary contracts on which the law was mainly based are: (1) bay (sale) in which the 
ownership is transferred for consideration, it is also said to be the archetype and to cover all 
commutative contracts in Shariah, and to be used extensively to draw analogies by jurists; (2) 
hiba (gift) in which the ownership is transferred without consideration; (3) ijara (hire) in 
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which the position is transferred for consideration; (4) ariya (loan) in which the possession is 
transferred without consideration. These four contracts are the most commonly discussed, 
yet, fourteen other contracts were nominated. Each nominated contract is accorded a distinct 




3.4.2 Developed away from the authority of the state 
 
Since the two primary sources of Shariah, the Quran and Sunna, deal with legal matters 
generally, they do not provide comprehensively detailed or technical rules. The legal scheme 
known today as Shariah represents the effort of the jurists working through the accepted 
methods of discovering the law through human reasoning.
438
 The legal philosophy is the 
result of the analysis and elaboration of Shariah law in abstracto rather than a science of the 




Those jurists in the classical period were never subjected to the authority of a state. In fact, 
there was no state during the formative stages. The current meaning of ‘state’ was not 
introduced to the Muslim world until the nineteenth century. The only means of authority was 
to have control over the law by appointing and dismissing judges. Yet, there was no authority 
to influence the decisions as to what law should be applied. Law was, in fact, created by 
society; communities produced their own legal experts who were qualified to fulfil a variety 




Jurists, for their part, believed that rational thinking is a gift from God and thus it should be 
fully utilized in a wise and reasonable manner. But to them human thinking cannot 
understand all the secrets of the world, thus rational thinking is not in itself enough without 
divine guidance. Rationality as such must be predetermined by the revealed will of God 
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3.5 The general theory of Shariah contract law 
 
The fact that classical jurists of Shariah law have based on nominative contractual scheme 
has raised the question of if it is bound by a general theory. Some jurists have treated the 
contract of sale as the prototype to which the contracts were expected to conform. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the whole contractual scheme is based upon many nominated 
contracts means that basing the general theory on one contract is of limited use, especially for 
the purpose of providing premises for analogy.  On other occasions jurists have attempted to 
deduce general principles from the extensive commentaries and exegeses produced by their 
predecessors. For example, Ibn-Taimiyah included in his famous book Majmu Fatawa a 
complete chapter on principles governing contracts in general. But, these principles were 




In the same sense jurists did not attempt to create a general concept to bind all contracts, they 
have never attempted to define contract in their manuals.  Although the technical term 
‘contract’ as known in Western jurisprudence is usually translated in Arabic to mean aqd, the 
two terms are not of precise equivalence. The term aqd literally means in Arabic to ‘tie’ or 
‘bond’ whereas the technical term ‘contract’ brings into common law the two essentials of 
agreement and consideration.  The term aqd is widely used to describe various transactions 
especially those that are concluded by offer and acceptance, but it is equally used to describe 





In fact, the term aqd under Shariah law is wide enough to cover the entire field of obligations 
including those that are spiritual, social, political, and commercial. It regulates spiritual 
matters by dealing with an individual’s obligation to God, it also regulates social relations 
such as marriage, and on a political level it encompasses treaty obligations. Additionally, it 
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The way the law of contract was laid out by classical jurists has led some scholars such as 
Schacht
445
 and Coulson to say that the Shariah law of contract is not bound by a general 
theory. For Coulson this is attributed to the fact that Shariah law is of a primitive nature. He 
states in the context of the development of the Shariah law of contract the following: 
 
‘It perhaps seems natural from the experience of Western legal systems that this stage of the 
development of Islamic legal doctrine would be followed by a further stage in which jurists 
analysis would derive from various particular cases the general principles and would thus 




Coulson’s reasoning is, however, undermined by the fact that jurists were able to generalise 
and rationalise in other areas of the law, most obviously the area of legal theory. It seems that 
the way the jurists treated contracts and their lack of an articulation of general theory was 
merely a reflection of the process of the development of the law. The Islamisation of the law 
in the early stages involved overriding pre-Islamic institutions by the norms of Islam. In the 
context of contract law, the starting point of Islamisation was subjecting the customary 
contract that existed in pre-Islamic Arabia to examination. Many of the nominated contracts 




Thus, the way the law was laid out was merely a reflection of needs at that time; the lack of 
generalisation was not intended. In fact the Shariah law of contract include many norms that 
are general in nature, such as the price and subject matter.  There are general norms that are 
applicable to all contracts; all contracts were subjected to detailed analysis to ensure that they 




Some contemporary scholars take the position that the Shariah law of contract is maintained 
by a general theory that contains general default rules applicable to all contracts. Their 
argument is that an innominate contract is given effect by Shariah law.
449
 However, Husain 
explains that innominate agreements were developed in the first place because of the absence 
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of a general theory.
450
 Other scholars have attempted to develop some Shariah rules of a 
general nature, which could be made applicable to all contracts. These general rules are 
derived in abstract hindsight from the regulation of nominate contracts by the classical jurists. 
Their attempts included treatment of issues such as the classification of legal acts and their 




However, the question to ask is: if the Islamic law of contract were to be bound by a general 
theory what this theory would be?  It would be possible to generate a general theory of 
contract from some verses of the Quran which present a moral injunction of extreme sanctity. 
For example the following verse provides that ‘Ye who believe, fulfil all contracts’.
452
 
However, such verses were not made the basis of a legal system of binding agreements but 
rather, as has been explained, a series of nominate contracts supplemented by means of 
giving effect to innominate agreements.  More significantly, the law of contract classically 
was based on principles that emphasise justice and equity rather than strict sanctity of 
contract. For the purpose of this research the next section addresses the extent to which 
contractual autonomy is implemented by the general principles of the Shariah law of contract. 
Limitation in freedom of contract is also considered. 
 
3.6 Contractual autonomy under the Shariah law of contract  
 
The fact that the Shariah law of contract is based upon nominate contracts has led some to 
assume a complete absence of freedom of contract. According to Hamid this means we have 
in hand a law of contract(s) rather than contract. As a result, we have to accept that the 
principle of freedom of contact is not recognised by Shariah law.
453
 Yet, according to Hassan 
this can be rejected by the fact that innominate contracts made by parties are given effect 




In fact it seems that freedom of contract is limited for other reasons that are not related to its 
being a law of contracts. The view taken by many contemporary scholars is that the Shariah 
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There is also the view that the legal effect of a contract is decided by the lawgiver not by the 
contracting parties. In general terms this means that whereas parties can decide to enter a 
certain contract or not, once they decide to do so, they are obliged to fulfil the requirements 
of the contract as determined by the lawgiver.
456
 In other words, the role of the will of the 
parties is simply to start the contractual process by choosing a particular form of contract, but 
the effects of this contract are governed by Shariah and apply automatically.
457
 Obeied upheld 
this view, arguing that ‘it is evident, for example, that any individual is free to make a 





However, how does the law deal with situations where parties decide that the legal effect of a 
certain contract set by the law does not meet their needs? In other terms, to what extent is 
party autonomy is recognised? In fact, a literal interpretation of some verses of the Quran 
would indicate a strict sanctity of contract.
459
 Nevertheless, classical jurisprudence did not 
base the law of contract on these verses only but rather acknowledged other principles which 
emphasise justice and equity. The closest treatment to the issue of parties’ autonomy by the 
classical jurists is found under the doctrine of shurut (ancillary conditions), which needs to be 
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3.6.1 The doctrine of shurut (ancillary condition) 
 
The term shurut is meant to describe any clause which has the consequence of adding or 
removing a certain effect accorded to the contract by the law.
460
 The four schools have 
approached the issue differently. Generally, ancillary conditions are largely admitted by the 
Hanbali school, whereas they are heavily regulated by the other three schools. The Shafi, 
Hanfi and Maliki schools admit certain freedoms for individuals to arrange the effects of their 
contractual relation. The discussion of the opinions of the three schools will be primarily 
focused on the Hanfi school position as it is very much the same as that of the Shafi and 
Maliki schools. Reference to the opinions of the other two schools will be made when 
necessary.  
 
3.6.1.1 The position of the Hanfi, Shafi and Maliki schools 
 
The ancillary conditions are considered by the Hanfi school to be either valid or null and 
void. Three types of valid condition are admitted.  First, a clause is valid if it conforms with 
the legal effect attributed by the law to a certain contract.
461
 Yet, this type of clause has very 
limited legal effect because it merely emphasises the normal consequences of a contract. This 
could be, for example, a clause in a contract of sale that stipulates that the ownership of the 
subject matter shall be moved to the buyer, or confirming the buyer’s right to return a 
defective item.
462
 It adds nothing to the effect of the contract imposed by the law; no 
additional rights or obligations are imposed on the parties.  
 
Secondly, there are those conditions that agree with the purpose of the act to which they are 
added. This type of condition is divided by the Hanfi school into three categories including: 
pledge, security on the price of sale, and power delegation. The three conditions are given 
effect by the Hanfi school in a very strict manner. To them the relevant conditions are given 
effect only if they were stated at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
463
 The position 
taken by the Shafi and Maliki schools is more flexible. It is enough for the Shafi school to 
give legal effect to a pledge if it is precisely identified and to give effect to security if it was 
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fixed at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
464
 The Maliki school take an even more 
flexible position by giving effect to conditions requiring a pledge even if the article of the 




The third category of valid conditions consists of clauses that give force to customary 
practices. In order to explain this type of condition, jurists laid out many examples. It 
includes services which buyers require from sellers by custom.
466
 Al-Kasani explained this 
type of condition by setting out the following examples; the purchaser of a leather sole asking 
the seller to cut the leather and add straps; a condition to cut boots out of a leather hide; to 
dye a garment or to shape woollen cloth into a bonnet.
467
 This category of ancillary 
conditions is validated as an exception (istihsan) by the Hanfi school
468
 and as a matter of 




As for null and void clauses, there are those conditions which do not suit the contractual 
relation to which they have been appended. This could be either because it is not admitted by 
practice or custom or because it gives benefit to one of the contracting parties over the other. 
It includes any condition that upsets the balance of the contract by imposing supplementary 
obligation.
470
 This category includes but is not limited to the following: (1) conditions which 
directly infringe the law or morality principles (for example to make the article sold 
inalienable or donation irrevocable); (2) conditions which are irreconcilable with the legal 
effect of the contract imposed by the law or those which impose obligations on third parties; 
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3.6.1.2 The position of the Hanbali school 
 
The Hanbali school took a more liberal approach, and give more effect to the sovereignty of 
the will.
472
 They admit the right of individuals to make any contractual relationship they 
wish, as long as it does not contradict with the general principles and the spirit of the Shariah 
law.
473
 According to Hanbali school, only conditions which are inconsistent with morality or 
expressly prohibited by the texts of the law (the Quran or Sunna) are void. Within the 
morality scheme contractual limitation is centred on the doctrines of riba and gharar.
474
 
Other than that there are some conditions that are prohibited explicitly by the texts of Quran 
or Sunna, which tend to be limited in scope. Examples of conditions that are considered void 
by  the Hanbali school by reference to a textual ban include: any contracts which comprise 
two agreements, one of which is the condition of the other; any contract of sale which has 
two ancillary conditions imposing supplementary obligations on the same contracting party; 





3.6.1.3 The effect of nullity 
 
In all schools of law the effect of nullity differs according to the object of the clause and 
nature of the contract to which it is attached.
476
 Accordingly, if the clause has the effect of 
making imbalanced advantages, the entire contract becomes null. To the Maliki school, the 
entire contract is rendered void if the void clause contradicts the principle effect of the 
contract.  But if the void clause only contradicts a secondary effect of the contract, the effect 
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3.6.2 How far is the autonomy of parties recognised? 
 
It seems that most classical jurists were under the impression that allowing individuals to 
freely arrange the effect of their contractual relationships (according to their whims) brings 
about the risk of having imbalanced economic relations. Consequently, the fundamental 





Some scholars point out that classical jurists assumed that the law has established a relation 
between judicial act and its effect. They support their argument with reference to texts of the 
Quran and Sunna that urge contractors to fulfil their contracts, for which they are responsible 
before God. According to Obeid, this is a variation of the broad belief that the role of human 
will is limited to bringing the agreement into existence, whereas the content of the act is 
already decided by the law. Therefore, the effect of an agreement must be determined by the 
lawgiver to avoid injustice and imbalance.
479
 As a result, a clause attached to the contract is 





Hussain explains that the reason for the difference in opinion between the schools lies in the 
interpretation of two propositions. The first is that the effect of contract is determined by the 




Looking deeply into the regulation regarding the doctrine of shurut it seems that the four 
schools agree on the primary aim of regulation. This is merely to have a contractual scheme 
free from elements of prohibition as stated in the Quran and Sunna. More precisely, it is to 
maintain a contractual scheme free from riba and gharar (explained below). In implementing 
these restrictions the schools of law had different approaches, and where the three schools 
preferred to remain cautious by strictly regulating contracts, the Hanbali school adopted a 
more liberal approach. This is supported by the fact that all four schools give legal effect to 
innominate contracts that do not violate general principles. All the schools are then in 
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agreement about the effective cause of limiting the contractual freedom but disagree in their 
method. 
 
It seems that the Hanbali position is the more favourable one for the present time because it 
serves commercial requirements.
482
 Furthermore, some contemporary scholars argue that the 
position of the Hanbali school agrees with the modern formula of the autonomy of the will. 
The opinion of the Hanbali jurist Ibn-Taimiyah supports this argument since he explains that 
parties to a contract have the freedom to ‘decide as they wish the content of their judicial acts 





It might seem that the Hanbali school position is similar to the Western idea of autonomy of 
the will, in that they are limited only by the demands of the moral order. However, the will be 
shown not to hold because the concept of morality in Shariah law is much wider then in 
Western laws. This will become clearer in the following discussion of the general limitation 
of contractual autonomy represented by the two principles of riba and gharar. The Hanbali 
position remains the most liberal approach within the Shariah law of contract and therefore is 




3.6.2.1 Limitation on profit (the doctrine of riba) 
 
The term riba is usually translated into English to mean ‘usury’ or ‘interest’ but it has in fact 
a much boarder sense. The literal meaning of the term riba in Arabic means augmentation, 
increase or gain.
485
 Al-Jazari defines it as an increase in one of the articles exchanged without 
there being any compensation for this increase.
486
 Schacht studied riba under the category of 
unjust enrichment where he defines it as ‘any unjustified increase in capital for which no 
compensation is given’.
487
 The way Saleh defines riba is the most accepted way of defining 
riba among Shariah scholars: ‘illicit profit or gain resulting from an inequivalence in the 
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counter-value of the reciprocal benefits during an exchange of two or of several articles of the 
reciprocal benefits of the same species and genus and governed by the same efficient cause’. 
According to Saleh, counter-values means ‘the two or more corporeal objects that the parties 
to a liberal contract exchange between themselves as a result of the contract’.
488
 Riba may 





3.6.2.1.1 Classification of riba 
 
In the attempt to bring all economic activities under social and moral control, riba was 
categorised into two broad classes by jurists: riba al-fadal (surplus riba) and riba al-nasi`a 
(credit riba).
490
 The four schools had different views regarding each of these categories, but 
generally it was understood that the basis for riba al-fadal (surplus riba) is found in the 
following text of the Sunna: 
 
‘Gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt 
for salt of the same kind for the same kind and the quantity for the same quantity, from hand 





Riba al-fadal is accordingly concerned with the unlawful excess of one of the counter-values 
in a hand-to-hand transaction. This text of the Sunna has acquired many different 
interpretations.
492
 Yet, it is sufficient to understand that it is generally accepted that the main 
purpose of the text is to emphasise the absolute equality of the exchanged counter-values of 
certain fungibles.
493




Riba al-nasi’a (credit riba) occurs when the exchange of counter-values is delayed.  A 
deferred exchange confers the possibility of producing a gain in one of the counter-values 
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because of delayed payment or delivery. Accordingly, it is considered unlawful whether or 
not it is accompanied by profit.
495
 Nevertheless, the prohibition does not apply to the 




3.6.2.1.2 Judicial method of regulating riba 
 
The early Shariah scholars made a great effort to specify all illicit transactions that contain 
elements of riba, whether in exchange or in loans. For example Al-Bayhaqi included in his 
book, Al-Sunan Al-Kubra, more than forty chapters on different categories of forms, types 
and nuances of transactions containing elements of riba in different sectors.
497
 Generally, all 
discussion by classical scholars was conducted with the prohibition of riba in mind and 
transactions were then categorised as being either valid or void on this basis. As a result 
many legal doctrines were created within the spirit of the doctrine of riba, such as the 
doctrine of just price which will be expanded upon further in this chapter.  
 
3.6.2.2 The prohibition of uncertainty (the doctrine of gharar) 
 
Under the Shariah law of contract each party has the right at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract to know the existence of her benefit and, ipso facto, of how much he stands to gain. 
This is done under the doctrine of gharar, which is a variation of the general principle that 
gain comes only from work. The initial prohibition of uncertainty in contract is found in the 
prohibition of gambling (mysier), which literally means in Arabic getting something too 
easily without working for it.
498
 The doctrine of gharar was formulated by linking the 
notation of riba with the prohibition of gambling.
499
 Gharar is a very sophisticated concept 
that is usually translated into English as risk of uncertainty or speculation, but it is more than 
this. Realising how difficult it is to define gharar, classical jurists did not attempt to define it 
but rather it was studied in the framework of transactions relating to the contract of sale being 
regarded as the typical form of contract. Contracts involving elements of uncertainty relating 
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to the object of sale, its price or the delay allowed for delivery of the goods are prohibited 




Classical jurists formulated the doctrine of gharar in the light of commercial reality.
501
 In the 
early development of the doctrine many fell into the mistake of assuming that it forbids 
contracting on future goods. The leading jurist Ibn-Qayyim has pointed out that the notion of 
the doctrine is not concerned with the existence or non-existence of the subject matter at the 
time of contract, but rather the uncertainty of the availability of the subject matter.
502
 The 
doctrine was then refocused onto knowledge about the existence or non-existence of the 




The definition formulated by Ibn-Rushed is a helpful formula for the application of gharar. 
According to him gharar can be produced by the material want of knowledge in either the 
subject matter or the price. However, if the subject matter can be adequately described and 
the price can be clearly fixed, gharar can be dismissed because of the elimination of 
speculative risk. Saleh puts the definition made by Ibn-Rushed in the following terms: 
 
‘Gharar in sale transactions causes the buyer to suffer damage (ghubn) and is the result of a 
want of knowledge (jahl) which effects either the price or the subject-matter. Gharar is 
averted if both the price and the subject-matter are known to be in existence, if their 
characteristics are known, if their amount is determined, if the parties have such control over 
them as to make sure that the exchange shall take place and, finally, if the date of future 




The doctrine was reformed and its effect has softened with time. It is not applied in 
contemporary jurisprudence to business risk but to speculative or unconscionable risk.  It 
does not also apply to minimal risk such as, for example the risk regarding if the subject 
matter in the contract of sale is certain to be delivered in a future date.  Gharar was described 
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as a ‘possibility or risk where the equilibrium of counter-values is upset or that an unjust or 
inequitable gain or loss is produced’.
505
 According to Noor contemporary thinking about 
gharar in contract could be summarised under the following headings: 
 
‘(1) There should be no want of knowledge (jhal) regarding the existence of the exchanged 
counter-values; (2) There should be no want of knowledge (jahl) regarding the characteristics 
of the exchanged counter-values or the identification of their speciousness? or knowledge of 
their quantities or the date of future performance if any; (3) Control of parties over the 




3.6.2.2.1 Judicial methods of regulating gharar 
 
In the attempt to have a contractual scheme free from gharar, just like in riba, customary 
transactions were divided into lawful and unlawful ones. This was done according to gharar 
as well as riba. In doing so transactions involving a high degree of risk were prohibited. In 
order to avoid gharar as much as possible certain conditions were emphasised by Shariah 
jurisprudence. In doing so, the importance of the existence of the counter-values, which are to 
be established at a meeting in order to examine them and hand them over to the other 
immediately, is stressed in bilateral transactions. 
 
In addition, emphasis is placed on the importance of examining the object of contract in a 
precise manner through inspections and communication.
507
 Generally, the safest way to avoid 
gharar and riba and guarantee that parties have choices grounded on genuine intent without 
any exploitation is by having contracts concluded immediately.
508
 It must be pointed out that 
the two doctrines of riba and gharar have been to some extent moderated in contemporary 
times under the doctrine of necessity.
509
 Nevertheless, they continue to exist in the very basis 
of the Shariah law of contract and remain the subject of scholarly debate. 
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3.6.3 Modern application of the doctrine of shurut by the Saudi courts 
 
The Saudi court upholds the Hanbali school position in that it admits the right of individuals 
to make any contractual relationship they wish, as long as it does not contradict the general 
principles or the spirit of Shariah law. The court relies on the text of the Sunna which 
indicates that individuals ‘will be held to their conditions, except the conditions that make the 
lawful unlawful, or the unlawful lawful’.
510
 On many occasions a number of different kinds 
of condition have been accepted and enforced by the Saudi courts.  Usually the court would 
validate the condition unless it is contradicted by a textual rule. For example, in a contract of 
sale where the parties agree that the price is to be paid by instrument in twelfth months. The 
contract contains a condition which states that if the buyer is two months late in paying the 
instrument the full price becomes automatically due.  This condition is held to be valid and 




On a different occasion, the Saudi court accepted the validity of sale conditioned upon the 
discharge of goods. A contract sale of commercial goods between a supplier and trader 
contained a term which states that; if the trader did not resell the product supplied to him by 
the supplier within a given time, he has the right, according to the relevant condition, to 





Conversely, it is observed that the Saudi court would invalidate three types of conditions: a 
condition containing element of riba, gharar, or a condition that does not agree with the 
purpose of contract.  In many instances the Saudi court has ruled in relation to contracts 
which included terms that would amount to riba as being void. In its essence the doctrine of 
riba is limited to the exchange of certain fungible goods. The majority of cases seen by the 
Saudi courts are related to the sale of gold. The court emphasises the absolute equality of the 




Similarly, any ancillary condition that amounts to gharar or gross uncertainty is invalidated 
by the Saudi courts. For example, in a contract of sale where the agreement contains terms 
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which regard the value of the contract as not final until approved by an accountings report, 
the price of the contract could be either decreased or increased prior to the conclusion of the 
contract.  When brought to court, it has been held that this is case of uncertainty which 
amounts to gharar and this renders the contract void.
514
 In a different case, a contract to 
supply contract chilled food contained a term that obliged the buyer to pay for storage 
expenses in addition to the price of the subject matter. The contract did not involve a 
mechanism for determining the storage costs. The court held that the contract involved an 
element of gharar as regard to storage costs. Thus, it ordered that the buyer is liable only for 




Furthermore, any ancillary condition that contradicts the purpose of the contract is 
invalidated by the Saudi courts.  A case was brought to court relating to a contract of sale in 
which the subject matter is land that is subject to dispute. The contract of sale included a term 
which obliged the seller to transfer the ownership of the land to the buyer once the dispute is 
settled. The buyer paid part of the price of the sale at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. The full amount was due upon the transfer of the ownership. The seller did not 
honour his obligation; he did not transfer the ownership of the land to the buyer even though 
the dispute over the land has been settled. When the case was brought to court it was held that 
this was an invalid contract of sale on account of it being subject to a condition which 
contradicts with the nature of the contract. The transfer of the ownership is the primary 
purpose of any contract of sale; thus subjecting this to a condition renders the contract 
void.
516
 Likewise, a condition to keep the subject matter of a contract of sale in the position 
of the seller until all instruments are paid was held by the court to be void. The Saudi court 
explained that such a condition contradicts the contract of sale where the subject matter must 







The central part of this chapter was focused on introducing the Shariah law of contract. The 
evolution of the law of contract took place around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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The classical period from the twelfth to the eighteenth century had an enormous role in 
shaping the Shariah law of contract. Most of the Shariah literature written during this period 
by the classical jurists is still relevant to modern Shariah law. Furthermore, the sources of 
Shariah law along with the judicial methodology were distinguished for their special nature. 
Shariah law is said to be a divinely orientated system, and as a result, legal development is 
made a matter of discovery. Two major characteristics that describe the nature of the Shariah 
law of contract were mentioned, and these are the fact that it is based on nominative contract 
and developed away from the authority of a certain state. The ongoing debate over the 
existence of a general theory that binds the Shariah law of contract was addressed. The 
discussion has revealed that parties’ autonomy under the Shariah law of contract is limited to 
the service of equity and morals. This has led to the conclusion that the Shariah law of 
contract is bound by the principle of permissibility of contract rather than freedom of 
contract. The major limitation on contract conclusion by the principles of riba and ghrar 
were introduced. In the following section notions of fairness under the Shariah law of 
contract will be addressed including duress, riba, gharar, just price, unfair exploitation and 
mandatory disclosure. This is aimed at characterising the situation of contractual justice 
under the Shariah law of contract. 
 
3.8 Notions of contractual justice in the Shariah law of contract 
 
The previous analysis addressed the general limitations to contractual autonomy under the 
Shariah law of contract. The general theory of contract is limited by the two fundamental 
doctrines of riba and gharar. The importance of the two doctrines, as will become clearer 
later on, is that all doctrines and legal rules under the Shariah law of contract have been 
created within their spirit. Since the general principles of the Shariah law of contract have 
been established we shall move on to address some detailed rules related to the research 
issue. This section aims to investigate the level of contractual justice offered by the Shariah 
law of contract. Particularly, it investigates the meaning and concepts of contractual justice. It 
determines how the law deals with perceived cases of injustice, and indeed, the extent to 
which individuals are legally bound to act fairly and justly towards each others. 
 
In Shariah justice is a central theme in dictating the traditions of law and how they should put 
into practice. Justice operates in both a legal and a divine sense. Individuals are required to 
conduct themselves and others in a just manner. It would, therefore, seem quite natural to 
120 
 
apply justice to the market place. Yet justice is a relative concept, and this is presented in the 
Shariah law of contract through two major principles, that gain has to be earned and the 
emphasis on the equality of counter-values. The discussion that follows is concerned with 
notions of contractual justice under the Shariah law of contract. 
 
Obligation in Shariah is created by consent, thus, the doctrine of duress, which is aimed at 
protecting consent will be addressed first. The general meaning of the doctrines of riba and 
gharar have been addressed above, here we shall determine the justice rationale behind the 
two doctrines. Other notions of contractual justice including the doctrines of just price, unfair 
exploitation and mandatory disclosure will also be addressed. 
 
3.8.1The doctrine of duress  
 
Primary texts of Shariah emphasise that no contract can be concluded without consent. This 
is mentioned in the following verse of the Quran ‘Squander not your wealth among 
yourselves in worthless dealings, but let there be trade by mutual consent’.
518
 Duress is 
generally regarded as a defect affecting consent in contract and therefore the validity of the 
consent. The doctrine is based on both objective and subjective requirements. To start with 
the objective inquiry needs to exist before considering the subjective feeling of the victim. It 
is, therefore, a matter of balance between the objective factors (types of duress and the nature 
of the threat) and subjective factors (the feeling of the victim).
519
 Yet, it must be stressed here 
that a threat to purely economic interests does not amount for duress under Shariah law.  
 
3.8.1.1 The objective test 
 
The objective test is concerned with the nature of the threat. Five objective conditions have to 
be satisfied in a claim of duress:
520
(1) the threat must be of serious injury to the victim of 
duress, including deprivation of liberty through physical confinement or serious damage to 
property; (2) the threat must be directed at the coerced person himself or one of his close 
relatives. Most jurists include spouses, children and parents in the category of close relative. 
The Maliki school include only the children of the contracting party, but the Hanfi school 
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broaden the category of close relative to include most relatives;
521
 (3) the threat needs to be 
realistic, in the sense that it is reasonable to expect that it will be carried out; (4) the threat 
must be of imminent injury or damage in a way that leaves the victim without a chance to 
protect himself by asking for help or recourse to the law. In this regard some jurists require 
the threat to be immediate or the coerced act to be performed in the presence of the coerced 
person.
522
 However, the essence of the condition is the formation of the fear in the victim’s 
mind when she feels she is left without any choice. As a result, according to the Maliki, since 
the real issue is the formation of fear in the victim’s mind there is no need to require that the 
threatened harm is immediate. It could occur in month but the victim may well be terrified by 
this and might not be able to ask for help;
523




3.8.1.2 The subjective test 
 
The objective test presented in the above listed criteria is meant to determine whether or not a 
reasonable ground for duress exists. When a reasonable ground for duress exists, the next step 
would be the subjective test.  The state of mind of the party is the primary concern of the test.  
Therefore, it investigates whether the coerced person believed, by a preponderance of his 
thought, that he was faced with a necessity that left him no alternative.
525
 Sarakhsi explains 
the test in the following terms: 
 
‘We consider the preponderance of thought [of the victim] and what he felt because the 
victim’s belief takes precedence over the reality concerning matters that we have no way of 
verifying independently […] The conditions of people vary according to their ability to 




The court then will proceed to decide whether or not the coerced party acted solely on 
account of the fear of threat. The individual personality of the coerced party is therefore a 
relevant consideration. The question to be determined by the court is whether the contracting 
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party himself believed that his failure to consent would result in immediate, unlawful and 




It seems that duress requirements are therefore relative according to the circumstances of the 
victim. Things that make an inexperienced person feel terrified do not necessarily have the 





3.8.1.3 The effect of duress 
 
With regard to its effect, duress is divided into two categories: compiling and non-compiling. 
All jurists agree that no person will be bound to an agreement he made under duress. 
Generally, compiling duress nullifies consent and vitiates free choice; it therefore, renders 
contracts non-binding and automatically non-existent. On the other hand, non-compiling 
duress nullifies consent but does not vitiate free choice. In this case the victim of duress is 





3.8.2 The fairness aspect of the doctrine of riba  
 
The doctrine of riba is believed to be the limitation of the contract for a moral objective 
related to fairness. Different rationales have been linked to the prohibition of riba. Some 
regard it to be limited to the prohibition of exploitive lending by loan sharks, which makes 
the prohibition of riba limited to high interest loans only. Others take it in general terms to 
mean that the prohibition of riba is centred on the potential for exploitation in contracts.
530
 
However, the view that the prohibition of riba comes from the stress of equilibrium of 
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The doctrine of riba is categorised by many under unjust enrichment.
532
 Shimizu explains 
that because labour is the only source of income tolerated by Islamic law, interest, which is 
enrichment of currency by itself, is not accepted. In the Islamic law of contract interest is 
regarded as unjust consideration. It is regarded as a surplus, a gain that destroys the 
equilibrium of the counter-values. Although the gain itself is accepted, an unjustified gain or 
a gain received without giving a counter-value is forbidden.
533
 Ibn-Rushed, the Maliki jurist 
has made a direct economic argument to explain how riba is concerned with inequality and 
injustice. This argument was presented in the context of the types of goods to which the 
prohibition of riba al-fadl applies.
534
 The analysis of Ibn-Rushed was articulated by Gamal in 
the following terms: 
 
‘It is thus apparent from the law that what is intended by the prohibition of riba is what it 
contains of excessive injustice (ghubn fahish). In this regard, justice in transactions is 
achieved by approaching equality. Since the attainment of such equality in items of different 
kinds is difficult, their values are determined instead in monetary terms (with the Dirham and 
the Dinar). For things which are not measured by weight and volume, justice can be 
determined by means of proportionality. I mean, the ratio between the values of one item to 
its kind should be equal to the ratio of the value of the other item to its kind. For example, if a 
person sells a horse in exchange for clothes, justice is attained by making the ratio of the 
price of the horse to other horses the same as the ratio of the price of the clothes [for which it 
is traded, tr.] to other clothes. Thus, if the value of the horse is fifty, the value of the clothes 
should be fifty. [If each piece of clothing value is five], then the horse should be exchanged 
for 10 pieces of clothing […] As for [fungible] goods measured by volume or weight, they 
are relatively homogenous, and thus have similar benefits [utilities]. Since it is not necessary 
for a person owning one type of those goods to exchange it for the exact same type, justice in 





Gamal, in his attempt to put Ibn-Rushed’s analysis into contemporary economic terminology, 
explained that the statement of Ibn-Rushed indicates that justice requires equality in the  ratio 
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of barter trade, the ratio of prices and of marginal utilities.
536
 In the first quoted paragraph 
Ibn-Rushed meant, according to Gamal, to say that justice is only obtained if ‘the ratio at 
which non-fungible goods are traded for one another (e.g. clothes for a horse) is the 
reciprocal of the ratio of their prices.’ Therefore, justice in this context means ‘making to 
market’, if a bag is worth 20 on the market it should be traded for 2 dresses that are each 
worth 2 in the market. As for very heterogeneous items (e.g. clothes for a horse), parties are 
required to comply with the ratio of market prices. Yet, because non-fungibles vary widely in 




Gamal further explains that in the second quoted paragraph mainly focused on fungibles, Ibn-
Rushed stresses the ratio of trading and the ratio of utilities (benefits) derived by the traders. 
According to Gamal, if this is to be put into modern terms it should be ‘the ratio of marginal 
utilities’. The second part of Ibn-Rushed’s statement is centred on the equality of ratios of 
barter trading and market prices and its relationship to economic efficiency, from which 
Gamal draws the following conclusion: 
 
‘Considering benefit/utility in the marginal sense, it would stand to reason that the ratio at 
which a barter trade takes place would roughly equate the two parties’ ratios of marginal 
utilities of the traded objects (with perfect equality if the goods were perfectly divisible), 
provided that they have access to many other trading partners. The trade will be conducive to 
economic efficiency if the trading ratio was equal to the ratio of marginal utilities over the 
entire economy. The latter is ensured—in turn—by equating the ratio of marginal utilities to 
the ratio of market prices. This is the condition for Pareto efficiency
538
 in the market. We can 
now appeal to the first and second welfare theorems of economics, and conclude that 





In its essence the doctrine of riba is concerned with the exchange of fungibles and credit 
transactions. The effect of the doctrine acquired a considerable weight in early times when 
the exchange of goods for something other than money was common. Yet, in modern days 
the significance of the doctrine of riba is largely limited to financial and credit transactions. 
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However, the spirit of the law’s stress on the equality of counter-values accords with the 
essence of the regulation of the law of contract. Indeed, riba has been the ground from which 
many legal doctrines of Shariah contract law have been evaluated. For example the doctrines 
of fair price and unfair exploration (explained below) were created in the light of the doctrine 
of riba. 
 
3.8.3 The fairness aspect of the doctrine of gharar 
 
The doctrine of gharar was formulated by linking the principle of riba with the prohibition of 
gambling.
540
 Uncertainty as prohibited by the doctrine of gharar is aimed at avoiding the risk 
of inequality either in a transaction which has the potential of resulting in riba or unequal 
gain.
541
 In other words, in order to judge whether or not a certain transaction is in compliance 
with the principle of equality of counter-values as described above in the context of riba, a 
fixed obligation will be needed as a precondition. It could be said that gharar is a principle 
that supplements the principle of riba by protecting the equality of counter-values in future 
transactions. 
 
This is supported by the opinion of many scholars. Chehata, in light of the attempt to define 
gharar concluded that the basis of the prohibition of gharar is the desire to ensure 
equivalence in commutative transactions.
542
 Furthermore, Obeid concludes her analysis of 
gharar by making a similar statement. She explains that ‘the concept of the balance of 
benefits’ is highly desired by Shariah law in the principle of gharar. She states that Shariah 
prohibits ‘all transactions in which the weaker party might be exploited by reasons of his 




3.8.4 The doctrine of just price  
 
The idea that contracts ought to be concluded at a just or fair price has always existed in the 
Shariah law of contract. The significance of the doctrine lies in pursuing justice rather than 
determining price. The earliest case reported was when the prophet denounced overcharging 
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 The concept was then applied by jurists in a restricted sense, mainly in 
relation to compensation. For example in the case of defective goods, usurpation or disposal 
of the property of trust. The general assumption was that the just price of something is the 
price which is paid for similar objects in a given time and place. For this reason, classical 




It was Ibn-Taimiyah who paid special attention to this matter. He explained the difference 
between iwad almithel (just compensation) and thamn almithel (just price). He used the term 
compensation of the equivalent to refer to the ethico-legal aspect of just price and the term 
just price to refer to the economic aspect.
546
 In differentiating between compensation of the 
equivalent and the price of equivalent Ibn-Taimiyah provided the following analysis. A just 
compensation is the amount with which people are familiar and to which they are 
accustomed. The price of the equivalent is an uncommon amount which results from an 
increase or decrease in volition or other factors.
547
 Ibn-Taimiyah further explained that just 
compensation does not occur in cases of exchange but rather in compensation or discharge of 
obligation. On the other hand, the price of the equivalent occurs in situations where there is 




Apparently, as illustrated by Islahi, Ibn-Taimiyah viewed the compensation of the equivalent 
as being a relatively durable phenomenon resulting from established custom. By contrast, the 
price of the equivalent is variable; it is determined by the forces of supply and demand and is 
affected by the will and desire of the people concerned. Accordingly, one can define the 
compensation of the equivalent as ‘the equivalent amount of that particular object in the 
prevailing usage’ or, ‘the rate and the custom.’
549
 The price of equivalent is ‘that rate at 
which people sell their goods and which is commonly accepted as equivalent for it and for 
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Ibn-Taimiyah explained that the best way to evaluate just compensation is by assessing the 
item by its equivalent in order to achieve real justice. On other occasions, he stated that ‘if 
people are dealing with their goods in the normal way without any injustice on their part and 
the price rises either due to shortage of the goods (i.e. decrease in supply) or due to increase 
in population (i.e. increase in demand), then it is from God. In these cases, to force the seller 




The second statement above identifies that it is the price established by the free play of 
market forces of supply and demand. The use of phrases ‘in a normal way’ and ‘without 
injustice on their part’ indicates that the price of the equivalent must be a comparative price 
and there must be no fraud. It is worth noting here that Ibn-Taimiyah encourages setting a 
price of the equivalent where one is not already in place. In doing so, the subjective value of 
the object to the buyer and to the seller is taken into consideration.
552
 Closely related to the 
issue of the price of the equivalent is ujrat almithel (the wage of the equivalent) and the profit 
of the equivalent. Ibn-Taimiyah applied the same rules of the price of the equivalent to the 




Just profit or the profit of the equivalent is a normal profit that is usually earned in a 
particular type of trade without harming others. Profit is generally permitted until it becomes 
abnormal or exploitive. This protects people who are not aware of the normal conditions of 
the market, as will be illustrated in the doctrine of unfair exploitation.
554
 Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of just price in Shariah is a supplementary principle in the sense that it cannot be 
invoked by itself. Other than cases where the price is not specified, one needs to prove a case 
of exploitation or defect to invoke the doctrine of just price. Similarly, in a case of unfair 
exploitation and in some cases of defect the unfairness of price needs to be determined to 
support such claims. 
 
3.8.5 Unfair exploitation (ghubn) 
 
The above discussion of the doctrine of riba and just price illustrates the stress on the 
equivalence of counter-values in the law of contract. The doctrine of unfair exploitation is a 
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means by which the principle is enforced. It was the Hanbali school who gave the doctrine a 
special attention and shape. They discussed the issue of unfair exploitation in relation to three 
practices; (1) sale by inexperienced persons, (2) necessity sale and (3) the act of meeting 
Bedouin traders before reaching the city market. The prohibition in the three practices is 
meant to protect the weakness or vulnerability of one of the contracting parties. Exploitation 
renders the contract voidable for the benefit of the exploited party who has the option to 




3.8.5.1 Sale by inexperienced persons (bay almustarsel) 
 
This kind of sale is concluded by a person who is ignorant of market prices. In this type of 
sale the inexpert contractor would disclose his lack of knowledge to the co-contractor, putting 
his/her trust in the other party to conclude the deal at market price.
556
  The relevant 
circumstances impose a duty on the seller to disclose the market price. He is under an 
obligation to honour the trust by ensuring a fair deal.
557
 Jurists defined almustarsel as the 
following: according to Ibn-Qudamh almustarsel is ‘a person who is unaware of market 
conditions and lacks […] bargaining skills’.
558
 Imam Ahmad suggests a similar definition: 
‘he is a person who has no advantage in bargaining and places his trust on the seller’.
559
  





3.8.5.1.1 The requirements of istersal  
 
Hanbali scholars have generally agreed that a claim under the doctrine of istersal needs to 
satisfy two conditions. First, the victim must be unaware of real market conditions; here the 
lack of bargaining skills is regarded as a presumption. Second, there must be an inequality of 
counter values where the inequality must be a gross and obvious imbalance between the 
exchanged values (ghubn fahish). It is enough for the Hanbali scholars to prove that there was 
a gross inequality between the exchanged values and that the exploited party lacked the 
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relevant market skills. The Maliki scholars, on the other hand, require that the other 
contractor is aware of the lack of knowledge of the part of the victim and exploited the other 




3.8.5.2 Necessity contracts (bay almuztar) 
 
This kind of contract is concluded to satisfy a basic need of the contractor (food, clothes etc).  
The way jurists describe this kind of sale impels an element of urgently or necessity, meaning 
that the sale is concluded in abnormal circumstances. In this context Ibn-Taimiyah illustrated 
that a person who has something that others are in need of and which nobody else can 





3.8.5.3 Meeting Bedouin traders before reaching the market (talaqqi al-rukban) 
 
Talaqqi al-rukban refers to the act of meeting Bedouin traders before reaching the city 
market whereby a city dweller would meet those traders at the outskirts of the city and buy 
their merchandise for unfairly low prices as the traders are unaware of the real market 
prices.
563
 Such a practice was prohibited by the text of the Sunna through the saying of the 




The essence of the prohibition of such a practice is to protect the Bedouin who are usually 
ignorant of market prices, which potentially leads to an unjust bargain. A similar requirement 
of claim under the sale by inexperienced persons is applicable to the doctrine of talaqqi al-
rukban. No fraud is required by the Hanbali school. It is sufficient to prove that the other 
contractor was aware of that the exploited party was ignorant of market conditions. This was 
presumed from the fact that such traders were yet to reach the market. However, a minor 
inequality of counter-values is tolerated. There must be gross exploitation (ghubn fahish) to 
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3.8.5.4 Modern applications of the doctrine of unfair exploitation  
 
From the available case law in the Saudi legal system, it seems that the fairness of the deal is 
the most significance aspect to be distinguished in a case of unfair exploitation. Ignorance of 
market price is presumed when there is a significant difference between the contract price and 
the just price (the price of the equivalence). In a case where the plaintiff claims that he bought 
a farm for more than it is worth as result of his ignorance of market price the Saudi court held 
that this is a case of istrisal, which can only be invoked if the price paid is grossly unfair. 
Although the court cited Ibn-Qudamh’s definition of the almustarsel, which is a ‘person who 
is ignorant of market price and lacks the bargaining skills’,
566
 it did not involve itself in a 
process of determining the situation of the buyer. The court did not attempt to distinguish 
whether or not the buyer was aware of the market price. Instead, focus was placed upon 
distinguishing the fairness the deal, particularly the fairness of the price, and determining the 




In deciding what amounts to fair price the court ordered an expert team to evaluate the price 
of the subject matter (farm land) at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The evaluation 
had to acknowledge the value of farms in the same area with similar characteristics (the price 
of the equivalence). The court however, explained that what amounts to exploitation is 
related to custom.  It is a matter of deciding whether the price charged is of usual profit or 
not. In this regard, the court mentioned the Maliki school position which indicates that a 
transaction is considered unfair exploitation if the price charged was above the price of 
equivalence by a third or more. The court, however, did not attempt to set a specific standard 
in this regard. Instead it was held that in the given situation the contract price is three times 




In a different case the court explained that the doctrine of unfair exploitation is for the benefit 
of both parties. The seller can rely on this right if she can prove that she has sold the subject 
matter by less than the price of the equivalence due to her ignorance of the market price.
569
 
The right to invoke the doctrine of unfair exploitation is dismissed when the abused party acts 
in a way which implies that she accepted the sale and had no objection to it.  The transfer of 
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the ownership of the subject matter to a third party is an example of this.
570
 The court cited 
Ibn-Qudamh’s statement that ‘options are dismissed by the transfer of the ownership.’
571
 The 
court has refused an obvious case of unfair exploitation in a sale of land; the land was sold for 
considerably less than the market price. The decision was based on the fact that the claimant 
did not act in a way which indicated his non-acceptance of the validity of the contract. The 
claimant had seen the buyer of the land building, farming and selling parts of it and remained 
silent for a long time.
572
 A victim of unfair exploitation is given the option of ghubn. She can 
choose whether to rescind the contract or claim the difference in price between the contract 
price and the price of the equivalence (irsh). 
 
3.8.6 Mandatory disclosure 
 
Silence is not generally an offence in Shariah; however, in few particular situations it could 
amount to negligence. There is a distinction between silence as an expression of consent and 
silence as concealment. The first silence concerns personal liberty and is thus preserved. The 
second silence relates to good faith in a transaction and may amount to a liability.
573
 Shariah 
law applies the doctrine of failure of disclosure to two situations. There are two situations of 
mandatory disclosure known in Shariah as defect disclosure and disclosure in trust 
contracts.
574
 All major schools of Shariah are in agreement that sellers are under a duty to 
disclose any default in the object of sale. Failure of disclosure of the defect is regarded to be 




The second situation is related to trust sales (bay al-amana). This type of sale is based on the 
relation of trust that the seller will disclose the original price of the subject matter. An 
example of a trust sale is morabaha, which is the sale of something for the price at which it 
was purchased by the seller and an addition of a fixed sum by way of profit. The nature of 
this sale requires the seller to disclose the original price of the commodity. This sale is based 
on the trust relation between a fiduciary and a beneficiary. The seller (agent) is under a 
responsibility to disclose the original price of the subject matter. Failure of disclosure is a 
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betrayal of the trust relation that amounts to responsibility. Such a failure gives the buyer the 




3.8.6.1 Modern applications of the doctrine of mandatory disclosure 
 
In the Saudi judicial system the defect defence is a common one for relief from contractual 
obligations.
577
 Such claims are not always successful. The fact that the defendant waited until 
the case was brought to court is taken by the Saudi court as evidence of trying to escape from 
contractual obligations. For a claim to succeed based on a defect claim the Saudi court has 
explained that the defect must have existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The 
claim is not likely to succeed if the claimant fails to prove that the defect was there at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract or is a consequence of a defect that was there at that 
time.
578
 On a different occasion, the court has explained in relation to a technical error related 
to a laser machine that there is a difference between an old defect that existed at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract and occasional defects, which are covered by the guarantee. 




Once the defect has been proved the buyer is required to use the option of defect. In a case 
related to a manufacturing defect in a car, the Saudi court explained that the buyer of the 
defective subject matter has two options. She can choose whether to rescind the contract or 




There is no certain time limit to bring the claim of defect. In fact the court has accepted a 
claim of defect even though the subject matter had been used up. The case was brought to 
court three months after the delivery. The subject matter was agricultural compost that 
according to the claimant did not satisfy common standards. The claimant had used up almost 
all of the compost which had caused him losses since it did not satisfy its purpose. The Saudi 
court held that since the claimant had used up most of the subject matter his right to rescind 
the contract was no longer possible. The court therefore ruled for (irsh), the decrease in price 
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as result of the defect to be paid to the claimant. In addition the court ruled that damages 




However, the option of the defect, just like the option of ghubn, is dismissed once the buyer 
has made an action that indicates that he has accepted the sale after the defect has come to his 
knowledge. The Saudi court refused the claim for the option of defect in a case of a defective 
car because the buyer of the car had transferred ownership through selling.
582
 Nonetheless, 
the examination and acceptation of the subject matter by the buyer does not obviate the 
buyer’s right to the option of hidden defects. In the case of a second hand car sale the court 
refused the defendant’s argument that the buyer had the chance to examine the car and 




There seems to be no rule on the value of what is considered a defect. While in cases of 
unfair exploitation the court is unlikely to accept cases where the exploitation is by less than 
the third, a case of defect would be accepted for an amount less than that. In a case of 
defective goods that did not meet accepted standards, the court ruled for 25% of the value of 




3.9 Concluding remarks 
 
The Shariah law of contract is governed by limited contractual autonomy. The moral scheme 
limiting the law is wide enough to say that the law is based on the principle of promissory of 
contract rather than freedom of contract. The two doctrines of riba and gharar constitute a 
general limitation on contractual autonomy. In their essence they uphold equality and 
certainty. Equality is a fundamental principle of the Shariah law of contract in the sense that 
all counter-values must be equal. This underpins the principle that profit must be a result of 
the work of labour not a matter of exploitation of the needs of others. For the purpose of 
satisfying these principles the Shariah law of contract has become highly regulated to satisfy 
its own concept of justice. 
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It is well accepted that the Shariah law of contract is based on the mutual consent of the 
parties. The doctrine of duress protects consent from any defect. Individual circumstances 
and personal differences and weakness are considered by the doctrine. Other than this the law 
is focused on the satisfying of justice within the substance of contract. The law provides a 
framework in which the contract scheme is bound by the moral ethics that promote justice 
and fairness in society. 
 
The principle of equivalence of counter-values appears as well as the doctrine of just price.  
A just price is the equivalent price: ‘that rate at which people sell their goods and which is 
commonly accepted as equivalent for it and for similar goods at that particular time and 
place.’
585
 The doctrine of unfair exploitation serves the same end. Under the doctrine of 
unfair exploitation vulnerable individuals are protected from exploitation. It ensures that they 
receive as much as they get in return.  Certainty of contract is enhanced to serve the same end 
through the doctrines of gharar and mandatory disclosure. Individuals are provided with the 
important information to help them to decide on the value of the commodity.  
 
As a result, it seems that fairness and justice are admitted and promoted aims of contract law. 
A fair deal in the eye of Shariah law is one where the rights and obligations of the contracting 
party are clearly determined and where each receives as much as she gives in return back. 
The stress on the equivalence of counter values aims to encourage work and to make it the 
only permitted cause of profit. 
 
Shariah law of contract deals with perceived unfairness in contract either by prohibition or 
correction. In order to correct perceived unfairness, a unilateral legal right of recovery is 
given to a party of contract to make up for any loses that may occur. A party who is the 
victim of an unfair situation has the right to either revoke or ratify the contract and thus 
determine its validity. In other words, the relevant contract is in theory valid subject to the 
use of the option.  This is done through the corrective scheme of options.  Options are 
measures that have been regulated to deal with any fault associated with the contact 
regardless of its classification (such as the options of ghubun and defect mentioned above) 
The concept is that whenever something goes wrong in a contract it is dealt with by an 
option. 
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Until now the research has addressed the issue of the general theory of contractual justice in 
both English and Shariah law of contract. The focus shall now be turned to consumer 
contracts. The following chapters move on to address the theoretical grounds for consumer 
protection, the practice of consumer protection under English law and the viability of 




































In this chapter, the theoretical basis of consumer protection will be addressed from economic 
and social perspectives. It investigates from a theoretical perspective why the law of contract 
should protect consumers over traders. Indeed, one could argue that the mere fact that the 
context of consumer contract is different from that of commercial contract does not in itself 
necessitate different regulations.  Consumer law diverges from the broader law of contract 
governed by the individual notion of free choice, in those legal systems that promote it. Thus, 
any intervention into the parties’ autonomy needs to be on a basis that is more than simply 
difference. In addition, distinguishing rationales for intervention helps to come up with the 
right remedies to deal with consumer problems.
586
 The protection of the consumer against 
fraudulent and other criminal practices has been thought to be appropriate for many centuries 
and is hardly conventional.
587
 A more difficult question to answer is why protect the 
consumer when there has been no fraud by the producer or the seller?
588
 The following 
section will address the theoretical aspect of consumer protection under the heading of 
consumer protection rationales. Next a critical perspective on consumer protection is offered 
as to the necessity, efficiency and chosen level of protection. The discussion of this chapter 
serves the second aim of the research by distinguishing the main theoretical characteristics of 
consumer protection to be tested under the Shariah law of contract. This will later be 
examined in chapter six in relation to the Shariah law of contract in order to determine the 
viability of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract.  
 
4.1 Consumer protection rationales  
 
Broadly speaking consumer protection is justified on two grounds: economic justifications 
and social justice justifications. Economic goals of regulation seek to improve efficiency and 
maximise welfare at a societal level. It does not, however, address how welfare is distributed 
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between people or groups within society except in certain limited senses. Indeed, it is 
commonly accepted that distribution resulting from market processes is not always fair and 
just. Therefore, some regulation ought to be based on distributional and fairness goals 
regardless of the efficiency of its outcomes. In this context, Ogus suggests that ‘regulatory 
measures designed to correct economic inefficiency should be subject to constraints resulting 
from perceptions of distributional justice.’
589
 The subsequent analysis will focus on economic 
(market failure) and social justice (distributive justice, paternalism and community values) 
rationales for consumer protection. 
 
4.1.1 Economic justification  
 
The free market was thought to be the best possible way to deliver economic efficiency. 
Classical theorists were under the impression that if the market is left alone it will achieve the 
greatest possible level of resource allocation.
590
 Although this idea of the ‘perfect market’ 
model has proved to be unrealistic in reality, it is still useful as a starting point for examining 
the economic justification of consumer protection.  In an ideal market there is no need for 
Government to intervention.
591
 Ramsay identifies the characteristics of the perfect market as 
follows: 
 
‘(i) there are numerous buyers and sellers in the market, such that the activities of any one 
economic actor will have only a minimal impact on the output or price of the market; (ii) 
there is free entry into and exit from the market; (iii) the commodity sold in the market is 
homogeneous; that is, essentially the same product is sold by each seller in the particular 
market;(iv) all economic actors in the market have perfect information about the nature and 
value of the commodities traded;(v) all the costs of producing the commodity are borne by 





In reality it has been proved that the idea of the ‘perfect market’ is unrealistic and a free 
market is not always the best way to allocate resources.
593
 When a free market does not 
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deliver the optimum allocation of resources it is said to fail: ‘market failure exists where the 
free market fails to deliver economic efficiency’.
594
 Market failure (neo-classical rationale) is 
the central economic rationale for government intervention. Market failure analysis of 
contract helps decision makers to identify the sources of consumer problems and take the 
relevant measures to correct them. The role of government is limited to rectifying the market 
failure.
595
 It is part of a modern corrective intervention which is taken to be a restatement of 
the classical law of contract and the freedom of contract.
596
 In the next section the most 
common market failures will be discussed to explain why it becomes necessary to intervene 
by regulating the marketplace. 
 
4.1.1.1 Absence of competition 
 
In a competitive market consumer choice is protected by ensuring that the consumer is able to 
choose freely.
597
 Competition has the advantage of making the market function effectively.
598
  
Munday names two main reasons to explain why monopolies occur in a free market. The first 
is referred to as the ‘economy of scale.’ It describes the need for a firm to become large if 
they are to succeed in minimising their costs. Although, in concept there is nothing wrong 
with this, the market may not be able to sustain more than few such large firms. The second 
issue is referred to as ‘profit move’ where in an effort to maximise profit firms may 
deliberately try to destroy competition. Destroying competition is one of the most effective 





The issue of competition failure is not limited to the occurrence of monopoly, but is also 
related to the extent to which consumers benefit from competition. Indeed, the effectiveness 
of competition might be reduced in a free market that is open for competition simply because 
consumers are not benefiting from that competition. ‘Switching costs’ is a major reason for 
this. Consumers might find it sometimes too expensive to switch from one producer to 
another. As a result, they prefer not look to what other competing suppliers offer. Farrell and 
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Klemperer identify the concept of ‘switching costs’ as consisting of exit fees, the cost of 
learning about alternative terms, and issues such as the paperwork necessary to effect the 
changes.
600
 All of these obstacles and expenses may lead the consumer to choose not to look 
at what other competing suppliers offer.  
 
4.1.1.2 Barriers to entry 
 
Free entry into the market is said to have a positive effect on the marketplace, yet, there are 
several different types of barrier to entry that can exist in markets. There is the product 
differentiation barrier, which reflects the difficulty that faces a trader when trying to 
introduce a new product to consumers. Consumers naturally need to identify a seller’s brand 
name with the product. This means that it is a significant hurdle for a new entrant to the 
market to make consumers familiar with her product. Additionally, there are institutional 
barriers, which are erected by government. These barriers take many forms such as patents, 
licensing tariffs and quotas.  Barriers are usually imposed to market entry in those areas of 
the market where the risks posed by a particular sector are seen to be great, such as 
pharmaceuticals. Finally there are economic barriers. One of the most likely obstacles to be 
faced by a new entrant to the marker is the issue of ‘economies of scale’. It means that the 
cost advantage rises with increased output of a product. This makes it difficult for a new firm 




4.1.1.3 Product homogeneity 
 
Homogenous products exist in an industry when products of one firm cannot be distinguished 
from those of others. Product homogeneity is said to be a characteristic of perfect 
competition. If products are homogeneous it is easier for a consumer to choose between 
products, since the only preferential difference is the price. However, traders prefer to 
distinguish their products from those of others to create consumer loyalty. Product 
differentiation occurs when consumers can differentiate the products of one firm from the 
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other on a non-price basis. Product differentiation is said to be a feature of monopolistic 




4.1.1.4 Information deficits 
 
The analysis of information asymmetries is a vital aspect of consumer discussion. It has been 
regarded as ‘the key analytical basis for early consumer protection law’.
603
 Indeed, 
information deficits are a justificatory factor in all consumer protection measures. 
Information is held to empower consumers to make informed choices. By contrast, 
information failure is likely to significantly injure a consumer’s position.
604
 Three types of 
information have been identified, which can assist consumers in making an informed choice.  
These three types of information are the price of the product and other complementary and 
substitute products, the quality of the product and other complementary and substitute 




Consumers usually obtain information through search or experience. Sellers also, often have 
an incentive to provide consumers with information to distinguish their products from other 
products. In addition, warranties, service contracts and producers reputation provide 




Nonetheless, the information one might expect to be supplied by the market is in all probably 
not perfect. Traders are not likely to provide consumers with the information they need to 
make an informed decision. Traders are likely to disclose information that promotes their 
goods but not that which might render their products unfavourable. A trader, for instance, is 
unlikely to provide the information that her products are outperformed in a material way by a 
substitute product. Traders often appear reluctant to engage in comparative advertising out of 
the fear of reprisals and because comparative information may lead to an overall reduction in 
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demand for the type of product.
607
An idea developed by Akerlof suggests that traders are 
more willing to disclose some types of information over others. Although price is one form of 
information that traders are likely to disclose, they may deliberately hide some extra costs.
608
 
Information such as quality tends to be more costly to supply in comparison to price since it 
is to some extent subjective, especially in the case of technology or professional services. 




The issue of information failure is not just limited to the disclosure of information; it is also 
linked to the extent to which consumers are able to process information.
610
 Traders may take 
advantage of the weakness of consumers by making information complicated for them to 
understand.
611
 This is described by Trebilcock and Elliott in the following manner: 
‘Information failure occurs where a transactor either lacks information about a proposed 
arrangement or lacks the ability to process it […] By processing information we refer both to 
the comprehension of complex legal and business facts and to the sorting and sifting of 
alternatives that people perform in an effort to decide which arrangement will best satisfy 
their utility functions. The lack of an ability to process information is in a sense a form of 
incapacity as some people lack the intellectual or experiential resources needed to synthesise 






An externality exists where a third party is affected by the actions of others. When an activity 
imposes a cause on a third party that is not reflected in the price, it is a form of externality.
613
 
It is mostly invoked in relation to the polluter effect of products on the environment; the 
purchaser of the product does not pay for its true social cost. The concept of externalities may 
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have a widespread effect leading to considerable complexities for policy makers that extend 




It is sufficient to say that externalities exist where harm or benefit results from an activity that 
was not taken into account by the market price. However, the requirement that there are no 
externalities is almost impossible to achieve. In practice, third parties are sometimes affected 
by decisions made by others within the market framework. For example, if a person buys a 





4.1.2 Consumer law and social justice  
 
Consumer protection measures, in addition to economic rationales, are linked to social justice 
concerns.
616
 It is a mistake to assume that consumer regulation is only a matter of counting 
costs and benefits. Intervention into the freedom of contract in consumer relations is, 
according to Howells and Weatherill, part of a wider judicial and legislative intervention 
directed at social justice. Intervention into contractual freedom is made for this purpose. The 
regulation of consumer relations is deemed to be capable of supporting social justice by 
emphasising general social concerns, rooted in equality and the protection of human dignity. 
It ignores the preeminent status of the market as an organising mechanism for society, which 
reflects the belief that ‘there is a core clutch of rights the protection of which transcends the 
rhetoric of economic efficiency.’
617
 There are three main elements to consider under the 





4.1.2.1 Distributive justice 
 
Consumer law and policy ‘may be viewed as general attempt to redistribute power and 
resources (e.g. rights) from producers to consumers, and changing producer markets to 
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 Rules aimed at lowering prices and those that adopt policies of loss 
sharing and shifting risk from consumer to producer, are inspired by distribution motives.
620
 
Distributional motives of consumer regulation afford more control to the law of contract 




The concept of distributive justice was explained by Aristotle and his most famous 
commentator Aquinas. Aristotle in the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, defines 
distributive justice (dianemetikon dikaion) as ‘the distribution of honour or money or any 
other things divisible among those who share in the regime’.
622
 More recently distributive 
justice has typically been invoked when looking at social approaches to regulation. It is 
associated with ideological movements such as socialism and liberalism.
623
 Various 
conceptions of distributional justice have been developed by socialist thinkers.
624
 Yet, they 
generally agree, according to Ogus, on the general theme of the pursuit of equality through 
the abolition of advantages conferred by power, privilege and wealth. In addition, it is 
concerned with ensuring individuals’ access to resources that enable them to participate 
equally and fully in the community.
625
 
Distributional concepts could influence regulatory policy either directly or indirectly. In cases 
where intervention is justified primarily on grounds other than fair distribution (e.g. market 
failure), it is achieved indirectly by predicting the distributional effect of the proposed 
measures and adopting a form of regulation that is consistent with fairness and justice.
626
 
Distribution between individuals on the basis of income and wealth (from richer to poorer) is 
the most direct and the most frequently encountered distributional policy.
627
 Distribution is, 
therefore, usually, from one group to another, such as from the affluent to the poor, or the 




However, on what grounds ought we to distribute from traders to consumers? It is suggested 
that the transfer of power in consumer protection measures may be effected on the basis that 
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there is an inequality of bargaining powers between traders and consumers.
629
 Recently, 
many studies have focused on poverty and the vulnerability of consumers to explain why 




4.1.2.1.1 The poor and disadvantaged 
   
There is a general assumption that consumers are poorer than traders. Despite this poor 
consumers are rarely named as intended beneficiaries of legislation; the issue of poverty, as 
Ramasy observes, has always been an undercurrent in consumer protection.
631
 Consumer 
policy might therefore be understood as part of a general policy of ‘positive welfare’ 
designed to establish minimum standards in the marketplace, provide equal access in 
consumption opportunities and enforce rights.
632
 In addition to the poor Burden identifies 
seven socially vulnerable groups which are likely to be socially excluded and vulnerable. 
These are the elderly, the young, the unemployed, those with a limiting, long-standing illness, 





A study published by the National Consumer Council in the United Kingdom, on the issue of 
low-income consumers indicates that ‘the poor pay more or get less’, and this phenomenon is 
attributed to the following causes: 
 
(1) The way the payment is made because cash payment is more expensive; (2) individuals 
who cannot afford to buy in bulk or weekly shop could pay more; (3) limited transportation 
or disability could limit the consumer choice if she cannot shop around; (4) markets in some 
cases, such as credit, may not be competitive for low income consumers. In other situations, 
such as financial advice, regularity barriers could form an obstacle in the way of 
innovation.
634
 Arguably, limited access to the internet is a major reason why the poor 
consumer pays more because the internet today has become a major source of comparative 
shipping. 
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The issue is dealt with by encouraging the private sector to supply essentials through the 
privatisation of national industries and the introduction of competition. However, the 
evidence shows that competition is not serving the needs of most of these disadvantaged 
groups. Although it can help bring prices down, providers use marketing techniques to 
choose the most profitable consumers. As a result, some socio-economic groups could benefit 




This is because ‘disadvantaged consumers are excluded either because they lack the skills to 
negotiate complex markets and systems, they are too costly to serve or they lack purchasing 
power’.
636
 In other words, they lack the skills and confidence to obtain the services they need. 
Furthermore, low income consumers are argued to be less rational in their market behaviour 
and may be less able to process market information or voice complaint about defective 
products, which make them even more vulnerable.
637
 Thus, it is said that market-based 





4.1.2.1.2 Procedural vulnerability  
 
A consumer may not be considered socially vulnerable as he could be well educated and well 
off financially, but still be in a weak position in relation to the process leading to the 
conclusion of the contract
639
, which we regard here as procedural vulnerability.  Many recent 
studies have focused on the vulnerability of consumers to explain why someone wishes to 
distribute to them. Burden identifies two reasons why the consumer may be vulnerable: 
difficulty in obtaining or dealing with information, and greater loss being suffered as a result 
of inappropriate decisions.
640
 Cartwright proposes a taxonomy of vulnerability that he claims 
helps to identify what makes consumers particularly vulnerable. He suggests that it is useful 
to consider the relation between vulnerability and the way the market operates in  classical 
theory in order to understand vulnerability. He categories vulnerability as following: (1) 
informational vulnerability; (2) redress vulnerability; (3) supply vulnerability; (4) pressure 
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vulnerability; and (5) impact vulnerability. These categories will next be invoked to illustrate 




A. Informational vulnerability 
 
The importance of the procedural stage is its effect on the consumer’s expectations of the 
contract and the consumer’s ability to protect her interests in relation to the substance terms 
of the agreement. One issue which may leave the consumer vulnerable at the procedural level 
is ignorance of the relevant information.
642
 Indeed, a consumer’s consent might well not be 
informed by knowledge of the terms of the contract or she may be unaware of the risks 
inherent in the substance terms. She consequently may be ignorant of the risk she might be 




Information deficits do not have the same effect on every consumer. Some consumers could 
have a detailed background knowledge as to the terms used and how they are typically 
interpreted and applied.  Nevertheless, in the general course of things consumers do not tend 
to have experience as to the types of standard terms used or in relation to their interpretation 
and application in practice by traders. Legal jargon such as conditions and warranties may be 
too complex for a normal person to understand by themselves. On the other hand, the 





Consumers may be ill informed because of the low level of transparency in the market; 
standard form contracts are often badly structured and some important terms tend to be put in 
small print. Also, there might be pre-existing signals that override the contract terms; 
advertising, for example, could be more powerful than the formal terms in building consumer 
understanding. It has the ability to distract consumers from formal terms and conditions to in 
the belief that formal terms are not important in practice.
645
 Some traders may intend to 
exclude some important information from marketing.  Furthermore, the basic expectations of 
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consumers may be reflected by performance in the market. Thus, a consumer may not pay 




In addition to a lack of informed consent the absence of information has the effect of 
preventing the consumer from comparing terms offered by different traders. This 
consequently undermines competition in the market because if the terms are not transparent 
and consumers cannot understand and compare the offers of different traders, there will be no 
incentive for traders to compete with one another. This has a direct effect on the level of 




B. Redress Vulnerability 
 
Closely related to informational vulnerability is redress vulnerability. A lack of informed 
consent could prevent consumers from benefiting from terms which could be used to their 
advantage and because they are unaware of this they are also not able to benefit if a dispute 
arises. Consumers who are unaware of their legal rights are prevented from securing redress, 
simply because they do not know about the existence of those rights.
648
 Typically, the more 
complicated the legal procedure is the less likely consumers are to benefit from it. This is 
evident from the fact that consumer cases are rarely brought to court in the UK. Consumers 
might think that the value of a transaction is not worth the hazard of going to court or doubt 
that they will benefit from taking the dispute further.  
 
C. Supply vulnerability 
 
Consumers might be well informed and aware of the legal consequences of the contract but 
still procedurally vulnerable due to lack of choice. The trader in question is likely to refuse 
the consumer’s offer to renegotiate a standard form contact, simply because it is the purpose 
of having standard terms to avoid negotiations. Besides, it is not efficient to engage in 
negotiation with every consumer.
649
 There may also be no alternative package offered 
anywhere else.  
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As a result, a consumer is not well placed to refuse entering a given contract. There is one 
simple explanation for this; she has a need that ‘must be satisfied’.
650
 It does not have to be a 
need in the sense of absolute necessity it is enough for it to be necessary in the type of society 
in which she lives.
651
 Supply vulnerability becomes even more problematic in relation to 
products essential to health and wellbeing. Nevertheless, even if a product is not essential, 




D. Pressure vulnerability 
 
Even if bargaining does occur, the consumer is not likely to be in good bargaining position to 
get what she wants. The notion of inequality of bargaining power is an impartment factor in 
consumer protection rationales. In fact it has been invoked frequently since the 1960s as the 
major rationale for consumer protection.
653
 Judges have made reference to the supposed 
inequality of bargaining power
654
 and statutory regimes make the issue relevant.
655
 As 
explained in chapter two, the inequality of bargaining power between parties has been 
regarded as the separation ground between consumer and commercial contract. Parties to 
commercial contracts tend to be of an equal bargaining position. By contrast, parties to 
consumer relations negotiate from unequal bargaining positions.
656
 However, the meaning of 
‘inequality of bargaining power’ is not clearly defined. 
 
According to Ramsay, inequality of bargaining power generally represents a disparity of 
power between the producer and consumer; this takes the form of a disparity of bargaining 
power, of knowledge and resources between the two sides.
657
 It may also result from ‘a 
feeling of inferiority or susceptibility.’
658
 The discussion of bargaining power is linked to 
either market power or lack of bargaining sophistication.
659
 Brownsword makes the point that 
the issue of inequality of bargaining power cannot be regarded in the abstract; it needs to be 
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regarded in relation to standard form contracts or to the other party.
660
 Thus, it is appropriate 
to evaluate the bargaining power of the consumer as relative to the trader in the following 
ways. 
 
The bargaining power of consumers and traders is dependent on their relative importance or 
what Brownsword regards as ‘the need to deal.’
661
 The importance that the trader places on 
the custom of a particular costumer is affected by many factors. These include: the overall 
situation of sales; the chance that the relevant consumer is going to make another purchase; 
the value of the product or services in question; the proportion that the contract represents in 
the supplier’s overall turnover. However, monopolist traders are not likely to be concerned 
with the custom of a consumer as he is in any event guaranteed this custom. Market power is 
also determined by the consumer’s ‘need to deal’. In other words, it is affected by the degree 
to which the consumer needs to obtain the offered goods and services (related to supply 




Furthermore, bargaining power and the consumer’s ability to use it for her benefit changes 
according to a number of factors.  To make this clear we can assume a typical situation where 
a consumer is in average need for a product or service and has the average time to obtain the 
deal; where there is a fairly large number of consumers in the market, and the cost of each 
product and service is a small proportion of the overall turnover of the trader; and where the 
consumer is relatively unimportant to the seller or supplier. As a result, the consumer has 
little power to negotiate terms for her benefit.
663
 Consumer vulnerability usually varies from 
one sector to another. For instance, consumer credit is an area where consumers are 
particularly vulnerable to pressure especially when a consumer is indebted. In financial 
services, consumers can be put under pressure by providers who are frequently in a position 
of power. Consumers might be under pressure because of their individual characteristics, 
temporary individual circumstances or physical situations. In addition, they might be under 
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Additionally, the matter of bargaining sophistication is related to the knowledge of the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties. The expertise of the parties in understanding the 
terms and the value of products and negotiation skills can determine the strength of the 
parties during the negotiation phase. The issue here is typically the limited skills and 
experience of the consumer which affects his ability to bargain thoughtfully and skilfully. 
Assuming that the trader has the upper hand in all circumstances is not accurate because 
consumers happen sometimes to be very skilled. Nevertheless, in a general course of things 
based on the average consumer, it is difficult for them to match a supplier in expertise 
especially in technical knowledge, for example in relation to financial services or technology. 
Traders are assumed to be professionals who are trained and/or practised at negotiation, 





A final point that affects bargaining power is ‘resources that can be called upon to support the 
bargaining process’. Again in the normal course of things, consumers have fewer resources to 
support their negotiation position. Negotiation may require an investment of time or money 
and traders, both of which traders tend to have more to a greater degree, which means they 




E. Impact Vulnerability 
 
An average consumer may be vulnerable because of the way they are affected by the 
substance of the contract. Consumers enter into contracts in order to sustain and enhance the 
private sphere of life rather than to make profit. The terms of these contracts therefore affect 
the physical safety, propriety, economic and social interests arising in, and affecting, the 
private sphere life. Therefore, the damaging effect of contractual terms would typically have 
a more serious effect on a consumer than on a commercial entity.
667
 This is what Burden 




A term which states that the trader is not liable when the product causes injury or death to the 
consumer would put the safety of the consumer in danger. By contrast a similar term simply 
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would not have the same impact upon a business entity since it cannot itself be physically 
injured. Even when the terms exclude liability for economic losses these are likely to have a 
more harmful effect on private consumers than a business entity. Commercial entities are 
generally in a better position to insure against such losses and can cope better with economic 
losses, for example by adjusting prices and wages. Therefore, the loss for business entities is 
in most cases of money or monetary value, whereas, losses affecting the economic interests 




4.1.2.1.3 Targeting the neediest  
 
One would assume that in order to achieve satisfactory distribution outcomes the system 
needs to actively target the neediest consumers within society (the poorest or most 
vulnerable). But it is indeed arguable that improving the position of all consumers is not 
likely to distribute to the neediest consumer groups. According to Wilhelmsson, consumer 
laws usually focus on information regulation and individual claims that tend to benefit 
affluent middle-class consumers, which leads consumer law to conceal and even reproduce 
injustice.
670
 Therefore, examining the distributive effect of consumer polices among groups 
of consumers and producers to assist policy makers when deciding from whom and to whom, 
to distribute, is thought to be preferable sometimes.
671
   
 
Nevertheless, the efficiency of such analysis is questionable. Willett explains that there is a 
serious limitation on the agenda to distribute resources to those who are most in need. Firstly, 
this is because the law of contract can only play a supporting factor in this regard. Other 
factors such as taxes and social security systems serve distribution goals better.  Secondly, in 
the context of contractual relationships, Willett doubts that the measures employed, such as 
regulation of unfair terms would provide systematic protection that serves the need of 
vulnerable parties. More importantly, distinguishing consumers who are vulnerable enough to 




Willett’s argument is valid in the sense that the distribution function of the law of contract is 
limited for many reasons. Systematic protection targeted to the neediest is not likely to 
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achieve accurate results. There is no guarantee that certain goods are going to be bought only 
by the neediest. Grocery shopping for example is an activity that all consumers share no 
matter how affluent they are. Nevertheless, the distributional function of the law of contract 
should not undermined just because it is not certain whether it will benefit the neediest or not. 
The distributive function of law relating to the consumer is surely not alone going to cure 
social issues such as poverty. However, it could definitely release pressure from social 
security systems such as taxation. A consumer regime structured around a distributive motive 
might not be able to ensure that distribution is optimally achieved, but it could definitely 
secure a friendly environment for consumers who tend to bargain from a vulnerable position. 
Such a policy would benefit the largest segment of consumers rather than a small group. As a 




The doctrine of paternalism is assumed to be a powerful motivation of consumer 
regulation.
673
 It constitutes an important concept in dissections of consumer policy.
674
  
Dworkin describes paternalism as ‘the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified 
by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of 
the person being coerced.’
675
 In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground 
that would be contrary to the actor’s own welfare is paternalistic. It protects people from 
themselves by limiting their capacity to make enforceable agreements of various kinds.  It 
includes those kinds of legal rule that ‘prohibit an action on the ground that it would be 
contrary to the actor’s own welfare.’ For example, prohibitions against suicide, the 
requirement that motorcyclists wear helmets, laws that restrict the use of drugs or make 




A state that intervenes into a party’s autonomy to undertake distributive or commutative 
justice is not acting paternalistically.  It is so rather ‘when it circumscribes or influences the 
choice a citizen would otherwise make because it believes the citizen’s choice is wrong, 
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whether through a want of prudence or of some other virtue.’
677
 A measure is taken to be 
paternalist rather than distributive if the individual who is supposed to benefit from it does 
not agree with it.
678
 In other words, paternalism is based on a lack of trust in the consumers’ 
judgment and rational decisions.  
 
In the context of consumer relations paternalism is usually associated with areas where 
consumers’ mistakes are likely to cause serious consequences, or if the long term interests of 
consumers need to be protected more than the short term ones.
679
 For example the laws 
related to the requirement of quality in goods and product safety are examples of paternalistic 
rules because they deny the consumer’s choice regarding the degree and kind of risk he is 
willing to accept.
680
 Also, the ‘cooling-off’ period imposed in many consumer transactions is 




The basis of paternalism is, however, contradicts with the notion of freedom of contract. It 
contradicts the basic idea of freedom of contract that people can be trusted to look after 
themselves, and to decide upon their own interests. It is argued that in many situations the 
consumer may feel that he does not need or want the protection imposed on him. This could 
be especially true if the protection measure is associated with extra charges carried by the 
consumer. It is argued that the cost of protection, whether it is a cost of insurance or any other 
cost, is eventually paid by the consumer. The private right of the consumer to choose how he 




On the other hand, there are those who try to justify paternalism both from an individualist 
perspective and an anti-individualist perspective.
683
 Those who base their argument on 
individualist grounds, refer to what we could describe as ‘rational paternalism’. It is based on 
the assumption that individuals in some situations may want to be protected from 
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 Individuals in some situations, particularly where decision making is difficult, 
may rationally delegate choices to others.
685
 This argument was developed in the area of 
problematic decision making where it is believed that individuals make irrational choices.
686
 
There is empirical evidence generated by psychological research which shows that people 





At its root this argument is based on the idea that there is a difference between real and 
apparent desire in individuals. Paternalistic rules give effect to the real desire over the 
apparent.
688
 The individualist justification of paternalism is criticised as it makes truth claims 
about what Kleining regards as at best inferred or as giving effect to fictional desires with a 




On the other hand, the justifications of paternalism on anti-individualist grounds deny the 
primacy of individuals’ desire. They view paternalism as both compassionate and 
humanitarian as an attempt to overcome the alienation of individualism and to show 
sympathy for others.
690
 It is argued that in some situations experts within society know better 
than individuals what serves their interests and should determine outcomes accordingly.
691
 It 
is also assumed that people, especially when young, lack the ability to make rational 




Ogus criticises the anti-individualist perspective as being unclear and uncertain. It lacks clear 
guidelines as to when intervention is appropriate. He suggests that paternalist regulation 
should be strictly restricted to certain activities where it is assumed that many individuals are 
likely to make unwise decisions. In order to avoid depriving choice in those who are well 
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4.1.2.3 Community values 
 
There are many other non-economic values that could be invoked to justify intervention into 
the market order, including the set of public interest goals described as ‘community values’. 
People in society may not be self-concerned only but are likely also to care about society as 
whole. They care about improving the social, intellectual and physical environment in which 
they live. Here the emphasis is on providing opportunities for individuals to participate in 




In the context of consumer protection ‘community values’ could be understood to refer to 
values such as honesty, fair-dealing and loss-sharing.
695
 It is arguable that rational self-
interested behaviour associated with the market can only flourish where mutual trust and 
confidence exist.
696
 As Stewart and Sunstein put it, consumer policy is not simply a ‘matter 
of counting economic costs and benefits, or of defending private entitlements, but part of a 
continuing process of deciding what sort of a society we shall be - how risk averse, how 
hospitable to entrepreneurial change, how solicitous of the vulnerable, and how willing to 




Consumer measures are believed to contribute to developing social norms of trust and 
confidence to improve the functioning of the market and the consumers’ entitlement to rights. 
Many consumer protection measures within financial services are justified on the basis of 
trust and confidence stimulation along with the promotion of public awareness and ensuring 
market confidence. The Commission also partly appeals to this value in promoting the 
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In addition, trust and similar values are believed to be economically efficient as they act as an 
important lubricant in the social system. Indeed, they enable people to produce more by 
saving them significant effort. Arrow claims that the government is better than the private 




Care for the community good should include not only the current generation but also future 
generations through sustainable consumption. Indeed, sustainable consumption has been 
recognised in recent years as an aspect of consumer policy and included in the United 
Nations Guidelines on consumer protection. Moreover, individuals are expected to act as 
reflective consumers and consider the impact their decisions have on the environment. 
Ramsay notes that ‘economists conceptualise environmental effects as externality (third party 





4.2 Consumer policy in perspective 
 
Although it is almost generally agreed that the consumer needs protection, the question of 
why the consumer should be protected is far from settled. This is probably due to the fact that 
fairness or justice is a relative concept. What might seem fair for someone in a particular 
situation might not be fair for someone else in the same situation at a different time or even at 
the same time. One might think that contractual justice can only be achieved when 
individuals can rely on the legal system to ensure that they get a fair and equitable deal out of 
their contracts. For others justice should be achieved by giving individuals the right to freely 
negotiate and regulate their contracts. While the former would call for closely regulated rules 
that guide the consumer in all contractual aspects, the latter would call for consumer 
protection that enhanced the informed will of consumer. In other words, the latter would call 
for consumer policy that rectifies market failure and encourages efficiency rather than the 
substantive fairness of balance in contractual relations. 
 
On one hand, from a social justice perspective, consumer protection contributes to achieving 
fair and just distribution of resources in the society. It serves general social concerns of 
protecting equity and human dignity. On the other hand, economic analysis supports 
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consumer protection because it contributes to achieving an optimal allocation of resources.  
The two goals are likely to produce contradictory outcomes on many occasions. Indeed a rule 
of economic efficiency might not be just socially, and vice versa.  The challenge arises when 
this contradiction arises. For example, the disclosure of certain information might be regarded 
as a basic right of the consumer in a democratic society, but at the same time will not be 
efficient from an economic perspective because some information might be expensive to 
supply. The choice between the two is a matter of general policy, which needs to be set by the 
policy maker.  
 
4.2.1 Setting out the policy 
 
The issue of setting the level of consumer protection is related to the general policy of the 
legal system. Two essential values are to be acknowledged when setting consumer policy. 
Among these are the ideological basis of the law and the concept of justice as understood by 
society.  The two factors should control the level of fairness encouraged and how much space 
is left for contractual autonomy after protecting the consumer. The policy maker’s decision 
must therefore be guided by these two factors. The policy maker ought to decide what level 
of unfairness is to be tolerated for the overall sustainability of contracts and efficiency of the 
market and vice versa.  
 
In this regard it is argued that the question of how to balance the aims of distribution and 
those of market efficiency is a matter of ideology. To libertarians efficiency is not to be 
sacrificed whereas to others minimum standards of justice should be achieved by regulation 
regardless of the economic cost.
701
 According to Willett, the level of justice is closely 
associated with the level of welfarism that is facilitated. Justice is associated with certain 
values of the Welfare State in that protecting the social and economic interests of weaker 
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There are generally two identified types of welfare in contract regulation: minimal and 
maximal.
703
 Maximum welfarism seeks to protect weaker parties within the contractual 
relationship (procedurally vulnerable consumers). An approach that seeks to address this 
issue can be viewed as maximally welfarist. In the case of maximum welfarism, it does not 
matter whether the party is weaker within the overall social order or not. A consumer is then 
accordingly protected even if he is well educated and well-off financially. Protection is made 





By contrast, minimal welfarism is focused on the overall position of the parties in the social 
order and its agenda is to distribute to the neediest within the society. It, therefore, favours 
the weakest consumers within the overall social order. It consists of fewer standards of 
protection or fairness, that would not protect consumers who are able to protect themselves 
procedurally and are better able then most to bear the consequences.
705
 However, whether 
such policy is practically viable is questionable. We discussed earlier the difficulty of 
distinguishing the neediest or most vulnerable consumers. Not being able to identify these 
groups by the consumer policy should not prevent the consumer policy. Instead it should seek 
to serve the largest group of people and thus aim for maximal welfarism.   
 
The law of contract, particularly in relation to the consumer, has indeed a role to play in 
securing fairness and the distribution of resources in society. This role might be limited and 
uncertain in terms of whether or not it will directly benefit the neediest groups.  Nevertheless, 
it definitely relieves the pressure on the tax and transfer system, and also reduces their side- 
effects. It creates a friendly environment for consumers to contract more confidently. 
Consumers who benefit from protection might not always be the neediest within the society, 
but studies have shown that most consumers tend to be vulnerable regardless of their level of 
education and status within society. This is because average consumers tend to be 
procedurally vulnerable compared to suppliers.
706
 Furthermore, they have been shown to be 
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Therefore, when consumer policy is set in the abstract it does not mean that it is unable to 
meet its distributive means. On the contrary, it might mean that a larger segment of 
consumers will benefit from the distribution and thus the level of welfarism will increase. It 
needs to be kept in mind that when the distribution function of the law of contract is 
suggested it is not understood to function independently. The role of distribution held by the 
law of contract, although very important, cannot achieve optimal distribution alone. Social 
security programmes are needed to complement the distribution resulting from the law of 
contract. 
 
Outside of this scheme there is still the argument that consumer protection policy is not 
achieving its objectives. In other words, it neither achieves economic efficiency nor 
distribution. It is claimed that mandating consumer protection is to violate contract autonomy 
for a protection that the consumer might not want or cannot afford. Mandatory consumer 
protection comes at a price. It involves changing seller behaviour, for instance, sellers do not 
tend to disclose unfavourable information about their product. This changing of seller 
behaviour would raise their costs. The cost is likely to eventually be passed to the consumer 
in the form of higher prices. Here comes the issue of heterogeneity of consumers. Their 
priorities and preferences differ depending on their situations and indeed according to their 
budgets. Some may prefer to pay for a better quality of goods, better contractual terms and 
informed choices. Others prefer to save these additional costs, meaning that some people 
waive warranty programmes, buy non-refundable items, choose slower delivery options or 
decline to insure. The same people will likely choose not to have mandatory consumer 
protection for the same reason. As a result, it is suggested that consumer protection should 




Let us assume for the sake of the argument that consumer protection is to be ‘optional’ rather 
than ‘mandatory’. How this would benefit consumers as whole? Consumers will need to be 
rational, sophisticated, intelligent and well informed to be able to bargain for the best deal. 
For example, the consumer needs to assess rationally the possible risks in the contract, and 
thus whether or not it is worth paying extra for optional protection. 
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However, in a free market system individuals do not tend to be well informed. There is 
certain information that unless it is supplied by the supplier it would be very difficult for the 
consumer to reach.
709
 Furthermore, social behaviour studies have proved that consumers do 
not act rationally.
710
 For these reasons only a small percentage of consumers will be able 
survive in such a laissez‐faire environment. Only those consumers who are rational, well 
informed and intelligent will be capable of bargaining for good value protection. Average 





Thus, the mandatory role of the policy maker is indispensable. The issues surrounding 
consumer decision making necessitates paternalistic intervention by the law.  The degree to 
which the law should intervene into contract (the level of protection) is affected by changing 
societal circumstances. This is related to the level of education and awareness that are likely 
to change over time. Nevertheless, the limitation of the human mind along with the increased 
sophistication of production makes it hard to imagine going back to a contract scheme of 
complete laissez‐faire. Furthermore, consumer protection, particularly in relation to 
information supply, has become part of a wider protection of human dignity.
712
 This is 
because a person entering a transaction that she knows very little about is arguably not treated 
with dignity. Thus it is argued that consumer rights are part of the new range of social rights 
and they are likely to be declared a human right in the coming years.
713
 This means that 
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consumer rights are likely to flourish rather than diminish or become optional. Therefore, the 
policy maker needs to act paternalistically to balance the benefit of individuals and the group 
of consumers as a whole to protect the greatest possible proportion of consumers. 
 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Consumer protection is supported from economic analysis as it contributes to achieving an 
optimal allocation of resources. More fundamentally, consumer protection involves the 
promotion and enforcement of ideas of cooperation and fairness in society by the law of 
contract. This requires intervention into the private sphere of contract by a public authority. 
As consequences, a law system that promotes consumer protection necessarily allows public 
intervention into private contracts and the legal theory needs to promote the paternalist 
behaviour of government.  Furthermore, the legal rules of consumer protection are of a 
special nature in that they are set with the aim of balancing the contractual relation for the 
benefit of the consumer rather than being set in a standard way for the benefit of both 
contracting parties. It is thus based on the idea that consumer contracts tend to be imbalanced 
and is understood in terms of a distributive function of contract. The means that have been 
distinguished in this chapter will be referred to where appropriate in the following chapter on 
consumer protection under English law. These means will be critically tested for their 
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The discussion in the second chapter regarding contractual justice under the English law of 
contract was focused on how over time the English law of contract has dealt with perceived 
contractual unfairness. The limitations on the court’s interference into contractual autonomy 
were emphasised.  Nevertheless, the general principles presented before do not give a full 
picture of the situation of contractual justice under the English law of contract.  This is 
because in modern times legislation has intervened into some aspects of private law by 
regulating specific types of transactions. Consumer law is a diversion from contract law 
where intervention into parties’ autonomy is promoted by the law. This chapter investigates 
the extent to which contractual justice is promoted under the consumer theory of English 
contract law. The evolution of consumer protection in England is traced along with the 
concept of the consumer. Additionally, the major techniques of consumer contract regulation 
are outlined. Lessons are extracted from the English experience of consumer protection in 
order to support the law reform proposed by this thesis in relation to consumer protection 
under the Shariah law of contract. The main characteristics of the law of consumer protection 
as well as the main values protected by the law of consumer protection under the English law 
of contract are summarised. This will later be tested in chapter five in relation to the Shariah 
law of contract in order to determine the viability of consumer protection under the Shariah 
law of contract.   
 
5.1 A historical perspective 
 
Earlier in this research an account was offered of how freedom of contract formed the 
cornerstone of the law of contract in classical times. The Caveat emptor - let the buyers 
beware - was an assertion of individual responsibility which led as a result to a firm belief in 




Under the classical conception of the common law of contract, an agreement should be 
enforced in accordance with its terms.
714
 The focus of control upon contracts was limited to 
procedural matters. As a result, doctrines of duress, fraud, and misrepresentation 
developed.
715
 Attempts to tackle the fairness of the substance of contract law were highly 
limited. Generally, the court could not set aside a term of private agreement because it was 
found to be harsh, unconscionable or unfair. The reasonableness of the terms of a private 
contract was considered to be the business of the parties of that agreement only. There was no 
place for the court to impose its own view upon the parties’ rights and duties. Even when the 
language of the contract needed a judicial interpretation, the task of the court was limited to 
literal interpretation. Public policy was the only tool that could be used to set aside the 





Starting from the late nineteenth century the classical view of the law of contract has been in 
general retreat. The laissez-faire doctrine has increasingly met with a cool reception. The idea 
that government should adopt a complete hands-off approach with respect to economic 
matters has been shown to be incorrect.
717
 It is recognised that the thematic unity of changes 
in the law of contract can be presented by untraditional concepts such as fairness and 
cooperation.
718
 Although there was a tendency towards the creation of a judicial limitation on 
the freedom of contract for the purpose of protecting the fairness of exchange, such a 




However, fragmentation comes to be a key theme in the modern law of contract due to the 
enormous intervention in it by statute. Such interventions are made in order to fix situations 
where there is assumed to be an imbalance between the contracting parties, as this was 
understood to harm the economy as whole. Presumably in this sense freedom of contract is 
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Specific relationships regulated by statutes include the law of landlord and tenant, the 
employer and employee relationship, and the consumer and supplier relationship. The core of 
these relationships is based on contract law, yet, the legal techniques aimed at striking the 





5.2 Consumer law as an exception to the freedom of contract 
 
Although the relationship between consumers and suppliers is deemed to be contractual, the 
modern law of consumer contract in England operates in a way that is quite different to the 
classical notions of individual autonomy and legal non-interventionism. It follows a rather 
distinct pattern of control over the consumer/supplier relationship. A starting point would be 
that the consumer contract in modern times usually takes the form of a standard form 
contract; no real bargaining process is conducted for the purpose of concluding the contract. 
As a result, the notion of respect for the parties’ bargain as the sole source of legal rights and 
obligations has declined. The notion of freedom of contract that underpins judicial non-
intervention appears to be no longer realistic. The relationship between the parties in a 
consumer transaction has become typically economically imbalanced in favour of the 
supplier. Therefore, state regulation of the bargain is seen as an appropriate response to the 




Under English law the consumer/supplier contractual relationship has become considerably 
more than simply an agreement. Consumer regulation is now subject to measures that set a 
minimum quality level, and must adhere to certain standards of fairness that also must be 
met, at least in the specific context of the type of clause.
723
 Statutory regimes intervene into 
the substance of contract. Furthermore, the court is now under a duty to consider the fairness 
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5.3 The evolution of consumer protection in the UK 
 
If we were to describe the evolution of the law of consumer protection in the United 
Kingdom (UK) by two characteristics these would be that it is statute-based and influenced 
by European law. Even though the UK is regarded as a common law country the law of 
consumer protection was developed by legislation rather than case law.
725
 The law of 
consumer protection took its current shape in the 1960s and 1970s and the common law role 
was very limited.
726
 One explanation for this is that consumer cases are rarely brought to 
court, which creates an obstacle in the shaping of common law because of the lack of judicial 
presentation. In addition, for very long period of time only few judges were willing to 




The movement towards the substantial development of consumer protection took place in 
England in the 1960s. The main concern raised at that time was the issue of addressing the 
natural imbalance between consumers and business providers and to stop trading abuses. The 
government sought to create new institutional procedures to tackle the issue effectively. 
Government reports published in the 1960s and 1970s presented source material that 




The report of the Committee on Consumer Protection (known as the Molony Committee after 
its chairman the late Sir Joseph Molony Q.C) published in 1962 was the first formal 
movement towards consumer protection. It reviewed the law relating to safety standards, 
labelling, advertising, civil redress and other aspects of consumer protection; and competition 
and market forces were taken to be the best way of protecting consumers’ interests.
729
 
Amendments of existing laws to accommodate consumer protection were recommended by 
the Committee. For example it suggested that the Sale of Goods Act 1893 be amended to 
introduce the definition of consumer sales. 
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Another government committee report, dealing with the subject of Consumer Credit was 
published in 1971.
730
 In addition, a number of English and Scottish Law Commissions made 
proposals, which to a large extent were implemented by the Government and Parliament in 
the formation of legislation.
731
 Most of the pieces of the statutory legislation which forms the 
development of consumer protection were produced during this period, for example: the 
Supply of Goods Act 1973; the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982. The statutory laws adopted showed ‘a willingness to bring together 
principles and rules of law to govern particular areas, some of which were until recently the 




5.4 The European influence 
 
At the European level, consumer law has been harmonised through the firm belief of 
European institutions that harmonisation raises consumer confidence that assist cross-border 
purchases in the internal market.
733
 The meeting of heads of State of the EU in Paris in 1972 
was the first movement towards harmonised consumer protection. A Committee was 
instituted in order to ‘strengthen and coordinate measures for consumer protection.’
734
 The 
Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 approved the principle of consumer protection and 
information policy. It gave a foundation to the development of consumer protection law and 
constructed a program aimed at improving quality of life via the protection of health and 
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Perhaps the most significant factor affecting the evolution of European consumer law is the 
enactment of the Single European Act in 1986. According to this, consumer protection law 
was an essential part of the policy concerning the completion of the Single European 
Market.
736
 The Council of Ministers was given the competence in cooperation with the 
European Parliament to enact measures that established or enhanced the functioning of the 




This was the starting point for the most significant development in the area: the adaptation of 
EU directives. The Directive is a legal instrument, which unlike EU Regulations, is not 
directly applicable but needs to be implemented by the states in their national legal order.
738
 
Harmonisation at the European level raises the question of the margin left to the member 
states to maintain the level of consumer protection; this depends on the nature of 
harmonisation.
739
 In the early years the directives set only the minimum ground for protection 
(minimum harmonisation). Thus, it was considered to be appropriate to offer a higher level of 
protection by member states. However, as this decision has proved to be leading to 




Directives that are adopted on the basis of minimum harmonisation provide the member 
states with a basis below which protection cannot fall. But member states have the option of 
implementing better protection by the texts introduced into their national legal systems. 
Fragmentation resulting from this was deemed to have a negative effect on the aim of 
bringing the national legal orders closer together.
741
 Therefore, since the mid 2000s 
maximum harmonisation’ directives were introduced by the EU. A directive based on 
maximum harmonisation sets not only a basis for protection but also a limit that cannot be 
exceeded by member states. No more and no less protection can be offered when 
implementing the directive into member states’ legal systems (for example the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive
742
). Nevertheless, the EU Commission had to compromise 
for a dual approach that mixes maximum harmonisation and minimum harmonisation (for 
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example the Consumer Credit Directive
743
 and the Directive on Consumer Rights
744
). The 
two directives have some rigid provisions and others which give the member states the option 




5.5 Definition of consumer 
 
It seems that there is no universally agreed definition of consumer thus regulations tend to 
define the term ‘consumer’ for their own purpose. Section 20(6) of the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 states: ‘Consumer (a) in relation to any goods, means any person who might wish to 
be supplied with the goods for his own private use or consumption; (b) in relation to any 
services or facilities, means any person who might wish to be provided with the services or 
facilities otherwise than for the purposes of any business of his; and (c) in relation to any 
accommodation, means any person who might wish to occupy the accommodation otherwise 
than for the purposes of any business of his.’ 
 
The CRA 2015 seems to have a more broad approach and it defines the consumer under 
Section 2 as ‘an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that 
individual’s trade, business, craft or profession.’ The ‘trader’ is defined as ‘a person acting 
for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting 
personally or through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf.’ 
 
Accordingly, in general terms, that there are two main characteristics attached to a person 
regarded a consumer. First, he must be a private individual acting in a private capacity. 
Second, she is dealing with a supplier in the course of business. 
 
5.6 Techniques of regulation 
 
The way consumer protection is typically influenced is by specific objectives being targeted 
in the rationales for protection.  In general the laws designed to protect consumers are 
focused on the following areas: ‘(a) unsafe products; (b) qualitatively deficient goods and 
services; (c) fraudulent trading practices; (d) insufficient information to exercise prudent 






 Nottage, Tokeley and Riefa (n 735) 52-91 
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trading practices; (e) economic exploitation through lack of competition or excessive 
prices’.
746
 Many legal techniques are used within regulations to control markets for the 
purpose of protecting the consumer. Prior approval regimes require standards to be met and 
broad statutory standards and improving access to justice are all part of this endeavour to 
protect consumers. For the purpose of this research the following discussion will be limited to 
the most popular regulation techniques within the law of contract. Regulations protect the 
consumer in his contractual relationship in multiple ways. Four major techniques are 
deployed by legislation for the purpose of balancing the consumer/supplier contractual 
relationship. These are (1) the test of fairness; (2) implied terms; (3) information remedies; 
and (4) the cooling-off technique (the cancelation period). These four techniques will be 
explained next.  
 
5.6.1 The test of fairness 
 
Unfair terms in consumer contacts are controlled by the CRA 2015.  This replaces the overlap 
between the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994, which were themselves superseded by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contract Regulations 1999. These regulations were enacted in the UK in order to implement 
the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (the Directive)
747
 issued by the EU as 
an attempt to harmonise domestic rules relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts. Since 
the CRA 2015, just like the old regulations, is an implementation of the Directive, most cases 
relevant to the Directive remain useful when deciding how the act should be interpreted, 




The fairness test under the CRA 2015 is applicable only to contracts between traders and 
consumers.
749
 The key provision setting the test is section 62(4). This section provides that ‘A 
term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.’ 
Section 62 (5) elaborates that testing the fairness of a term is determined by ‘(a) taking into 
account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and (b) by reference to all the 
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circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the contract 
or of any other contract on which it depends.’ 
 
The language of the Article is very similar to the language of the Directive and thus the old 
regulations. Yet, it is broader in the sense that the test is no longer limited to terms which 
have not been individually negotiated but extends to all terms. As a result, the scope of the 
fairness test is no longer limited to standard form contracts. Otherwise the substance of the 
test of fairness remains the same in the old regulation.  
 
In addition to the requirements set out in section 62, section 68 imposes requirements that all 
written terms in consumer contracts should be transparent, a quality that is defined as ‘in 
plain and intelligible language and […] legible’. Section 69 (1) adds a rule that ‘if a term in a 
consumer contract […] could have different meanings, the meaning that is most favourable to 
the consumer is to prevail.’ 
 
To understand the nature of the test the three main requirements set out by the CRA 2015 
need to be elaborated. These are the requirements of ‘significant imbalance’, ‘good faith’ and 
‘transparency’. Unfair terms will become non-binding to the consumer,
750
 but, the remainder 





5.6.1.1 The requirement of ‘significant imbalance’ 
 
There is general agreement that the requirement of significant imbalance is directed to the 
substantive fairness of the contract and this is supported by the wording of legislation and 
case law.
752
 It is directed at the ‘substance of the contract terms’, which according to 
O'Sullivan and Hilliard, is obvious from the indication given by the gray listed term.
753
 The 
gray listed term under the CRA 2015 is a defining feature of the sort of terms likely to be 
regarded as unfair. The gray list is laid down in schedule 2 of the CRA and is gray because 
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the terms in the list are not necessarily unfair whilst at the same time there may be other 
unfair terms which are not included in the list. It is a guide to what potentially could be unfair 
terms. The gray listed terms are an illustration of the significant imbalance being considered 
with respect to the substance of the term. For example under schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 the 
gray list includes any term that gives the trader the right to terminate a contract of 
indeterminate duration without giving the consumer a notice with no serious grounds and a 
term that obliges the consumer to fulfil all of his obligations where the trader did not perform 
his obligations. These terms are obviously considered as part of the substantive fairness of the 
deal. 
 
This position is also supported by case law; it was made clear by the House of Lords’ 
decision in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc that the test of 
‘significant imbalance’ requires assessment of the substantive terms of the contract.
754
  The 
same approach was supported by the Court of Justice of the EU in Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de 
Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa where the essence of the test was elaborated. It was stressed 
that the issue of ‘significant imbalance’ requires the court to consider whether the consumer 
is deprived of an advantage which he normally has under national law. In doing so, the court 
needed to consider the significance, purpose and practical effect of the term in question. Also, 





However, a mere imbalance is not enough to render the term unfair. According to O'Sullivan 
and Hilliard the gray list indicates that the imbalance between the parties must be 
‘significant’. Courts have on many occasions stressed that it is not enough for the imbalance 




Furthermore, it is held that the consumer will not be able to rely on legislative protection 
against unfair terms just because he has made a ‘bad bargain’.
757
 In Banker Insurance Co Ltd 
v South Mr South relied on his travel insurance to pay for damages to Mr Gardener, which 
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contract which said that the insurance does not cover accident involving ‘motorised 
waterborne craft’. The court held the term was clear and covered jet skis. The term was 
regarded to be fair because there were no significant imbalance to the detriment of the 
consumer since Mr South had paid a very low price for the insurance. Mr South got what he 




In short, the requirement of significant imbalance is related to the substantive fairness of any 
consumer contract term. This includes standard term contracts and individually negotiated 
contracts. According to this requirement the court has to look at the substance of the term in 
order to determine its fairness. It should consider whether the term deprives the consumer of 
an advantage that he would usually have under national law. The court should take into 
account the significance, purpose and practical effect of the term in question and its 
consistency with the reasonable objective that the relevant term seeks to protect. The 
imbalance needs to be significant and this excludes imbalance caused by bad bargains. 
 
5.6.1.2 The requirement of ‘good faith’ 
 
The meaning of the good faith requirement is not as clear as the meaning of significant 
imbalance. It is not entirely settled whether it refers to procedural or substantive 
consideration and what it adds to the requirement of significant imbalance. Indeed, the 
requirement of good faith has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Directive to 
be received by English law
759
; Teubner has gone so far as to call it a ‘legal irritant’ for 
English law.
760
 There are potentially three answers to these questions; that good faith 
involves (1) procedural considerations; (2) substantive consideration (3) a mix of procedural 
and substantive.  
 
One position that is held is that the good faith requirement is only meant to deal with 
procedural unfairness. In this sense it is meant solely to tackle unfairness related to the 
formation of a contract. For example, it examines whether the trader dealt with the consumer 
in good faith by making sure she is aware of the term in question at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract. In a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in West v Ian Finlay & 
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Beale takes the position that the good faith requirement is of both procedural and substantive 
consideration.762 This approach was supported by Lord Bingham in Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc, where he posited that that good faith is concerned with 
both how the contract was formed and the fairness of the deal and that it requires ‘fair and 
open dealing’.763 
 
Yet, Lord Steyn in the same case insisted that good faith is related to substantive fairness, and 
that this meant ‘that there is a large area of overlap between the concepts of good faith and 
significant imbalance.’764 The same approach was supported by Lord Millett.765 So, if tests of 
both significant imbalance and good faith are related to the substance of the terms how does 
‘good faith’ add to ‘significant imbalance’? 
 
Lord Millett pointed out that good faith requirements could be explained in the light of 
reasonable expectations of the consumers.  He explains that it is important to decide ‘whether 
if [the term] were drawn to his attention the consumer would be likely to be surprised by 
it’.766 In other words, Lord Millett meant to refer to the idea of the ‘unfair surprise’ 
justification in the sense that consumer should not be surprised by a term.767 
 
The Court of Justice of the EU also seems to be of the view that the good faith test is related 
to substantive fairness. It was held in Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i 
Manresa that whether a term is unfair and contrary to the requirement of good faith is 
dependent on ‘whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, 
could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such tern in individual 
contract negotiations’.
768
 The Court of Justice relied on the opinion of the Advocate General 
Kokott who thought that it is essential to consider whether the contract terms are common, or 
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surprising, or objectively justified. Micklitz and Reich illustrate that the wording of the Court 
of Justice indicates that ‘good faith requires a balancing between the interests of the supplier 




Collins makes the argument that the good faith requirement imposes ‘social market 
conditions’ onto the fairness test. According to him, the significant imbalance requires a 
condition that the goods or services supplied must be of a competitive price. And the good 
faith requirement adds the condition that the goods or services supplied must be of at least the 
minimum quality that consumers reasonably expect.
770
 As a result, a contract for the sale of 
goods of low quality at a very low price may not amount to a ‘significant imbalance’ but may 
not pass the test of ‘good faith’, because consumers expect goods to be of certain quality no 
matter how cheap they are.
771
 This view again supports the idea that the good faith 
requirement is closely linked to consumer expectations.  
 
In sum, the meaning of the good faith requirement of the test of fairness is a matter of 
controversy. Nonetheless, from the available indications it seems that it is akin to the 
requirement of significant imbalance, in that it is related to the substantive fairness of the 
term.  While the requirement of significant imbalance ensures that there is a balance between 
the rights and obligations of the consumer and trader, the good faith requirement ensures that 
the trader is acting in a fair and equitable manner. Particularly the requirement of good faith 
is there to protect consumer expectation. It other words, it protects consumers from being 
victims of unfair surprises.  
 
5.6.1.3 The requirements of ‘transparency’ 
 
A written term in a consumer contract needs, according to section 68 of the CRA 2015, to be 
transparent in the sense that it must be expressed in ‘plain, intelligible and legible’ language.  
The drafting of the CRA 2015, which is a mirror to the Directive, does not indicate whether 
the requirement of transparency is part of the test of fairness or in itself a separate 
consideration. One might well regard it as separate from the test of fairness as it reads as a 
separate requirement and arguably there is no obvious connection between unclear language 
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and a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations. Nonetheless, as O'Sullivan 
and Hilliard observe that there is no specific language in the CRA 2015 for the breach of the 
transparency requirement.
772
 Thus, it is most likely that the requirement of transparency is 
meant to be part of the fairness test. 
 
It was mentioned in the Law Commission’s consultation Paper of 2013 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts that ‘we do not think that non-transparent terms are automatically unfair, 
though it is an important factor to consider.’ The recommendation of the Law Commission 
was that the transparency requirements should be assessed under the broader question of the 
fairness test.
773
 The same approach was taken by Davies, who takes the wording of the CRA 
2015 to mean that non-transparent terms should be subject to the test of fairness. According 
to him ‘if a consumer would be surprised by the term upon being told of it after entering into 
the contract, it will generally be subject to the test of fairness.’
774
  To recap, a term is 
generally considered non-transparent if a consumer would be surprised by it once it comes to 
his knowledge at any time after the conclusion of the contract. A non-transparent term is not 
regarded as automatically unfair but it rather becomes subject to the test of fairness. Non- 
transparency is, however, an indication that the term might not be fair. 
 
5.6.1.4 Terms excluded from the test of fairness 
 
The general rule is that any term in any consumer contract can be assessed for fairness; the 
exception is laid down in section 64 of the CRA 2015. It provides that: (1) A term of a 
consumer contract may not be assessed for fairness under section 62 to the extent that—(a) it 
specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or (b) the assessment is of the 
appropriateness of the price payable under the contract by comparison with the goods, digital 
content or services supplied under it.’ 
 
These sorts of terms are commonly known as ‘core terms’. According to section 64 (2) the 
core terms are excluded from the assessment of fairness only if they are ‘transparent and 
prominent’. The meaning of prominent is elaborated under section 64 (4) ‘A term is 
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prominent for the purposes of this section if it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a 
way that an average consumer would be aware of the term.’ 
 
Such exclusion could be criticised as undermining the consumer right of protection especially 
in relation to price fairness. Indeed, a consumer should have the right to prove that a 
particular product was too expensive and the price was accordingly ‘unfair’. Howells and 
Wilhelmsson point out that the intention behind the exclusion of the core terms by the 
Directive is a result of being cautious not to intervene into ‘anything resulting directly from 
the contractual freedom of the parties’.
775
 It is said that the Directive and the CRA 2015 





Bright explains that this fits with consumer behaviour since most consumers will focus on the 
price and the quality of goods before entering into the contract. Thus it said that, in the 
majority of non-monopoly cases, the core terms reflect a free choice. By contrast, consumers 
rarely consider other terms of the contract when making their decision and this ‘explains why 




Furthermore, one would argue that there is no ‘unfair surprise justification’ in relation to 
price and main subject matter because the consumer takes notice of these at the time of 
contract conclusion. Also, it is regarded as unacceptable from the standpoint of freedom of 
contract, for the trader or supplier to give the consumer the right to undo a bargain freely 
entered into on the grounds that they later regretted their original willingness to pay a given 




However, it is stressed that the exception of core terms should only be interpreted narrowly to 
avoid unwanted consequences.
779
 Lord Bingham in Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank plc held that broad interpretation of core terms would potentially lead to a 
limitation of protection under the fairness test. He explained that ‘the object of the regulations 
and the directive is to protect consumers against the inclusion of unfair and prejudicial terms 
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in standard-form contracts into which they enter, and that object would plainly be frustrated if 
regulation’ terms excluded from the test ‘were so broadly interpreted as to cover any terms 
other than those falling squarely within it. Thus the exemption in Regulation […] should only 




In the same case Lord Steyn supported the approach that the core terms need to be interpreted 
narrowly ‘since all terms of the contract are in some way related to the price or remuneration’ 
and if this is not done it will ‘enable the main purpose of the scheme to be frustrated by 





The CRA 2015 adopted the narrow interpretation of the core terms by making them subject to 
the requirements of ‘transparency and prominence’. The requirement of ‘transparency’ as 
explained before is a general requirement for any term but, the requirement of ‘prominence’ 
was exclusively mentioned in relation to the core terms. It is submitted that the requirement 
of ‘prominence’ is similar to the common law requirement of incorporation of unusual or 
onerous terms.
782
 It places the seller under an obligation to ensure that the consumer has read 
and subjectively understood the term (almost an impossible task to fulfil). It also prevents the 




The requirement of ‘prominence’ was not there in the old regulation before the CRA 2015. 
This has led to the undesirable decision in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Bank. The 
case was concerned with charges that banks levied on their consumers for unauthorised 
overdrafts. The Supreme Court refused to assess these terms for fairness, as they concerned 
part of the price consumers paid for their current accounts. The fact that the charges were not 
essential or a core part of the price was not taken to be relevant.
784
 The approach of the 
Supreme Court considerably reduced the scope of protection offered to consumers to a level 
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Furthermore, the CRA 2015 requirement that core terms are only excluded from the fairness 
assessment if they are transparent and prominent has the ability to protect the consumer from 
hidden charges. This is because traders are increasingly pressurised to advertise ‘low headline 
prices whilst earning their profit through other charges’.
785
 According to the requirement of 
prominence unless these charges were read and subjectively understood by the consumer they 
would be subjected to the fairness test. 
 
5.6.2 Implied terms  
 
Modern regulation of consumer protection does not stop at testing the agreed terms for 
fairness. Favourable terms are imposed by legislation into any consumer relation. These 
terms share the purpose of protecting the contractual fairness by imposing conditions that 
protect the contractual right of the consumer as the vulnerable party and protect the essence 
of the contractual relation. 
 
Implication of terms into contract is an old technique of common law (implication by custom 
or fact). It is a tool that works from a practical perspective, as a technique of construction or 
interpretation of contract. In general, implication of terms into private contracts conflicts with 
the fundamental principle of sanctity of contract in common law. Neither the court nor the 
parliament is a party of the contract. Yet, implication by the common law is a means of 
avoiding conflict with freedom and sanctity of contract.  It is a matter of interpretation of the 
contract made between the parties by asserting the actual intention which might only 
imperfectly have been expressed in words, oral or written.
786
 By contrast, terms implied by 
legislation intervene into freedom of contract. On some occasions the legislator intervenes 





Such implication of certain terms into contracts is meant to protect the essence of contract to 
reflect consumers’ expectations and the quality of goods. By enforcing conditions that goods 
must be of certain level of quality the legislator is protecting consumer expectation. The 
protection of the quality of goods is a modern approach which deviates from caveat 
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 Lord Weight describes implied terms with regard to quality as a shift from caveat 
emptor to caveat vendor.
789
 It indeed reflects the change in the law. Until the early nineteenth 
century the position was that caveat emptor applied to all aspects of the sale, and the only 




Terms implied (or included) into consumer contracts are now regulated under the CRA 2015. 
It replaces the implied terms to consumer contracts under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The 
language of the included terms under the CRA 2015 is similar to the one under the old 
regulation. Therefore, case law under the old regulations remains to a large extent relevant. 
Thus, reference to case law under the old regulation will be made in this chapter where 
applicable. The following discussion will be limited to implied terms in the sale of goods 
only. 
 
5.6.2.1 Implied terms with regard to quality 
 
Section 9 of the CRA 2015 implies the condition that goods must be of satisfactory quality in 
all consumer contracts for the supply of goods. Goods are regarded as satisfactory if ‘they 
meet the standard that a reasonable person would consider satisfactory, taking account of— 
(a) any description of the goods, (b) the price or other consideration for the goods (if 
relevant), and (c) all the other relevant circumstances […] The quality of goods includes their 
state and condition; and the following aspects (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects 
of the quality of goods (a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are usually 
supplied; (b) appearance and finish; (c) freedom from minor defects; (d) safety; (e) 
durability.’ 
 
Determining the question of goods being of satisfactory quality is simply a matter of 
application of the criteria stated by the law. Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Con, 
Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd stated that in order to determine the question of 
whether the goods are of satisfactory quality or not judges need only to determine factual 
questions as stated in the regulations (fitness for purpose, appearance and finish, freedom 
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from minor defects, safety and durability.
791
 Failure of the goods to be satisfactory in one 




Section 9(4) provides for the exemption of certain matters causing the goods to be 
unsatisfactory if the defect was sufficiently drawn to the consumer’s attention either directly 
by the seller or indirectly through examination of the subject matter or a sample, provided 
that the defect would have been apparent on a reasonable examination. 
 
5.6.2.2 Fitness for particular purpose 
 
If the buyer notifies the seller that the goods are needed for a particular purpose then the 
goods must be fit for that specific purpose, as stated in section 10 of CRA 2015. This is true 
even if the specified purpose is not one for which goods of that kind are usually supplied. The 
buyer must have relied on the seller’s expertise and judgment when buying the goods in order 
to benefit from the Article. 
 
The fitness for particular purpose implied by section 10 is different from fitness for purpose 
in section 9. The latter, unlike the former, concerns the general requirements for quality of 
goods. It is thus apparent that fitness for purpose is a concept playing two roles. One is 
related to the quality as determined by the court in considering whether the goods are of 
satisfactory quality or not, and the other represents a distinct implied term.
793
 Accordingly the 
goods may satisfy the test of satisfactory quality in section 9 but breach the implied term in 
section 10. In Ashington piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd, animal food was supplied 




5.6.2.3 Conformity with description 
 
It is assumed that the majority of sales carried out today are at least partly sales by 
description. The sale of any future goods including any internet sale, catalogue sale and so on 
is a sale of description.  Even sales via supermarket racks or shelves contain an element of 
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description; if someone buys a package of tomatoes marked ‘organic tomatoes’ where the 
fact of their being tomatoes is obvious and needs no description the ‘organic’ part is an 
element of description to which the goods need to conform.
795
 Section 11 of the CRA 2015 
implies that every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term 
that the goods will match the description. This includes all kind of descriptions, even 
descriptions provided with goods that were exposed for supply and selected by the consumer, 
as well as any information that is provided by the trader about the goods. Furthermore, if a 
description is provided in the sale in addition to a sample the bulk of the goods must match 
the description as well as the sample. 
 
The application of implied terms as to the conformity with description is a straightforward 
procedure, if the goods sold were described as so-and-so and they were not so, then they 
would fail the test of conformity with description, with no complication.
796
 This is confirmed 
by the history of the relevant case law.
797
 Case law indicates that it is not relevant whether or 
not the buyer relied on the description.  
 
Furthermore, it does not matter if a sample was also supplied or if the sale is of specific or 
unascertained goods or even if the goods were inspected or chosen by the buyer, as long as 
there was some description applied to the goods it is then a sale of description.
798
 Lord 
Wright in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd defined sale by description as the following: 
‘A thing is sold by description, though it is specific. So long as it is sold not merely as the 
specific thing but as thing corresponding to a description, e.g., woollen under-garments, a hot 




In sale by description the descriptive words need to form a part of the contract, and not be 
present as a mere representation. This is a matter which needs to decided through the ordinary 
principles of contract law.
800
 Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith Lines v Hansen-Tangen, 
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held that the description in the contract is relevant to the implied term only if it forms a 




5.6.2.4 Correspondence of bulk with sample 
 
When goods are supplied, by reference to a sample section 13 of the CRA 2015 implies a 
condition that the goods will match the sample. The only exception is if any differences 
between the sample and goods were brought to the consumer’s attention before the 
conclusion of the contract.  
 
It is only a sale of sample if the sample was intended to form part of the contractual basis of 
the sale. The mere fact that a sample was presented in the course of negotiations does not 
make it a sale by sample. Sir Goode observes that ‘a sale is likely to be considered a sale by 
sample unless the sample is released by the seller to the buyer […] for the purpose of 





Lord Macnaghten in James Drummond & Sons v E.H. Van Ingen & Co. held that the bulk 
needs only to correspond with the sample in respect to qualities which could be disclosed 
through reasonable observation and testing, rather than exhaustive testing. However, the 





5.6.2.5 Implied terms with regard to the ownership of the commodity 
 
According to section 17 of the CRA 2015 the trader must have the right to transfer the 
ownership of the commodity. This implies a condition that goods must be free from any 
‘charge or encumbrance’, which is not known to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the 
contract. Furthermore, the goods must remain free from any ‘charge or encumbrance’ until 
the contract is concluded and the ownership is transferred to the consumer. Once the contract 
is concluded the consumer should enjoy quiet possession of the goods ‘except so far as it may 
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be disturbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or 
encumbrance so disclosed or known.’ 
 
5.6.2.6 Remedies for breach 
 
If any of the goods fail to comply with any of the contract terms the consumer is given three 
means of response. The first is the right to reject under sections 20 and 21of the CRA 2015. 
Goods can be rejected in full or in part within 30 days of the goods being supplied, unless the 
expected life of the goods is shorter. The consumer is entitled to treat the contract as at an end 
and receive a refund, but must make the goods available for collection by the trader. 
 
The second remedy is the right to repair or replacement under section 23 of the CRA 2015. It 
places the trader under a duty to provide the repair or replacement within a reasonable time, 
without causing significant inconvenience to the consumer and at no cost to the consumer. If 
the consumer requests a repair or replacement within the first thirty days of the goods being 
supplied then the short term right to reject is paused.  On provision of the repaired or replaced 
goods the consumer has either the remainder of the thirty day period or seven days, 
whichever is the longer, in which to reject the goods if they still do not conform to the 
contract. The consumer only has to accept one repair or replacement.  If the goods still do not 
meet the contract terms, either because the original issue persists or a new one has arisen, the 
consumer can exercise their right to a price reduction or the final right to reject. 
 
The third remedy is the right to a price reduction or the final right to reject under section 24 
of the CRA 2015. It is available where a repair or replacement is unsuccessful, impossible or 
not provided within a reasonable timeframe or without significant inconvenience to the 
consumer.  Essentially, the consumer chooses either to keep the goods and claim a reduction 
in price or return them and claim a refund.  The reduction in price must be an appropriate 
amount, taking into account all of the circumstances and can usually consider any use that the 
consumer has had from the goods.  However, no deduction for use can be made where the 
goods are rejected within six months of supply except in the case of motor vehicles. 
 




Information remedies are another technique implied by the English law for the protection of 
consumers while contracting. Information remedies are the cornerstone of modern consumer 
protection. Information remedies provide the consumer with all the information needed to 
make an informed decision. Generally, the English law does not recognise a general duty to 
disclose material facts known to one party but not to the other.
804
 Information under the law 
of contract is only regulated by the law of mispresentation, which regulates deceptive and 
misleading statements. The growth of consumer protection in modern times as an essential 
regulatory concern has led to the evolution of disclosure regulations.
805
 In the early stages 
regulation of information disclosure was limited to product labelling; it now covers most 




Information remedies are much more than laws controlling trade description. The latter is 
only concerned with the accuracy of the information which businesses pass on to 
consumers.
807
 Information remedies on the other hand regulate three aspects: (1) removing 
restraint on information; (2) correcting misleading information; and (3) encouraging 
additional information.
808
 This potentially covers a wide range of information, including the 





The disclosure of material information in contract is regulated under the Consumer Contracts 
(Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (the Regulations).
810
 It 
requires certain information to be supplied to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the 
contract (informational requirements). These requirements are extended by the Regulations to 
on-premises, off premises and distance contract (which can include contracts made by 
electronic means and contracts commenced by telephone call). 
 
Schedule 1 of the Regulations lays down the information to be included in any on-premises 
contract (not applicable to a contract which involves a day-to-day transaction and is 
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performed immediately at the time when the contract is entered into).
811
  It should include: 
the main characteristics of goods and services, the identity of the trader, the price and any 
additional charges, the terms of the contract (including arrangements of the payment, delivery 
performance, the time of performance and the duration of the contract), where applicable any 
information related to the functionality and any information related to the applicable technical 
protection measures, of digital content and ‘any relevant compatibility of digital content with 
hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected to have been 
aware of.’ 
 
In addition, the regulation in schedule 2 mandates the disclosure of extra information in 
distance and off-premises contracts which are mostly related to cancellation. These are ‘(l) 
where a right to cancel exists, the conditions, time limit and procedures for exercising that 
right in accordance with regulations 28 to 31; where applicable, that the consumer will have 
to bear the cost of returning the goods in case of cancellation and, for distance contracts, if 
the goods, by their nature, cannot normally be returned by post, the cost of returning the 
goods […].’ The effect of failure to supply the specified information is regulated under 
section 12 of the CRA 2015; any contract information supplied by the trader under the 
regulation falling within schedule 1 and 2 of the Regulations is to be treated as an implied 
term of the contract. 
 
Disclosure is also encouraged by legislation in relation to defects; a trader is released from 
liability if she makes the consumer aware of the defect before the conclusion of the contract. 
Section 9(4) of the CRA 2015 excludes from the trader’s liability as to the quality of goods 
any defect ‘which is specifically drawn to the consumer’s attention before the contract is 
made’. 
 
5.6.3.1 Information remedies in perspective  
 
The promotion of the informed consumer is a cornerstone of modern consumer protection.
812
 
Regulation remedies are a popular regulation technique in modern consumer litigation.
813
 It is 
assumed that once a consumer has the relevant information he would be able to protect 
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himself by acting accordingly.
814
 Moreover, if the correct information is made available to 




Information disclosure as a technique of consumer protection is particularly supported by 
those who advocate minimising government interference into the market and insist that the 
market remains regulated by the notion of caveat emptor.
816
 Making information available to 
consumers gives them the chance to make their own choices and therefore introduces ‘less 
rigidity into the market’. Moreover, it leaves the market free to respond as consumer 




Flexibility is another advantage of information disclosure since it provides consumers with 
the opportunity to protect themselves according to personal preferences. This releases the 
regulator from the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences with a common 
standard. Finally, information remedies are said to be harmless, no serious risk is likely to 




However, disclosure regulations do not seem to meet the expectations placed on them. It is 
said that consumer’s policies are a waste of effort since only a few consumers make use of 
information provided.
819
 Some scholars assume that the only reason that information 
disclosure is promoted by governments is because it is relatively inexpensive.
820
 Most 
consumers do not have the time and the chance to use the available information in the course 
of their daily lives.
821
 Moreover, consumers do not deal with information in the same manner. 
This is a normal consequence of consumer being from different classes and different 
educational backgrounds.
822
 The more affluent, well-educated middle-class consumers are 
likely to benefit from information more than any other group. Evidence from studies of 
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consumer credit disclosure rules suggests that it is the better-off consumers who tend to make 




The assumption on which disclosure regulations are based is that consumers will make the 
rational decisions if they are supplied with the right information, but this has been challenged 
by behavioural economics. Kahneman and Tversky describe consumer action as being 
irrational as a result of human nature regardless of levels of education and intelligence.
824
 
Thus, the focus of consumer polices on average consumers has been criticised as attaching 
above average qualities to consumers by considering them to be ‘reasonably well informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect’.
825
 It is argued that the model employed by the 
law assumes that the average consumer is capable of identifying information and processing 
it rationally to act in a predictable way. By the same means vulnerable consumers are 
regarded as atypical consumers who need special protection. Yet, it is argued that the needs 
of the vulnerable group should not form an obstacle to ‘deregulation and liberalization to 
benefit the ‘average consumer’. This assumption, according to behavioural economics, is 
unrealistic. Every consumer is to some extent vulnerable due to the limitations of the human 
mind.
826
 Jacoby suggests that the focus needs to be shifted from whether consumers are well 
informed to whether the information provided contributes to creating competitive prices and 
terms. In his view, consumers only need to be provided with the minimum information 





Another point that may make information remedies non-useful is related to the impact of 
information presentation on consumers. The traditional economic assumption that consumers 
would react in a predictable way to the expected utility of the alternatives is criticised as 
being imprecise.  It has been proved that the way information is presented could have a 
significant impact on how consumers perceive and react to information.
828
 Consumer choices 
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A major point in the debate is related to the processing of information. This is vital because 
information disclosure cannot provide consumers with protection unless consumers are able 
to make sense of information and use it.
830
 This is especially critical in relation to technical 
information. Information must be capable of being understood by consumers, but at the same 





A consumer may be aware that a certain product is faulty, but he might not be aware of the 
technical implications for usability, which could affect the overall quality of goods on the 
market. This point was invoked by Twigg-Flesner in relation to the application of Article 2 
(3) of the Consumer Sales Directive, which is implemented now by section 9 (4) of the CRA 
2015. She argues that the importance of ‘consumer’s expectations’ is ignored by these 
information polices. Consumers usually have a certain idea about the product and its use 
before making the purchase. At a basic level, a consumer expects that ‘the goods will be 
suitable for his needs and, even more fundamentally, work reliably’ However, according to 
section 9 (4) if the consumer was told about the defect he then cannot claim that the goods or 
services did not meet the contract description. She claims that it is not enough to correct the 
information failure to make sure that the consumer is aware of the defect, ‘but also the extent 




Perhaps it is the high expectation attached to information polices that make them seem 
ineffective. Collins has rightly suggested some useful recommendations to avoid such 
outcomes by lowering expectations of information policies and considering other policies to 
complement information rules. Furthermore, the effectiveness of information rules should be 
enhanced by developing a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to information. The 
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rising level of consumer education could also be taken into account in the assessment of 
consumers’ ability to benefit from information remedies.
833
  Additionally, it would be 
worthwhile for the policy maker to consider carefully how information rules should be 
delivered to consumer. The best situation regarding information rules need to be established, 
including how information should be delivered to consumer and what sort of information 
consumers need.
834
 Current legislation does to some extent reflect the need to deliver 
information in a way that assists the understanding of consumers. This is partially 
acknowledged by the legislator in the Regulations since it is provided that ‘something is 
made available to a consumer only if an average consumer would be aware of how to access 
it’.
835
 Finally, one should not ignore the fact that disclosure regulations relate to a basic right 
of the consumer in a democratic society to be informed about products and services on the 




These are means that could enhance the effectiveness of information policies. However, the 
importance of information remedies in consumer policy should not be underestimated, 
especially since it could be ‘the only practicable approach, given the limits on the legislative 
technique and a shortage of enforcement resources’.
837
 Scott and Black rightly observe that ‘it 
is misguided to adopt the attitude that because consumers at present will not use information 
there is no need for it.
838
 One should not underestimate the rectifying effect of ‘active 
information seeking consumers’.
839
 Even if only a small percentage of consumers use the 
information, there is potential to benefit the consumer market considerably.
840
 Furthermore, 
whether the consumer is benefiting from the information supplied or not it is arguably an 
inherited right of the consumer to have sufficient information about the contract he is entering 
into. Otherwise, consumer consent might not be voluntary simply because the consumer is 
not aware of the real condition of the transaction. Information remedies therefore are an 
indispensable technique of consumer protection. 
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5.6.4 The cooling-off period  
 
The cooling-off or cancellation period is another essential regulation technique for consumer 
protection. It is a technique that is designed for protecting the consumer by giving him the 
option to reflect when the contract is concluded, in circumstances that are likely to vitiate the 
consumer’s will. The first time the cooling-off period was introduced in the UK was to 
control issues surrounding doorstep selling. Considerable abuse issues were associated with 
doorstep selling in the UK. These were related to overcharging and inducing consumers to 
sign contracts committing them to substantial payments for things which, on reflection, they 
do not want. The cooling-off period allows the purchaser to reflect, and gives him a remedy if 




The ‘cooling-off’ period has been extended to distance selling and off-premises contracts, 
under the Regulations. Consumers are given a fourteen day ‘cooling off’ (cancelation) period 
after the day on which the contract is entered into.
842  
Regulation 28 gives consumers the right 
to cancel a distance or off-premises contract at any time during the cooling-off period. The 
consumer should not pay for any costs except in relation to enhanced delivery chosen by the 
consumer
843
, if the value of goods is diminished by consumer handling,
844
or costs of service 




5.7 Consumer protection of English law in perspective  
 
Certainly consumer protection now extends far beyond the general common law of contract 
in protecting the fairness of private transactions. Four main contractual values are protected 
under consumer legislation. The essence of contract protected by the implied terms reflects 
consumer’s reasonable expectations; informed choice is protected by information remedies; 
fairness of terms are subjected to the fairness test and the consent of consumer is preserved 
by the cooling-off period. All of these measures violate the basic concepts of common law 
contract that promote the free will of the contracting parties.  
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These measures set standards aimed at protecting consumers regardless of their individual 
circumstances. Abstract protection regimes that protect consumers regardless of their position 
within the overall society, according to Willet, amount to maximal welfarism. However, there 
are other aspects, such as price regulation, that need to be achieved by the law to reach 
maximal welfarism. According to Willet, a regime that aims to achieve maximal welfarism 
needs also to satisfy the requirement of fair price.
846
 Accordingly, the one action that might 
reduce the level of protection offered by English law is the exclusion of the price from the 
test of fairness under section 64(1) of the CRA 2015. The price is indeed a significant aspect 
of fairness; a consumer should have the right to prove that a particular product was too 




Another factor with regard to the level of protection in the UK is the fact that it mostly 
derives from an implementation of EU law. This raises the question of the effect of the 
British exit from the EU on the level of protection. However, although it is true that the law 
of consumer protection comes primarily from European Directives, it is enshrined in the UK 
by national Acts which means that changes are not likely to be immediately imminent, 
especially given the recent introduction of the CRA in 2015. However, the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU is not yet clear. The UK certainly wants to maintain a 
commercial relation since it currently account for 44% of UK trade. If the UK wants to 
continue selling products to consumers in the EU, it definitely needs to continue to comply 




5.8 Lessons learned 
 
The second aim of this research is to test the viability of consumer protection derived from 
the Shariah law of contract. The English experience has been invoked for the purpose of 
distinguishing the main values and major techniques of regulations of consumer protection to 
be tested under the Shariah law of contract. The ongoing analysis of English consumer 
protection reveals that the protection of the consumer by the law of contract is a matter of 
theory as well as practice. Consumer protection involves the promotion and enforcement of 
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ideas of cooperation and fairness in society by the law of contract. The ongoing discussion 
indicates that the English law has intervened into the private sphere of contract in order to 
balance the contractual relation for the benefit of the consumer. This has reflected the 
promotion of the paternalist behaviour of government and the distributive function of contract 
by English consumer contract theory. 
 
The most important values within consumer policy are reflected in English law by the four 
major techniques of regulation discussed above: consumer expectations (reflected by the 
imposed terms); the balance of the contractual relation (reflected in the fairness test); the 
informed choice of the consumer (presented by information remedies); and the voluntary 
consent of the consumer (as indicated by the cooling-off period). These constitute the 
minimum values to be protected by a consumer protection policy. A successful body of 
consumer rules must ensure that deals made by consumers are free, equitable, balanced and 
voluntary. 
 
5.9 Concluding remarks 
 
Consumer contracting under the English law obviously follows a theoretical path that differs 
from that of general contract.  On the one hand, the general theory of contract limits 
intervention into parties’ autonomy to a minimum. Under the general conception of the 
English law of contract parties are under no obligation to contract in good faith or to act 
reasonably towards each other. By the same rationale, the power of English judges to 
intervene into the substantive fairness of a contractual relation is very limited. 
   
On the other hand, in consumer transactions the law intervenes in many ways for the purpose 
of balancing the contractual relation. The intervention is mainly meant to rebalance the 
contract for the benefit of the consumer. Such intervention into the autonomy of the parties is 
sometimes rationalised under the neo-classical theory of market failure, which is itself a 
modern restatement of the classical theory of contract. It accepts the fact that failures occur in 
the free market and that the law ought to intervene to correct such failures. As a result, 
consumer policy is expected to stop at the point the market failure is rectified. The aim is to 
achieve efficiency in the market rather than fairness. The market failure explanation of 
consumer policy agrees (or at least does not contradict) with the general conception of the 
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law of contract. The motivation for consumer protection in this model thus focuses on the 
overall situation of the market rather than the position of individual consumers.  
 
Nevertheless, evidence shows that consumer protection in England amounts to more than 
this. For example, the terms of consumer contracts are tested for fairness rather than 
efficiency. Furthermore, good faith is required on the part of the supplier under the CRA 
2015 when setting contract terms. This in principle contradicts the general principles of the 
English law of contract, which does not impose a requirement of good faith and does not 
allow the intervention of testing contract terms for fairness. Such measures can only be 
rationalised under fairness and distributive social motives.  
 
Accordingly, this has led to the conclusion that substantive fairness of contract is not 
completely irrelevant to English law of contract. The consumer contract scheme forms a large 
proportion of contractual relations at this point in time. Although consumer theory has a 
distinct theoretical basis the law of contract remains its cornerstone. Accordingly, it becomes 
hard to say that substantive fairness of contract is completely irrelevant to the English law of 
contract. 
849
 The next chapter will move on to examine the viability of consumer protection 
afforded by the Shariah law of contract. The English model of consumer protection will be 
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The overall discussion of the thesis is focused on contractual justice by examining the extent 
to which the two relevant legal systems promote the intervention into the autonomy of the 
contracting parties to fix perceived injustice in contracts. English and Shariah laws of 
contract have been reviewed from classical to contemporary times by focusing on contractual 
justice, equity and acknowledgment of vulnerability in both legal systems. It has been 
demonstrated that the English law of contract is focused on the absolute sanctity of contract 
(in its classical form) and economic efficiency (in its modern form). On the other hand, the 
Shariah law of contract is governed by the general principle that gain comes only from labour 
and stresses the importance of the equivalence of counter-values. This chapter attempts to 
investigate the viability of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract. The matter 
is approached by testing both the theoretical and practical aspects of the law. The English 
model of consumer protection, as discussed in the last chapter, is invoked for guidance. The 
outcomes should guide and enhance the legitimacy of consumer protection measures in 
Shariah-ruled countries. 
 
6.1 A Shariah consumer law? 
 
In order to protect consumers, intervention into the autonomy of the parties is needed for the 
purpose of preserving the fairness and reasonableness of contracts. While honest and fair 
dealing is an essential consideration of the Shariah law of contract, Shariah law does not 
recognise the concept of the consumer. The Shariah law of contract is the product of the 
seventh and eighth centuries where the concept of consumer was not yet recognised. Thus an 
argument has been made that Shariah law cannot form a satisfactory model of consumer 
protection to offer solutions to contemporary issues regarding the consumer. The negligence 
of Muslim society with respect to Shariah law has lead to its retreat. The current practice of 
Shariah is not taking full advantage of the relevant provisions and this means it is unqualified 
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to compete with modern legislation.
850
 Nevertheless, many contemporary scholars of Shariah 
claim that consumer protection is an admitted value of Shariah law.
851
 Mancuso refers to the 
means of protecting individuals’ rights and lives against any interference as a basis for 
consumer protection.
852
 Riyad argues for Shariah fraud as a basis for protecting consumers 
against industrial and commercial fraud.
853
 A number of other such arguments have been 
made by reference to the general acknowledgment of moral and honest dealing set by Shariah 
law and the prohibition of fraudulent practices.
854
 But these theses do not attend sufficiently 
to the issue of consumer protection. None involve the determination of the major values to be 
protected by a consumer policy nor how Shariah rules would satisfactorily address these 
values. Neither fraud nor the recognition of moral and honest dealing could form a 
satisfactory basis for consumer protection. Fraud enables protection against dishonesty and 
cheating in commercial transactions. This does not support the minimum values to be 
protected under a consumer policy, including securing free, equitable, informed and 
voluntary transactions. The encouragement of fair and honest dealing is not an adequate basis 
for consumer protection which requires far more than an engagement with honest dealing.  
 
A more thoughtful thesis has been proposed by Ahmed who makes reference to many 
technical rules of Shariah which protect fairness and cooperation. He employs examples of 
certain technical rules within Shariah that protect contracting parties from being victims of 
fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and unfair contracts.
855
 He thus invokes the right rules 
that can potentially protect consumer values. Yet, his thesis is mostly focussed on the 
practical aspect of the law. He does not test suggested Shariah rules for their computability 
with modern values of consumer protection. Rather he presents the relevant Shariah rules in 
their original form without offering a formula as to how they could be employed in consumer 
protection. 
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This research argues that consumer protection calls for more than just honest and fair dealing. 
It is matter of balancing the aims of securing the stability of contract by protecting the 
autonomy of the contracting parties and securing a fair and just market.  It requires 
governmental intervention into private contracts to enforce elements of fairness and 
distribution in the marketplace. It fixes unbalanced contractual relations by setting minimum 
standards of quality, transparency and fair contractual terms. 
 
Any legal system consists of both theoretical and practical aspects. Thus, to introduce a 
suitable legal solution it must be compatible with both theory and the rules of law. The 
discussion of consumer protection under English law has helped to shed light on the 
characteristics of consumer protection. From a theoretical perspective, the value of protecting 
the fairness and reasonableness of contractual relations is central to any consumer policy. 
Under consumer theory cooperation and reasonableness are values that are enforced by law. 
Consequently, in order to secure a satisfactory consumer regime, the law needs to provide an 
avenue for the government to intervene into the parties’ autonomy. In other words, legal 
theory needs to promote paternalistic behaviour on the part of the government. Consumer 
protection rules are of a special character in the sense that their focus is on fixing the fairness 
of the deal for the benefit of consumer rather than both parties of an agreement and they, 
therefore, acknowledge the idea that being in a weaker position qualifies a person for special 
treatment. To put this in the proper terms, this means a distributional function of the law. 
Furthermore, consumer protection is a form of social responsibility and care for the 
community. These issues have been touched in the chapter on contractual justice in Shariah 
and will be expanded in this chapter. 
 
From a technical perspective, the law requires proper rules to reflect its theoretical ideas. In 
the chapter on consumer protection under English law four major techniques of regulation 
were discussed to identify the major values to be protected by the law of consumer 
protection. Consumer rules must protect the following: consumer voluntary choice, informed 
will, fairness and equitability within the contractual deal. The intention here it to search for 
technical rules within the Shariah law of contract that could reflect these values, and propose 
a formula as to how it could be employed in a consumer context to ensure the maximum 




To illustrate further the issue facing the protection of the consumer under Shariah law, the 
experience of Saudi Arabia (one of the leading countries applying Shariah law) will be 
outlined below. Next, the theoretical basis of consumer protection under Shariah will be 
analysed by invoking three grounds: paternalism, distributive justice and community values. 
The technical aspect of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract will also be 
expanded upon.  
 
6.2 Shariah consumer law in application  
 
Saudi Arabia acknowledges Shariah as the former law of the country. Shariah governs 
morals, duties, behaviours, and other aspects at the level of both individual and society. The 
legislative power of the government is restricted by the rules of Shariah. The creation of legal 
rules by the legislative assembly must take place within the scope and dominance of the 
sources of law indicated by Shariah. Any proposed or existing legislations must not 




Consumer protection in Saudi Arabia is given attention particularly in sensitive areas such as 
health and safety. The protection of the consumer in Saudi Arabia falls mainly under the duty 
of three bodies: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Health.
857
 These bodies are entitled to issue secondary 
legislation, when appropriate, to regulate the consumer market.  The focus of these bodies has 





For the aim of protecting the consumer, the Ministry of Commerce has been supervising the 
supply of goods and service in the market by setting standards as to the quality and safety of 
those goods. It oversees the advertising process for the purposes of preventing exploitation 
and exaggeration in prices and the provision of misleading information. It does occasionally 
intervene in the market by putting an end to excessiveness and exaggeration in prices. It seeks 
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to guarantee the availability of basic living materials in the market at equitable and 
reasonable prices.
859
 Recently, increased attention from the Ministry of Commerce has been 
paid to consumer contract terms in relation to cancellation pricing and guarantees, and has 
come in the form of ministry decisions rather than legislative rules. 
 
However, the Saudi consumer protection system suffers many issues on both conceptual and 
practical levels. The law suffers from complexity and inconsistency. This is in part because 
there are multiple entities involved in the process of consumer protection. More importantly, 
the protection of consumer is made in a random way as it not bound by a single legislative 
code. The system is focused on preventing fraudulent and misleading practices, more than 
ensuring a fair deal for consumer. The complexity and lack of clarity of the system is 




More fundamentally, the system is potentially suffering a legitimacy problem. There is no 
evidence that these rules have been tested under Shariah. This could potentially lead to these 
rules being challenged for inconsistency. The issuance of a single body of legislation 
compatible with Shariah rules is likely to be the key solution for all of these issues. Perhaps a 
fear of changing the nature of the Shariah law is what is currently preventing any attempt to 
develop and codify it. A belief common among some Shariah scholars of the last century was 
certainly that codifying the Shariah law has a negative impact on ijtihad (human reasoning). 
There is always a fear that if the law is codified, it will stop developing and its nature will be 
affected. Furthermore, if the codification was made based on wrong ijtihad, this would lead 
to the misapplication of Shariah. Nevertheless, codification is a necessity if Shariah is to 
survive in modern times. It would bring much needed elements of clarity and consistency to 
the law. The codification of consumer protection in Saudi Arabia, along with creating a stable 
and clear system, is likely to enhance legitimacy and moderation within the practice of 
consumer protection. The following analysis will test the general theory of the Shariah law of 
contract for its compatibility with the theoretical grounds of consumer protection; 
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6.3 The theoretical ground for consumer protection 
 
Under the discussion of consumer protection rationales two large headings were invoked: 
economic and social justice rationales. Economic justifications of consumer protection are 
focused on the idea of rectifying market failure in a free market system. The economic 
rationale for consumer protection or the so called neo-classical theory of contract softens 
classical ideas of non-intervention into the marketplace. It provides that the law should 
intervene into the marketplace in order to rectify market failures to achieve efficiency. Such 
ideas cohere with the classical ideas of free market and trade liberalisation that are important 
within the historical context of English law. The situation in Shariah law is different and the 
discussion of the general theory of Shariah contract law has revealed that liberal ideas of 
contract have never formed a basis for the law of contract. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that economic analysis is a primary aspect of Shariah law considerations. Additionally, in the 
last chapter the conclusion has been reached that the economic dimension of consumer 
protection cannot explain all consumer protection measures. Some consumer protection 
arrangements can only explained under social and distributive ideas.
861
 The discussion of 
market failure remains useful when trying to locate the sources of consumer vulnerability. It 
is however, not relevant to distinguishing the theoretical ground of consumer protection 
under the Shariah law of contract. For the time being, therefore, the discussion will be limited 
to the social aspect of consumer theory and will attend to three factors: paternalism, the 
distribution function of the law of contract and community values. 
 
6.3.1 The distributional function of contract  
 
The law of contract is a tangled mass of legal rules set for the purpose of regulating the 
process of private exchange. Kronman identifies three legitimate functions of the law of 
contract; ‘first, to specify which agreements are legally binding and which are not; second, to 
define the rights and duties created by enforceable but otherwise ambiguous agreements; and 




A less settled function of the law of contract is the distributive function. It has been suggested 
that the law of contract is an instrument by which distributive justice can be achieved.  For 
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the purpose of achieving a fair division of wealth among the members of society, law makers 




The distributive function of the law of contract is reflected in certain legal rules that promote 
a kind distributional end, such as usury laws limiting interest on loans, rules concerned with 
the quality of goods, habitability, and minimum wage laws. Generally, it includes any body 
of rules which promote, in accordance with the principles of distributive justice, the transfer 





Giving effect to the distributional function of the law of contract could pose a conceptual 
hazard to a liberal system of contract such as the English law. Indeed, many libertarians deny 
the role of the state in enforcing a system that redistributes wealth from one individual or 
group to others.
865
 The opponents of the distribution function of contract regard any 
involuntary transfer of wealth as theft, regardless of the way it is done and the motive behind 
it. This group strongly believes that distribution must be occur outside the law of contract, 
which ought to be based on consent only. Distribution is better achieved through the social 




Kroman, who strongly believes in the distributional function of the law of contract, argues 
against the standard libertarian position. He argues that distributive justice should be 
considered under the law of contract. The distribution function of the law of contract is 
necessary if the law is to achieve a minimum moral acceptability. He argues that the idea of 
voluntary exchange within the libertarian theory of exchange cannot be achieved away from 
distributive means. He states that ‘the notion of individual liberty, taken by itself, offers no 
guidance in determining which of the many forms of advantage-taking possible in exchange 
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In the Shariah law of contract the situation is different, since the notion of liberty only barely 
forms a base for the law of contract. Yet, if we are to claim a distributive function for the 
Shariah law of contract we need to indicate how it functions. To give the matter a proper 
consideration the meaning and origin of the concept of distributive justice will be discussed 
below. 
 
6.3.1.1 Distributive norms 
 
Distributive justice is a social norm that can be traced back to Aristotle. Distributive justice 
aims at allocating resources in a fair and just manner. Nevertheless, Fleischacker proposes 
that the concept of distributive justice in modern times is different to the Aristotelian 
principle. He observes that ‘the ancient principle has to do with distribution according to 
merit while the modern principle demands a distribution independent of merit.’ According to 
him the concept of distributive justice in a modern sense is related to a state responsibility to 
guarantee that resources are distributed throughout society so that everyone is supplied with a 
certain level of material means. These material means are regarded essential in the sense that 
they must be guaranteed to everyone regardless of their character traits or their actions. Most 
debates on distributive justice are therefore related to the size of the means to be granted in 
terms of the extent of the governmental intervention necessary to guarantee such means. He 
further explains that this is different to the Aristotelian sense of justice. Distributive justice as 
created by Aristotle is a system that ‘called for deserving people to be rewarded in 




In general, the issue of the distribution of resources has been of interest to many philosophers 
throughout history.
869
 The means by which resources are divided in a fair manner among 
individuals has been given great attention. However, the question of how individuals divide 
resources between themselves in a just manner is a matter of disagreement between theorists. 
Whereas some theorists insist that there is only one norm of equity
870
 others regard equity as 
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comprising more than one norm of justice.
871
 Broadly, there seems to be three independent 
justice norms attached to the theory of distributive justice to explain how resources should be 




Under the equity norm the distribution of resources needs to be made based on the inputs of 
the individuals. The underlying assumption of this position is that, when various inputs are 
seen to be equal, then fairness requires their rewards to be equal. Inequality exists if two 
people who made the same contributions receive different outcomes.
873
 This argument is 
similar to the primary formal Aristotelian principle of justice. Aristotle regards ‘merit’ as the 
relevant quality according to which goods are justly distributed. Because people are different 
in their merit, proportionate equality does not require that all individuals have an equal 
share.
874
 The justice theory proposed by Homans draws from Aristotle in that contributions 
are linked to rewards. Justice is centred on what people should receive in return for their 
actions or contributions.  Homans’ idea is that it is a universal concept of justice to match 
rewards with ‘investments and costs’.
875
 The equity norm of distributive justice whereby 




By contrast, the equality norm distributes equally to all members of society regardless of their 
differences and contributions. Sampson justifies the equality norm on the basis that people 
are not by their nature ‘equity theorists’ thus sometimes resources need to be equally 
distributed between them.
877
 Need is another justice norm that has received significant 
attention. In general terms, the need principle requires that resources be allocated in response 
to recipients’ legitimate needs and to prevent suffering.
878
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Greenberg and Cohen suggest that the choice between the three norms of justice depends on 
the relevant circumstances and conditions.
879
 For example, as reported by Leventhal, the 
equity norm is likely to be appropriate in economic situations where production and 
efficiency are highly valued.
880
 The equality concept, on the other hand, as suggested by 
Deutsch, is relevant when the focus is placed on group harmony and positive social 
relations.
881
 Lerner points out that in situations where group identity is more important than 
that of individuals’, the equality norm become appropriate.
882
  Deutsch illustrates that the 
need principle will predominate in situations where personal welfare, development of the 





Here we need to keep in mind that this research supports that the role of contract law in 
achieving distributive justice is limited. The contract law can only make a contribution to the 
aim of protecting consumers.  At the same time, other institutions of the welfare state need to 
be invoked to achieve distributive justice successfully.
884
 This is why it is preferable to use 
the term the ‘distributive function’ of contract law rather than using terms such as ‘achieving 
distributive justice’. Now we turn to the issue of the distributive function of the Shariah law 
of contract. In the light of the admitted justice norms can we say that Shariah law of contract 
has a distributive function? If so which of the mentioned norms could describe it, if any?  
 
6.3.1.2 Distributive norms in the Shariah law of contract 
 
Equality is stressed by Shariah as a norm of social welfare by discouraging extreme 
inequalities and promoting social harmony.
885
 The fulfilment of the basic needs of individuals 
is a matter of concern in Shariah economics.
886
 Zakah is the mechanism by which extreme 
inequalities are tackled.
887
 Nevertheless, this is not really reflected in the law of contract. 
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Instead, the distributive function of the Shariah law of contract could possibly be described 
by the other two norms of ‘equity’ and ‘need’ in the following sense. 
 
The equity norm stresses the matching of ‘inputs’ with ‘returns’ or ‘contributions’ with 
‘rewards’. This agrees perfectly with the general principle of the Shariah contract law, which 
emphasises the matching of the counter-values exchanged. This stress on the equivalence of 
counter-values aims to encourage work and make it the only permitted cause of profit. The 
principle is reflected in a number of doctrines.  The doctrine of riba (usury) prohibits the 
exchange of unequal quantities of similar fungibles and interest on loans (usury laws are a 
typical example of rules that reflect distributive motives).
888
 The doctrine of just price is 
another means by which the equivalence of counter-values is emphasised. According to the 
rules of Shariah a just price is the equivalent price.
889
 Informational rules of Shariah 
presented by the doctrine of gharar and mandatory disclosure also serve this end. They 
provide individuals with important information to help them to decide on the value of the 
commodity.
890
 As a result, contractors are protected against unexpected and future 
inequalities.  Under the doctrine of unfair exploitation, an exploited party is given a remedy 
to rebalance the contracting agreement when the price is proved not to reflect the price of the 
equivalence.
891
 All of these rules imply the principle that each of the contracting parties 
should receive as much as he gives in return. This seems to agree with ‘equity’ in that input is 
matched with return.  
 
The ‘need’ norm of distributive justice is also reflected in Shariah contract rules. It is present 
in the doctrine of unfair exploitation, which aims to protect the weakness or vulnerability of 
one of the contracting parties. Three practices are regulated under the doctrine of unfair 
exploitation: the sale to inexperienced persons, necessity sale and the act of meeting Bedouin 
traders before reaching the city market. In each case, one party is contracting from a weak 
position; this weakness is obvious and known to the other party who is prevented from 
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When a sale is concluded by an inexpert person who is ignorant of the market price, once the 
seller becomes aware of the vulnerability of the buyer he is under a duty to conclude the deal 
at the market price.
893
 Under the necessity contract a person is concluding a deal to satisfy a 
basic need (food, clothes etc) accompanied with an element of urgency or necessity 
(abnormal circumstance). The seller is under an obligation to conclude the contract at a fair 
price.
894
 Finally, the sale of talaqqi al-rukban refers to the act of meeting Bedouin traders 
before reaching the city market whereby a city dweller would meet those traders at the 
outskirts of the city and buy their merchandise for unfairly low prices since the traders do not 
know the real market prices.
895
 The essence of the prohibition of such a practice is to protect 
the  Bedouin who are usually ignorant of the market price which can lead to unjust bargains. 
In these three practices the law protects an element of ‘need’ or ‘vulnerability’. A moral 
obligation is placed upon the superior party who is prevented from exploiting the counter 
party’s need for his own benefit. Underlying this is the assumption that the element of ‘need’ 
qualifies the contractor for special treatment.  This reflects the fact that the ‘need’ norm of 
distribution requires resources to be allocated in response to the recipient’s legitimate needs 




Paternalist motives in the law of contract are behind any legal rules that prohibit an action on 
the grounds that it will be counter to the actor’s own benefit. Paternalism limits the freedom 
of contract; it deprives the party of the right to decide whether their voluntary agreement 
should be legally binding. In most cases, paternalistic rules tend to protect the general interest 
of society at large. It has the purpose of protecting the promisor by limiting her contractual 




In the context of consumer contracts, the cooling-off period
897
 and compulsory terms
898
 
represent paternalistic motives. Compulsory terms are perhaps the most obvious example of 
paternalism in consumer contracts. They require individuals to conclude their agreement in a 
particular way, when they would rather make it differently. For example, when the law 
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judges that it is in the buyer’s best interests to pay a higher price to receive a superior product 
quality or a warranty, the law maker is then acting paternalistically.
899
 Paternalistic motives 
of contract can be explained by more than one norm. It can be understood in terms of 
‘economic efficiency, distributive justice, the idea of personal integrity, and a third set of 




Under the English law of contract, paternalist motives for regulation have been subject to 
challenge under the notion of freedom of contract. Paternalism contradicts the basic idea of 
the freedom of contract that people can be trusted to look after themselves, to see to their own 
interests. It is argued that in many situations the consumer may feel that he does not need or 
want the protection imposed on him. This could be especially true if the protection measure is 
associated with extra charges that are carried by the consumer. It is argued that the cost of 
protection whether it is a cost of insurance or any other cost is eventually paid by the 





In the Shariah law of contract the situation is different. The discussion of the freedom of 
contract under Shariah has shown that classical jurists assumed that the law has established a 
relation between judicial act and its effect.
902
  According to Obeid, this is a variation on the 
broad belief that the role of human will is limited to bringing the agreement into existence, 
whereas the content of the act is already decided by the law. Therefore, the effect of an 
agreement must be determined by the lawgiver to avoid injustice and imbalance.
903
 As a 
result, contract terms are only admitted if they agree with the nature of the act in such a way 




Although Shariah schools differ in the degree to which they recognised individual autonomy, 
they all agree on the primary aim of regulation. This is merely to have a contractual scheme 
free from elements of prohibition as stated textually in the Quran and Sunna. More precisely, 
it is to maintain a contractual scheme free from riba and gharar. In implementing these 
                                                          
899
 Ibid  
900
 Kronman ‘Paternalism’ (n 676) 
901
 Atiyah ‘Freedom of Contract and the New Right’ (n 112) 355-8; See argument against paternalism in section 
4.1.2.2 
902
 See section 3.6.2 
903
 Hussain (n 453) 
904
 Obeid (n 457) 32 
207 
 
restrictions the schools of law had different approaches. Where the three schools preferred to 
remain cautious by strictly regulating contracts, the Hanbali school adopted a more liberal 
one. This is supported by the fact that all four schools give legal effect to innominate 




Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that the Shariah law of contract is based on the 
principle of ‘permissibility’ rather than ‘freedom of contract’. This means that individuals are 
free to enter into any agreement they wish if this agreement is not prohibited by Shariah.  In 
this light, we could argue that ‘paternalism’ is a central value of Shariah law of contract. The 
following passage by Obeid illustrates the paternalistic approach of the Shariah law of 
contract: 
 
‘Allowing individuals to freely arrange the effects of their juridical acts according to their 
whims brings the risk of their committing abuses by perpetuating aleatory contracts […] This 
will have the effect of an imbalance of the benefits of the contracting parties, evidently going 
against the principles of equity and justice that the Quran […] and the Sunna of the Prophet 





In the context of public intervention in the law of contract it seems appropriate to turn to the 
practice of the institution of ‘hisbah’ under Shariah law. The hisbah is an institution by which 
public intervention into the marketplace in the early days of Islam was made for the purpose 
of preserving fair and just dealing. 
 
6.3.2.1 The institution of hisbah 
 
The hisbah is an institution of monitoring within Shariah.  The institution of hisbah, 
according to Ibn-Taimiyah, is a moral as well as well as a socio-economic institution that is 
based on the Quranic commands of promoting good and forbidding evil.
907
 Al-Mawardi 
defines it as the ‘struggle to ensure that people do good deeds, when it is apparent that such 
an activity is being neglected, besides guarding against evil, when it is noticed that the 
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majority are being involved in such an activity.
908
 The philosophy of hisbah stems from the 
encouragement of social responsibility, integrity and fairness for the aim of protecting social 




In the context of the marketplace, the process of monitoring includes all actors engaged in the 
market. The hisbah’s functional role is to maintain public law and order by the supervision of 
the behaviour of actors in the market. It is reported that the Prophet Muhammad himself acted 
as the first hisbah officer (the muhtasib). The duty of hisbah was subsequently carried by 
people who are known for their honesty and moral character. The role of the institution of 
hisbah is to preserve a high standard of morals in society, by supporting moral behaviour and 
combating immoral behaviour. In addition, it aims to increase the welfare of society by 
increasing the level of social responsibility and awareness among people. It provides society 
with a system of monitoring which supports and strengthens positive activities, while 




The institution of hisbah is responsible for appointing members of society (mutasib) who are 
responsible for the maintenance of the market. The mutasib is concerned with preserving 
justice and fairness in the market. His role is to help to enforce fair play among economic 
actors in order to minimise possibilities for exploitation. The muhtasib is required to go out 
into the market and supervise its operation. He inspects weights, and measures, the metallic 
content of coins, and the quality of food products. It is part of his role to supervise prices, 
supplies and production, monopolistic collusions, cheating, mispresentation and fraud.
911
 In 
doing so he is expected to prevent any illegal and unfair dealing. He thus inspects whether 
weights and measures are constituted properly, and oversees the terms and conditions of 
contract, the safety and quality of products, and the standard of the units traded in the market, 
along with hearing complaints from the public, attending to them on the spot.
912
 In short, the 
muhtasib intervenes into the market to investigate whenever the economic balance is violated 
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Nevertheless, the role of the muhtasib is limited to fixing obvious violations of Shariah.  He 
does not have the authority to question any prima facie approved behaviour nor could he 
engage in secret probing into a doubtful affair. Furthermore, he could only intervene to fix 
the violation rather than punishing the violator.
914
 The role of the institution of hisbah is 
therefore an executive rather than a regulatory one.  It is nevertheless, an indication that the 
Shariah law promotes paternalistic intervention into marketplace. 
 
6.3.3 Community values 
 
Shariah rules, like those of all religions, encourage people to care about society as a whole 
and to abandon selfishness and self concern. Honesty, fair dealing and loss-sharing are 
stressed on many occasions by Shariah ideologies and are implemented in the law of contract. 
The principle of ehsan is a form of social responsibility, in which individuals are encouraged 
to enhance and strengthen their relationship with each other. In this sense market actors are 




People are not only encouraged to care about the society, it is rather an obligation.
916
 The 
virtue of unity is a basic concept of Shariah philosophy by which cooperation and care for 
others are mandatory. Individuals are also recommended to maintain a sense of balance in all 




6.4 Summary  
 
The first part of this chapter addressed the viability of consumer protection under Shariah law 
of contract from a theoretical perspective. The general theory of the Shariah law of contract 
has been tested for its compatibility with the theoretical grounds of consumer protection; 
these are paternalism, the distribution function of the law of contract and community values. 
                                                          
913
 Salim, Abdullah and Ahmad (n 911) 
914
 Abd Ar Rahman Khaldun, The Muqaddimah (Franz Rosenthal 2012) 29 
915
 Abbas Ali, Business Ethics in Islam (Edward Elgar 2014) 202  
916
 See Salma Taman ‘The Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility in Islamic Law’ (2011) 21 Indiana 
International & Comparative Law Review 481 
917
 Rafik Issa Beekun, Islamic Business Ethics (International Institute of Islamic Thought  1997) 23-5 
210 
 
It seems that the rational grounds of consumer protection perfectly agree with the theoretical 
bases of Shariah law.  Shariah contract law performs a distributional function based on both 
‘equity’ and ‘need’ norms. Paternalist motives constitute the theoretical basis of a good deal 
of Shariah rules. Furthermore, public intervention into marketplace has been practiced since 
the early days of Islam through the institution of the hisbah. Finally, values of honesty, fair 
dealing, unity and encouragement of cooperation are promoted by the philosophy of Shariah. 
The following section will move on to test the practical aspect of the Shariah law of contract. 
The discussion will be guided by the modern regulations of English law of consumer 
protection and a formula of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract will be 
offered. The proposed formula addresses the following values; (1) consumer expectations, (2) 
how well consumer’s are informed, (3) fairness and balance within the contract and (4) 
voluntary will. The following section is to address how these values could be protected under 
the Shariah law of contract.  
 
6.5 The technical aspect    
 
By this point in the research, we have established that fairness of exchange is a promoted 
value of exchange under the Shariah law of contract. The research has also established that 
the spirit of the law in general promotes theories of distribution, paternalism and community 
values. This makes the theory of contract in Shariah law perfectly suitable for the 
accommodation of a consumer protection policy. Nevertheless, the promotion of these values, 
although necessary as a basis for consumer protection, is not in itself enough for satisfactory 
consumer protection. There are minimum values that need to be protected by the law of 
consumer protection in order for it to achieve its goals. Modern regulation regarding 
consumer contracts protects certain values including a well-informed consumer, voluntary 
consent, legitimate expectations, and balanced and equitable transactions. It is hard to 
imagine a successful consumer protection regime that does not serve these values. These 
values are reflected in the English law of contract mainly through four regulation techniques; 
implied terms, information remedies, the test of fairness and the cooling-off period.  
 
In order to discuss the viability of consumer protection under Shariah law the technical aspect 
of the law ought to be examined. The following section attempts to search for technical rules 
within the Shariah law of contract that could possibly serve the values of consumer 
protection.  This research argues that the rules of Shariah contract have the potential to 
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protect the following values: (1) consumers’ legitimate expectations; (2) consumer’s 
informed consent; (3) consumers’ voluntary consent; and (4) fairness and balance of 
contractual. The following section will discuss these values individually in order to address 
the extent to which they could be protected under the Shariah law of contract. It makes 
extensive use of the rules and legal doctrine that protect the fairness and justice of contract. A 
formula to achieve the maximum benefit from the Shariah rules is proposed. The suggested 
rules give similar effect to consumer protection as that offered by modern legislation. More 
importantly they stem from the spirit of the Shariah law and reflect its values. 
 
6.5.1 Consumers’ legitimate expectations 
  
Any contractor typically would have certain expectations in his mind that he assumes the 
contract will satisfy.  For example, a contractor would assume that the subject matter would 
satisfy the contract purpose and specifications. This is particularly important in consumer 
transactions for many reasons related to consumer’s vulnerability.
918
  Imposing terms into 
consumer contracts is one of the common techniques used in consumer regimes to achieve 
this end.  The essence and fairness of the contracts is protected by imposing terms that ensure 
the balance of the contractual relation. Four terms are imposed by the English law in any 
consumer contract. These are: implied terms of quality, fitness for particular purpose, 
conformity with description, correspondence of bulk with sample, implied terms of 




The idea of enforcing terms into contractual relationships is not new for the Shariah law of 
contract; if we were to consider the fact that it is a law of contract(s) rather than a law of 
contract. The Shariah law of contract is based on a number of nominate contracts by giving 
each contract a separate consideration. Just like imposed terms, the detailed regulation of 




Some of the conditions imposed into the contract of sale that are relevant to the purpose of 
creating consumer protection compatible with Shariah will be outlined below. The focus will 
be limited to the contract of sale, yet with the understanding that the contract of sale under 
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Shariah is wider than the western concept. It includes barter trading and money exchange. 
The following discussion will be limited to the sale of goods only.  
 
6.5.1.1 The ownership requirement 
  
The requirement of ownership is essential for the validity of the sale of goods.  In classical 
manuals the ownership requirement is usually expressed passively by requiring goods to be 
owned by the seller.
921
 Al-Qurafi defines ownership as ‘a permission conferred by the 
Shariah to a person to utilise the benefit that he or his representative may gain from a 




The authority of this requirement is found in the Sunna in the following text, which clearly 
expresses the ownership condition: Hakim Ibn Hizam said ‘I asked the Prophet, a man comes 
to me and asks me to sell him what is not with me. I sell him (what he wants) and then buy 
the goods for him in the market (and deliver them).’ The Prophet said: ‘Do not sell what is 
not with you.’ The phrase ‘do not sell what is not with you’ is interpreted to mean do not sell 
what you do not own even if you are going to acquire the ownership in a later time.
923
 
Typically, the requirement of ownership has been stressed in Saudi cases in many instances 




6.5.1.2 Capability of delivery  
 
The majority of classical jurists of Shariah agree that in a valid contract of sale, goods must 
be capable of delivery at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
925
 Delivery of goods 
according to Al-Kasani means ‘handing over the goods to the buyer in such a way that the 
goods reach him safely, and, making them over solely to him so that no other party can make 
a claim over the goods.’
926
 The seller is under an obligation to waive any impediments 
between the subject matter of the sale and the buyer, for the purpose of allowing the buyer to 
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take delivery of the subject matter.
927
 The method of delivery differs depending on the nature 
of the subject matter; it could be actual or constructive.  
 
The delivery of goods sold by quantities for example must be actual; by physical transfer of 
the goods so that the buyer can take actual possession of them.
928
 There are other goods that 
can only be delivered constructively, for example the sale of a house or building.
929
 In such 
cases Al-Nawawi requires that the seller takes the appropriate actions to keep the subject 




The law links the requirement of capability of delivery to both the goods and to the seller’s 
ability to deliver them. The subject matter must be of a nature that makes delivery possible. 
Furthermore, the seller must have the relevant resources to give effect to the delivery. The 




The issue of incapability of delivery has been expressed by scholars through similar 
examples. These are inter alia the sale of birds in the air, the sale of a fish in water and the 
sale of a runaway.
932
 The incapability of delivery can be either absolute or relative.
933
 For 
example, in the case of a runaway animal, if the seller has no idea about its location this is an 
absolute incapability of delivery. However, if the seller has some information about the 
whereabouts of the runaway it is a relative incapability. The incapability affects the validity 
of the sale only if it is absolute. When the incapability of delivery is relative the sale can 




This requirement has been affirmed by Saudi case law. In a case of the purchase of land the 
buyer was surprised by the legal authority that bans him from building his home on the land 
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due to it being government property. The court held that the contract is void because every 
contract of sale is underpinned by the requirement that the subject matter is free from charge 




6.5.1.3 Inspection of the subject matter 
 
The inspection of the subject matter by the buyer has been given special attention by the 
Shariah law of contract. Immediate sale is encouraged for the purpose of certainty. While 
spot trade is encouraged, need sometimes requires that the contract is concluded in absentia. 
The actual inspection of the subject matter by the buyer is required as long as it possible. The 




6.5.1.3.1 Spot sale  
 
In spot sales the contract is made on a cash-and-carry basis. The actual appearance of the 
commodity in a contractual meeting (majlis al aqd) is required so that the buyer is capable of 
inspecting the subject matter for the purpose of avoiding uncertainty. The seller is under an 
obligation to make the subject matter available for inspection by the buyer.
937
  This type of 
sale is encouraged by Shariah because it carries minimum risk since the buyer has the chance 
to inspect the subject matter just before the conclusion of the contract. 
 
6.5.1.3.2 Sale by description  
 
Sale by description is permitted only if the actual inspection cannot be effected without 
hardship. For example, if the subject matter is in a location that is distant from the contracting 
parties, this means that cannot be reached without hardship.
938
 Most of the relevant 
discussion of the classical jurists was focused on the distance and how faraway the 
commodity is. Yet, Mahmor argues that the situation is different in present times due to the 
development of transportation. What used to cause a hardship may not be a cause of hardship 
anymore.
939
 Thus, the effective cause here is the hardship rather than the distance.  
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Once the hardship is established, the sale is validated without inspection according to certain 
conditions. The subject matter must be clearly and sufficiently described by which is meant 
that the nature of the object should be indicated by specifying its type and/or species Ibn-





6.5.1.3.3 Sale based on previous sighting 
 
In this type of sale the sale is concluded based on the buyer’s knowledge of the subject matter 
gained from a previous viewing. The subject matter that is not present in the contractual 
meeting has been already viewed by the buyer prior to the contract. Sale based on previous 
sighting is valid as long as that the subject matter has not changed since the viewing. If there 
is a chance that the subject matter has changed since that time, the sale become invalid unless 




6.5.1.3.4 Sale by Sample 
 
In sale by sample the subject matter of contract is inspected via a sample. In the sale of 
fungible goods, according to the Maliki school, it is sufficient to inspect part of the subject 
matter. On the other hand, partial inspection is not sufficient in the sale of non-fungible 
goods.
942
 The Shafi on their part, necessitate that the sample be part of the subject matter. 





6.5.1.3.5 Remedy for the sale with neither inspection nor description  
 
In some situations the contract of sale could be concluded with neither inspection nor 
description of the subject matter. Whereas some scholars disallow this kind of sale as being 
null and void, others render the contract voidable subject to the option of inspection (khyar 
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 The option of sighting or inspection is granted by those who permit it to the 
person who buys something without inspection or description. The option of inspection is 
meant to achieve the fundamental aims of certainty and transparency regarding the nature and 
quality of the subject matter. Ideally from a Shariah point of view the subject matter should 
be presented in the contractual session (majlis al-agd) and made available for inspection by 
the buyer. Yet, if for commercial needs that buyer has to contract for something that she has 
not seen, certainty is then enhanced by the option to rescind upon sight and inspection of the 
goods. The buyer, accordingly, has the right to rescind the goods if it did not meet her 
expectations.
945
 This situation is different from the non-conformity of description because no 
description is provided.  
 
6.5.1.4 The existence of the subject matter 
 
There is a general agreement among the classical jurists of Shariah that the subject matter 
must be in existence at the time of the contract’s conclusion. It seems that the common 
impression was that the existence of the subject matter of sale is necessary to give effect to 
the essence of the contract of sale which is the transfer of the ownership.
946
 The requirement 
that the subject matter must be, inter alia, in existence at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract was emphasised on many occasions. The requirement of the existence of the subject 
matter is explained by Al-Kasani in the following text: 
 
‘There are several conditions for the contract of sale to be validly concluded with special 
reference to its object. The first condition is that it must be in existence; the sale of the non-
existent and sale of anything, which is susceptible to the hazard of non-existence, is void. 
Examples are as in the sale of the offspring of a future-born animal and the sale of the foetus 
of an animal before its birth, of which the former is the sale of non-existent whilst the latter 




There are two exceptions to the general rule of the existence of the subject matter of sale; the 
salam sale and the istisna sale, subject to certain conditions. The two exceptions are agreed 
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upon by the four schools of Shariah law and subjected to certain rules and conditions.
948
 The 
salam is a sale of an object that is not in existence at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
whereby the seller commits to deliver the subject matter at a fixed future date for price paid at 




The sale of istisna is for the purchase of something that will be manufactured later according 
to certain specifications. The practice of the two types of sale is subjected to certain 
conditions, which are meant to enhance the certainty of the transaction. In both sales the 
subject matter must be specified leaving no ambiguity that could lead to a dispute. The 
contract must specify all possible details including the type of the commodity, quality, 
quantity, time of delivery and the place of delivery, which must be expressly mentioned in 
the contract.  A subject matter that cannot be determined by description cannot be contracted 
upon by salam or istisna. In addition, in the sale of istisna contracts, the subject matter must 




In the light of these two exceptions the leading scholars of the Hanbali school, Ibn-Taimiyah 
and Ibn-Qayyim, diverted from the majority position.  According to them the non-existence 
of the subject matter is not in itself a cause for nullity. According to Ibn-Taimiyah, the 
prohibition of dealing non-existant commodities has never been explicitly indicated in the 
primary sources of the Quran and Sunna. The effective cause of the prohibition of selling 
non-existent subject matter is not the state of existence itself but rather the uncertainty or 
gharar attached to it. On this, Ibn-Taimiyah notes the following: 
 
‘Some people said, the sale of non-existent is unlawful, however, their view has not been 
supported with any legal texts or consensus of opinion (Ijma). In fact, there is consensus that 
invalidates some sales of the non-existent as it invalidates the sale of some other articles, 
which actually exist. So, in what sense should they generalise that the effective cause of the 
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Ibn-Qayyim agrees with Ibn-Taimiyah that the prohibition of the sale of non-existent 
commodities is not prompted by non-existence itself but by gharar.
952
 It seems that the 
classical scholars have become sometimes overprotective in their endeavours to keep the 
element of uncertainty or gharar away. The requirement of existence of the subject matter is 
one such occasion. This over-protectiveness has led classical jurists to the imposition of very 
strict rules of contract. The requirement of the existence of the object at the moment the sale 
is concluded is based on confusion over the requirements of the doctrine of gharar. 
 
Al-Sanhuri proposes a useful guide to differentiate between non-existent subject matter that 
can be subject of the contract and that which cannot. He argues that a distinction should be 
made between ‘non-existent’ subject matter and that which is ‘non-existent at the time being 
but shall necessarily occur in the future’. Whereas the first cannot be subject to sale, the 
second can be subject to a valid sale. Where the subject matter is potentially coming to 
existence, the danger of gharar is excluded. Yet if the future existence of the subject matter is 




This position seem to be favourable to modern scholars as it responds better to the needs of 
the modern market. The modern Shariah position is then that the non-existence of the subject 
matter does not necessarily invalidate the contract. Thus, it is suggested that the principle of 
gharar be applied to determine whether or not the non-existent commodity can be a valid 
subject matter of the contract of sale or not. Accordingly, the sale of non-existent subject 
matter is void only if it causes unreasonable certainty regarding the qualitative and 
quantitative description of the subject matter. Thus, the prime concern for the validity of the 





The Saudi court seems to agree with the later position that the sale of future subject matter is 
valid as long as it can be determined with reasonable certainty. In a case of sale of plastic 
boxes, the contract contained a term that the delivery of the subject matter would be made in 
stages, the price being payable upon the delivery of each group. The buyer accepted the 
delivery and paid for the first part of the delivery, but then refused to accept the delivery of 
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the rest of the amount specified in the contract. When the case was brought to court, the 
buyer argued that the contract was void from the beginning as it is a form of the sale of non-
existence, which is prohibited by the opinion of the majority. The buyer rested his argument 
on the fact that the wording of the contract of sale was written in the past sense (e.g. A has 
sold a certain amount of boxes to B). The contract did not mention that the subject matter was 
going to be manufactured but instead was stated as being an orthodox contract of sale. 
Accordingly, the contract is void as it is a form of the sale of the non-existence prohibited by 
Shariah law. The court held that this is a valid contract of istisna (manufacturing), which is 
accepted as a valid contract by all legal schools. Although the contract did not specify that it 
is a contract of manufacturing this is clear from the situation of the contract. The court 
explained that a contract of istisna is valid if the following are specified: subject, type, 




Nevertheless, in a different case the court ruled against the validity of a future sale. In a 
contract to supply lambskin hide, the buyer refused to accept part of the supplied goods as 
being defective. The court held that the subject matter is of the kind that cannot be 
determined by description; as a result it cannot be subject to the future sale. The court 




6.5.1.5 Determination of the counter-values 
 
Both the subject matter and the price must be precisely determined by the contract of sale for 
the purpose of reducing uncertainty.
957
  All schools of Shariah jurisprudence are in agreement 
that the subject matter must be determined by avoiding any form of unreasonable uncertainty. 
Yet, a trivial uncertainty about the characteristics of the subject matter is tolerated.
958
 Goods 
must be determined in relation to their specific item, quantity and description.
959
 The way the 
goods are determined is affected by the nature of the goods; some can determined by 
description or quantity whereas others can only be determined by rough estimation. The 
subject matter must be determined by one or more methods of determination including: 
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description, quantity rough estimation, and quality which will be individually addressed 
below. Furthermore, the price of the contract must be determined. 
 
6.5.1.5.1 Determination by description  
 
Some goods can only be determined by description. This is normally the case in the sale of 
goods to be manufactured (istisna). In this case the subject matter must be described with 
reasonable certainty. It must be specified leaving no ambiguity which may lead to a dispute. 
The contract must specify all possible details including the type of the commodity, quality, 
quantity, time of delivery and the place of delivery. Furthermore, the subject matter must be 
specified by its use, or the purpose for which it is made.
960
 When the subject matter posesses 
unique characteristics, its unique features must be established by precise description. 
Additionally, when the contract of sale is concluded for the sale of a specific item, its 




6.5.1.5.2 Determination by quantity 
 
The quantity of goods must be determined in accordance with their nature. The subject matter 
must be determined appropriately by weight, number, length, volume, etc. The exact quantity 
of the goods must be clearly determined in order to effect a valid sale.  Accordingly if a seller 




6.5.1.5.3 Determination by rough estimation  
 
The exact quantity of the subject matter of the sale of contract could, either according to 
certain circumstances or due to its nature. This is the case in the juzaf sale.
963
 juzaf is the 
selling of something that has been inspected by the buyer but is not bound by description of 
quantity. For example, the sale of a heap of wheat inspected by the buyer but not 
measured.
964
 The authority of the juzaf sale derives from the fact that it was commonly 
practiced during the life time of the prophet. It said that the juzaf sale is permitted as a matter 
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of necessity as an exception to the general rules in response to market needs.
965
 The sale of 
juzaf is permitted subject to certain conditions. It must be inspected and approved by the 
buyer. The exact quantity of the subject matter must not be known to either party. If it turns 
out that the seller knows the exact quantity of goods and has kept this information from the 
buyer the sale is void.
966
 Furthermore, the goods must be capable of estimation.  A subject 




6.5.1.5.4 Determination by quality 
 
The subject matter must also be determined by its quality. The determination of quality is 
important for the purpose of avoiding any uncertainty as to the value of the subject matter.
968
  
The formula offered by classical jurists for such determine reflects the methods available in 
their historical period. For example, they stress the determination of the subject matter based 
on species and origin, which is somewhat different from the modern way of describing goods 
by maker, model, ingredients, expiry date, manufacturer guarantee, minimum quality and so 
on. Certainty about the value of the subject matter cannot be achieved today without invoking 
such criteria. Thus, the proper application of the requirement of determination of the subject 
matter under Shariah law requires that the current criteria be included. It is self-evident that 
the information as to the maker, model, specification of guarantee, etc, comes under 
specifications of quality required for the purpose of deciding upon the value of the subject 
matter.  
 
6.5.1.5.5 Price determination  
 
The prevailing opinion among scholars is that the price of the contract of sale must be fixed 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Failure to comply with this requirement renders 
the contract void.
969
 Ibn-Taimiyah however, diverts from the majority consensus. He 
advocates that the non-determination of the price in the contract should not render the 
contract void. According to him the requirement of price determination might sometimes be 
difficult to meet. He proposes that when the contract provides nothing on the price, the 
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 This proposal responds to modern needs 




6.5.1.5.6 Remedy for non-conformity with specifications 
 
Failure to determine the subject matter renders the contract void in the majority of juristic 
opinions.
973
 However, if the subject matter turns out not to conform with the description 
specified in the contract the contract is then voidable. The buyer has the remedy of khyar al-
wasf (the option of description). The option is mandatory, any purported agreement to 
exclude it is null. Although no strict time limit is required, the option must be practiced 




Non-conformity with specifications is a significant topic in modern times. The Saudi court 
has explained that non-conformity with specifications must occur within one of two 
situations. First, when the non-conformity with specifications causes decrease in the value of 
the subject matter, this is dealt with by the option of defect. Under the option of defect the 
buyer can choose whether to rescind the contract or claim the difference in price between the 
fit and the defective product (irsh).
975
 The second case of non-conformity with specifications 
is when the subject matter proves to be unfit for the purpose of contract. The Saudi court 
considers this situation as a case of non-effective delivery, which renders the contract void. 
The court has explained the importance of this differentiation with reference to duration. 
While in the first case the right to use the option of defect is dismissed if the subject matter 
has been used for a sufficient period of time; the situation is different in the second case, 




6.5.1.6 Merchantability of the subject matter 
 
Generally the requirements of quality have only been mentioned for the purpose of 
determining the value of the subject matter as explained above.  Hardly ever has the 
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specification of quality been mentioned in other situations.  Nonetheless, under the doctrine 
of defect,
977
 the buyer has the right to rescind the contact upon the discovery of fault.  The 
defect must have existed in the goods at the time of the contract. This, according to Coulson, 
impels a requirement that the goods must be of merchantable condition. The criterion is 
determined by normal commercial usage. Failure to meet with the condition gives the buyer 




The Saudi court seems to uphold the position that every contract of sale implies a condition 
that the goods must meet accepted standards. In a case of the sale of agricultural compost that 
did not satisfy common standards the court held that this is to be considered a defect. The 
buyer of defective goods has the choice whether to rescind the contract or claim the 
difference in price between the fit and the defective product (irsh)
979
 Furthermore, the Saudi 





6.5.1.7 Consumers’ legitimate expectations under the Shariah law of contract  
 
Certainty is encouraged by Shariah law under the rules pertaining to the sale of goods.  
Certainty has the potential to narrow the gap between consumer expectations and reality. The 
above discussion presented conditions intended to protect the essence of the contract of sale 
under the Shariah law of contract. These conditions can be employed by the legislator in 
consumer protection in order to protect consumer expectations. The research argues for 
specific conditions to be implied in legal statues that regulate consumer protection in Shariah-
ruled countries. The implication of these conditions serves the value of protecting consumers’ 
expectations. Every consumer contract for the sale of goods should imply the following: (1) 
the goods must be owned by the supplier before the conclusion of the contract; (2) the subject 
matter must be free from charge or encumbrance; (3) the supplier must enable the consumer 
to inspect the subject matter where possible; (4) where the inspection of the subject matter is 
not possible, the subject matter should be determined in a way that dismisses any uncertainty; 
(5) where the subject matter is to be found in the future it must be of the type of good that can 
be determined by description; (6) the subject matter of the sale must conform with all the 
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specifications mentioned in the contract; (7) the subject matter must be of merchantable 
quality and must satisfy the purpose of the contract. The implication of these conditions into 
consumer relations, as well as being compatible with Shariah regulations, should serve the 
purpose of protecting consumer expectations.  
 
6.5.2 Consumers’ informed consent  
 
Information deficits are a major issue that affect consumer decisions. Unless a contractor is 
equipped with all relevant information surrounding the contract, including contract terms and 
goods specifications, the contract might not reflect the contractor’s will. Remedying 
information issues has the potential to deal with many consumer issues. The supply of the 
right information has the ability to empower the consumer into making informed decisions.
981
 
Although the English law of contract does not recognise a general duty to disclose 
information under the law of contract, information remedies is an essential aim of consumer 
regulations. Information disclosure is enforced in almost all aspects of consumer 
transactions.
982
 Information remedies regulate three aspects: (1) removing restraint on 
information; (2) correcting misleading information; and (3) encouraging additional 
information.
983
 These remedies therefore potentially cover a wide range of information, 
including the quality of products and services, their price, including the cost of credit and the 




Generally, honesty and transparency are promoted by the rules of Shariah for the purpose of 
preserving fair dealing. However, to what extent can Shariah rules reflect the above values to 
ensure that consumers’ informed consent is promoted? We suggest that the information rules 
of the Shariah law of contract should be separated into two categories. First, there is the 
general duty of disclosure which is applicable in all contractual relations.  Second, there is a 
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6.5.2.1 The general duty of disclosure  
 
In the normal course of contracting the contractor is under an obligation to disclose three 
types of information under the rules of the Shariah law of contract. First, there is the 
requirement to disclose information needed for determining the subject matter. As part of the 
requirement of determination of the subject matter explained above in relation to the 
condition of sale, the seller is required to disclose all relevant information in order to specify 
the subject matter with reasonable certainty. This includes the description, quality and 




In this regard, we can say that the seller is under a general duty to disclose every piece of 
information known to him at the time of the conclusion of the contract that is related to 
identifying the subject matter. This is evident from the requirement of the sale based on rough 
estimation (juzaf) mentioned above.
986
 The validity of sale of juzaf is conditional on the fact 
that the seller has no information about the exact quantity of the goods which he is keeping 
secret from the buyer. If the seller does keep information that could contribute to the 
determination of the subject matter secret, the seller is then in breach of contractual 
obligations. 
 
Second, there is the requirement to disclose information regarding any defect known to the 
seller. Under the doctrine of defect disclosure the seller is under a duty to disclose any defect 
known to him at the time of the conclusion of the contract. There is no exception to this rule. 
The discovery of a defect that existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract qualifies 
the buyer for the option of defect (khiyar al-aib). It allows the buyer to rescind the contract 
upon the discovery of a defect or fault that was present at the time the sale was concluded.  





Third, in addition to the disclosure of information related to the subject matter, disclosure of 
information regarding the condition of the contract is encouraged under the doctrine of 
gharar. Under the Shariah law of contract each party has the right at the time of  the 
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conclusion of the contract ipso facto of how much she is stand to gain.
988
 This means that 
each contracting party must know for sure at the time of the conclusion of the contract all 
rights and obligations set by the contract. Gross uncertainty as to the contract terms and 




6.5.2.2 The specific duty of disclosure  
 
In addition to the general duty of disclosure, there is the specific duty of disclosure which is 
limited contracts concluded in special circumstances. This applies according to the doctrine 
of unfair exploitation when the contract is concluded with a person in a vulnerable situation.  
Under this rule the seller is not only required to disclose all relevant information as to the 
subject matter and sale terms, but also to disclose the real value of the commodity on the 
market.  Under the doctrine of unfair exploitation the seller is according to specific conditions 
required to disclose the market price to the other party who is ignorant or contracting out of 
urgent need. Three practices are regulated under the doctrine of unfair exploitation: (1) 
necessity sale; (2) sale by inexperienced persons; and (3) the sale concluded with Bedouin 
traders before reaching the city market. The three practices share the characteristic that they 
are concluded with the person in a vulnerable or needy situation. 
 
In addition to disclosure based on vulnerability or need, there is the disclosure duty based on 
trust. When there is a trust relationship between the contractors (e.g. Morabaha contract of 
sale) the seller comes under a duty to disclose the actual value of the commodity. This sale is 
based on the trust relation between a fiduciary and a beneficiary. Failure of disclosure is a 





6.5.2.3 Consumers’ informed will and the regulation of Shariah  
 
Information rules under Shariah regulations seem to meet the values protected by consumer 
information remedies. It encourages the removal of information restraints and the supply of 
additional information in relation to the subject matter and the contract terms. In fact the 
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Shariah rules go beyond this by enforcing a duty to disclose the market price or the real value 
of the commodity in certain situations. The effective causes in these situations are either the 
vulnerability of the contractor or the trust relationship between the contracting parties. 
Arguably the two factors (vulnerability and trust) are applicable in the consumer supplier 
relationship. Therefore, the specific duty of discourse should be applied in consumer 
contracts for the proper application of Shariah law.  
 
Consumer vulnerability is a major factor in the need for consumer protection in general and 
information remedies specifically. Causes of consumer vulnerability have been discussed 
before, including poverty and procedural vulnerability (information, redress, supply, pressure 
and impact).
991
 The three practices are regulated under the doctrine of unfair exploitation in 
terms of three types of vulnerability: poverty, supply vulnerability and information 
vulnerability. 
 
The situation in the case of the necessity sale can be explained under poverty and supply 
vulnerability. Necessity sale is a type of sale that is concluded to satisfy a basic need of the 
contractor (food, clothes etc). This is usually accompanied with an element of urgently or 
necessity, meaning that the sale is concluded in abnormal circumstances. The special 
regulation of this type of sale is arguably based on poverty since the consumer is contracting 
to satisfy basic needs.  Furthermore, it could be also understood as supply vulnerability. 
Supply vulnerability, as has been explained, occurs when the consumer lacks choice because 
there is no alternative package offered anywhere else.
992
 This is exactly the case in a 
necessity sale: the buyer has no choice and cannot afford to refuse to enter the contract. Sale 
to inexperienced persons can be explained under information vulnerability. The special 
regulation of this type of sale is made based on the buyer’s ignorance of market price, and 





This rule applies not only when the lack of knowledge of the value of the commodity is 
certain but also when it is presumed, as in the situation of meeting Bedouin traders before 
reaching the city. Here the law presumes that those Bedouins are ignorant of the market price 
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since they have not yet reached the market. We have seen that the Saudi court presumes the 





In this light, it might be possible to generate the rule that whenever it appears that the buyer is 
contracting from a vulnerable position the seller is under a duty to disclose the market price. 
This vulnerability could be as a result of poverty or necessity or procedural vulnerability, as a 
consequence, for example, of a lack of information or a lack of bargaining skills. This rule 
does not apply to situations where parties are negotiating from equal bargaining positions. In 
other words, the special duty of disclosure of the value of the goods is applicable to consumer 
contracting but not commercial contracting. 
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the consumer/supplier relationship is in many instances 
accompanied by an element of trust. This is especially true when the consumer is relying on 
the commercial name or reputation of the supplier. In this case the consumer is putting his 
trust into the supplier who is under an obligation to honour this trust. Honouring the trust 
between the contracting parties is promoted by Shariah law. When there is a trust relationship 
between the contractors the seller comes under a duty to honour this trust.  Betrayal of trust in 
a contract based on trust amounts to responsibility.
995
 Honouring trust requires the buyer to 
supply information about the value of the goods in the market. 
 
6.5.3 Consumers’ voluntary consent  
 
A basic right of any contractor is to be bound only by contract that she has concluded through 
her free will. This is a right that no law of contract would deny.  This value is protected under 
rules that protect contractors against coercion, such as the doctrines of duress and undue 
influence. However, the protection of the consumer calls for more than the protection from 
obvious actions of coercion. Consumer contracts are sometimes concluded in circumstances 
that are likely to vitiate the consumer’s will. This is likely where the contract is concluded 
outside the business premises or in distance contracting. Such situations are usually dealt by 
the cooling-off or cancelation period. This technique is designed to give the purchaser time to 
reflect and gives her a remedy if she feels she was prejudiced by a transaction. 
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The Shariah law of contract recognises the right of parties to rescind the contract upon 
reflection. Parties are given avenues to rescind the contract on the simple basis that they have 
had second thoughts and no longer wish to proceed. The option to rescind (khiyar al-faskh) 





6.5.3.1 Khiyar al-majlis (the option of the contractual session) 
 
The session option is based on the simple ground of second thought.
997
 The purpose of the 
option is to allow time for reflection before the contract becomes absolute. The parties to the 
contract of sale have the option of repudiation before the contractual session (majlis al-aqd) 
breaks up.
998
  This option is based on a tradition attributed to the Prophet according to which 
he said: ‘Each of the parties to a contract of sale has the option against the other party as long 




The option of session is determined by physical proximity in that the parties must be in the 
same place. There are no specified time limits for the determination of the option; it continues 
until the parties are physically separated from each other or as indicated by ordinary common 
sense. In other words, the right to rescind continues as long as the two parties are still in the 
place where the contract was concluded. Parties can exit the contract by agreeing upon a 
stipulated period of option.  The extension of the option terminates in one of the following 
ways: (1) natural termination of the contractual session, even when this is effected 
deliberately by one of the contracting parties; (2) renunciation of the option by either party 
(such recession is effective only against the party who made it), which might be oral and 
express or implied; (3) loss of the object of the contract during the session (this is could be by 
passing the ownership to a third party by a second contract);  (4) when the parties agree on a 
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6.5.3.2 Khiyar al-shart (option by stipulation) 
 
When the contract of sale is inter absentes the application of the option of session is not 
practical. This being said, it might be held that a constructive contractual session exists in 
these cases at the time and place of the recipient of the offer. The notion of physical 
proximity is however essential for the contractual session option. Thus, the only way for the 
parties to gain time for reflection is by agreeing upon a fixed time for rescission. 
 
The contracting parties are permitted to agree upon a period of time during which either or 
both contracting parties can rescind the contract. Such an agreement is considered valid as it 
reinforces the fundamental aim of certainty of contractual commitment.
1001
 Ibn-Qudamh 
disallows any option that could lead to a loss or exhaustion of some of the benefits contracted 




The option by stipulation must satisfy the following requirements. First, parties must agree 
upon a certain period for the option.  There is no limit of duration set by the law. But it must 
be determined in unambiguous way. For example to say ‘as long as I choose’ or ‘until it 
rains’ is not valid due to uncertainty. However, the option ‘until harvest’ is valid as long this 
is being within reasonable time, since it this is known by experience and custom. Second, the 
options’ period must start from the time of the conclusion of the sale. Third, the option must 
be agreed in good faith. This means that it must be agreed on for the purpose of reflection. 
The option is void if it transpires that it has been made for a different reason. For example, if 
the buyer wanted to secure a short-time gain, by benefiting from the subject matter during the 
option period. The option terminates at the end of its specified time or by unilateral 
renunciation without the presence or concurrence of the other party. It also terminates with 




6.5.3.3 Consumers’ voluntary will under Shariah regulation 
 
The application of the option of the contractual session on consumer transactions amounts to 
giving the consumer a very short cooling-off period. This period ends as soon as the 
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contracting parties are physically separated. This means that the cooling-off period ends as 
soon as the consumer leaves the store from which he bought the goods. As a result, it could 
hardly contribute to the protection of the consumer’s voluntary will. Moreover, it is not 
beneficial to the protection of the consumer in distance selling, as it requires physical 
proximity. 
 
The option by stipulation is linked to the contractor who can choose whether or not to have it 
and can decide on its duration. This does not suit the nature of consumer protection, which 
tends to be legally enforced rather than optional. Thus, the protection of the voluntary consent 
of the consumer would require the enforcement of a cancellation period by law when the 
contract is concluded in circumstances that are likely to vitiate the consumer’s will. 
  
Nothing in the rules of Shariah contradicts with the enforcement of a cooling-off period in a 
distance contract. On the contrary, a cancellation period would serve the fundamental aim of 
certainty of contractual commitment as it would give the buyer the chance to inspect the 
subject matter upon reception before the contract becomes binding.  Furthermore, the idea of 
cancelling a contract upon second thought is not foreign to Shariah law. It is enforced for 
instant contracts under the option of the contractual session thus it is should also be enforced 
in the case of distance contracts. The regulation of a mandatory cooling-off period in a 
Shariah-ruled country should reflect the conditions of the option by stipulation. It should be 
set for a certain period of time, starting from the time of the conclusion of the contract, and it 
must encourage good faith.  
 
6.5.4 Balance and fairness of the contract terms 
 
Consumer policies generally derive from the idea of inequality of bargaining power between 
consumer and supplier. There tends to be a disparity in power between the producer and 
consumer, due to a disparity of bargaining power, knowledge and resources between the two 
sides.
1004
 This is likely to result in imbalanced contractual obligations. As a result, the 
attainment of fairness and balance of contract has become a major value of consumer 
protection.   
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The fairness test under English law is a judicial technique which tests the balance and equity 
of terms of consumer contracts. Three criteria are employed for the purpose of deciding on 
the fairness of the terms, as addressed in chapter three.  These are the requirement of good 
faith, transparency and significant imbalance. Significant imbalance refers to the substance of 
the contract terms. It requires the court to consider whether the consumer is deprived of an 
advantage which he normally has under national law. In doing so, the court needs to consider 
the significance, purpose and practical effect of the term in question. Also, the term must be 
consistent with the reasonable objective that the relevant term seeks to protect. However, the 
imbalance must be ‘significant’, and thus a ‘slight’ imbalance does not render the term unfair. 
Accordingly, the consumer will not be able to rely on legislative protection against unfair 
terms just because he has made a ‘bad bargain’. The good faith requirement is explained in 
the light of reasonable expectations on the part of the consumer. It imposes ‘social market 
conditions’ on to the fairness test. It adds the condition that the goods or services supplied 
must be of at least the minimum quality that consumers might reasonably expect. The 
transparency requirement requires that the terms be in ‘plain, intelligible and legible’ 
language.  Yet, non-transparent terms are not automatically unfair. When a consumer would 
be surprised by the term upon being told of it after entering into the contract, it will generally 
be subject to the test of fairness. 
 
The Shariah law of contract does not include a similar technique for testing the fairness of 
contract terms. Nonetheless, fairness and justice of exchange is a stressed value in the law of 
contract. Next a formula for a test of fairness that is derived from the Shariah conception of 
fairness and justice is proposed. All rules and legal principles that have been invoked 
throughout the research are acknowledged by this formula. There are three requirements that 
would constitute a potential fairness test based on Shariah principles these are: freedom from 
advantage taking, transparency and agreement with the purpose of the contract. These 
requirements will be addressed next. 
 
6.5.4.1 Free from advantage taking 
 
We have seen that advantage taking is condemned by the Shariah law of contract mainly by 
the principle of the equivalence of counter-values. Under the doctrine of fair price or the price 
of the equivalent (thaman almithel), contracts ought to be concluded at a just or fair price. 
The significance of the doctrine lies in pursuing justice and denouncing the overcharging of a 
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trusting customer. The general assumption is that the just price of something is the price 
which is paid for similar objects at a given time and place. For this reason, classical jurists 
used the term (thaman almithel) the price of the equivalent. The price of equivalent is ‘that 
rate at which people sell their goods and which is commonly accepted as equivalent for it and 




The price of the equivalent is variable, determined by the forces of supply and demand and 
affected by the will and desire of the people concerned. A fair price is established by the free 
play of market forces of supply and demand.  The price of the equivalent must be a 
comparative price and there must be no fraud. Accordingly, the profit in the contract of sale 
must be fair. Fair profit or the profit of the equivalent is a normal profit that is usually earned 
in a particular type of trade without harming others. Profit is generally permitted until it 
becomes abnormal or exploitive. A term or agreement will not satisfy the test of fairness 





Unfair profit or advantage taking is also protected under the doctrine of unfair exploitation. 
This protects people who are not aware of the normal conditions of the market. The doctrine 
of unfair exploitation is a means to enforce the principle of the equivalence of counter-values. 
The prohibition in each of these three practices is meant to protect the weakness or 
vulnerability of one of the contracting parties. The essence of the doctrine is to give special 
attention to people who are ignorant of the market price or bargaining from a weak position 




Generalising these rules enables the prohibition of any form of advantage taking. This 
includes any imbalance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. The 
fairness of the price is the core element of the test. All terms and conditions of the contract 
should be tested against the price to determine its fairness. The Shariah principles in this 
regard disagree with the regulation under the English law of consumer protection, which 
excludes the price as a core term from the test of fairness. 
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6.5.4.2 Transparent  
 
With respect to the transparency requirement, we shall invoke the information rules of 
Shariah. These are presented in the two doctrines of gharar and mandatory disclosure. The 
requirements of the two doctrines have been explained in depth earlier in relation to the 
requirement of the contract of sale and information disclosure.  Overall, the conditions of the 
contract of sale need to be reasonably determined leaving no ambiguity. The seller is required 
to make all information known to him available to the buyer. The contract must be reasonably 
certain in the normal course of things and should accord with custom.
1008
  This implies a 
condition that all contract terms must be transparent. 
 
Here we need to pay attention to the fact that the lack of transparency in itself has the ability 
to render the contract unfair. We have seen that the doctrine of gharar is a major limit to the 
freedom of contract.
1009
 This is different to the English practice of the fairness test, under 
which the lack of transparency does not in itself render the term unfair, it rather makes it 




6.5.4.3 Agrees with the purpose of the contract 
 
A third requirement that can be added to the fairness test is that the terms should not 
contradict with the purpose of the contract. It has been mentioned before that the law of 
contract was originally based upon nominate contract which means that each contract has a 
certain essence that is attributed to it.
1011
 In this light, the terms of the contract should not 
extend beyond the essence of the contract. This assumption agrees with the position taken by 
the Saudi court in that a condition which contradicts with the nature of the contract is void. 
For example, a condition to keep the subject matter of a contract of sale in the possession of 
the seller until all instruments are paid was held by the court to be void. The Saudi court 
explained that such conditions contradict with the contract of sale where the subject matter 
                                                          
1008
 See section 6.5.1.5 
1009
 See section 3.6.2.2 
1010
 See section 68 of the CRA 2015 
1011
 Hussain (n 453) 
235 
 





6.5.4.4 Remedy for unfairness 
 
It is observed that all situations of unconscionability render the contract either null or 
voidable depending on the degree of unfairness.  The contract is not regarded void or null 
unless there is no way to fix the fairness of the contract. As long as a means exists to remove 
the defect the contract is voidable. The defective contract remains voidable (non-binding) 
until the defect is removed or condoned by the aggrieved party. The issue is regulated by the 
doctrine of faskh (rescission). It provides the aggrieved party with a unilateral right to cancel 
a contract validly concluded, by which he exercises his right of khiyer (option). The 
corrective system of options is extensive. There are more than six different options, some of 





Voidable contracts are different to batil (null) contracts. The latter are considered non-
existent in the eyes of Shariah. Voidable contracts are existing contracts which are subject to 
dissolution for the benefit of the exploited party. The corrective system of option is to 
preserve the fundamental principles of Shariah jurisprudence. It maintains the highest 
possible degree of certainty in the rights and obligations arising from contracts. A contract 
does not acquire an absolute binding force unless all options of rescission have been 
dismissed. It is only when it has been established that none of the options exists that a 
contract acquires an absolutely binding legal force. The system of option potentially makes a 




An important point here is the extent to which advantage taking amounts to a remedy. 
Interestingly, although the Shariah law of contract stresses the importance of the equivalence 
of the counter-values highly the imbalance is required to be gross to acquire a remedy. This 
probably comes from an acknowledgement of the importance of keeping a stable contractual 
scheme at the cost of slight unfairness that might not always be avoided. This seems to be in 
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line with the English requirement for the imbalance to be significant. A gross imbalance 
renders the contract voidable for the benefit of the exploited party who has the option to 




This has been affirmed by the Saudi court. It explained that what amounts to exploitation is 
related to custom.  It is a matter of deciding whether the price charged is of usual profit or 
not. In this regard, the court mentioned the Maliki school position, which indicates that a 
transaction is considered unfair exploitation if the price charged is above the equivalence 
price by the third or more. The court, however, did not attempt to set a certain standard in this 
regard. Instead it was held that if in a given situation the contract price is three times more 
than market price, this is an absolute case of unfair exploitation.
1016 
Bringing certainty to the 
test of fairness would require setting standards as to what amounts to an unfair price. The 
Maliki scholars rule that the price is unfair if it is proved to be above the equivalence price by 
a third or more can be adopted. 
 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Unlike English law where the theory of consumer protection makes challenge to the 
established principles of the law of contract, the ideas upon which consumer protection is 
based fit easily within the general principles of the Shariah law of contract. This chapter has 
proved that most ideas underlying consumer protection are already acknowledged by the 
Shariah law of contract. Just like modern consumer protection regimes, the Shariah law of 
contract encourages social responsibility and care for others. This is reflected by the 
distributive function attributed to the law of contract. Moreover, public intervention into 
contractual autonomy is promoted by the Shariah law of contract; it is based on the principle 
of permissibility rather than freedom of contract. Overall, the Shariah law of contract is 
heavily regulated for the purpose of securing free dealing for everyone in a way that excludes 
any notion of ‘caveat emptor’. 
 
Furthermore, the way the general ideas of distribution and fairness are implanted in the 
Shariah law of contract has some similarities with those employed for consumer protection. 
The typical values protected by consumer measures are to some extent already reflected by 
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the rules of Shariah contract law. For example, the way the Shariah law of contract regulates 
contracts by introducing certain conditions into contracts is very similar to the imposition of 
terms into consumer contracts for the purpose of protecting consumers’ expectations. The 
above discussion has shed light on these rules and has proposed a formula to extract the 
maximum benefit from them in a consumer protection context. The proposed formula should 
protect the following values: consumers’ informed will, voluntary consent, legitimate 
expectations and balanced contractual obligations. The adaptation of this formula by Shariah- 




























Chapter Seven:  Contractual justice and consumer protection: a critical approach to 





This chapter offers final remarks as to where the two relevant legal systems stand in relation 
to contractual justice. A comparative method is invoked in light of all that has been discussed 
throughout the research in relation to the general law of contract and consumer theory in both 
Shariah and English law. It starts by outlining the extent to which the legal doctrines of both 
legal systems serves substantive or procedural justice. It brings attention to certain issues that 
have been touched upon throughout the thesis regarding the situation of contractual justice 
and consumer protection under Shariah or English law, which call for explanation.  In 
relation to Shariah law, the good faith requirement and commercial and consumer contract 
separation will be addressed. Under the English law of contract these issues include: the 
effect of the rejection of a general doctrine of substantive fairness on English law; the 
European influence on English law and the regulation of price justice. Finally, justice norms 
adopted by both Shariah and English law are addressed. These norms might seem at first 
glance very different and consequently incomparable. Here, we must recall the principle of 
functionality mentioned in the methodology section, according to which things are only 
comparable if they fulfil the same function.
1017
 Thus, the matters discussed in this chapter are 
brought together by the following question: ‘How does the law respond to perceived 
unfairness?’ 
 
7.1 Procedural or substantive fairness  
 
Most of the discussion of this research is focused on contractual justice as a distributional 
norm. Nonetheless, the research acknowledges that this is not the only aspect of fairness. 
While modern  concepts of fairness attribute to the state the role of ensuring that contractual 
relations are fairly concluded, there is another approach to contractual fairness which flows 
from ‘utilitarian premises’.
1018
 The latter used to be dominant in the classical period of 
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English law. It was reflected in the domination of the notions of freedom and sanctity of 
contract.
1019
 People are seen to be the best judges of what will maximise their own utility and 
thus, society as whole. Just outcomes are achieved by leaving people to do the best they can 
according to the circumstances.  Equity was implemented through common law duress and 




It seems the idea of fairness as a utilitarian premise is still, to a certain extent, valid today.  
There remain those who believe that fairness is best achieved through a free market. From 
this perspective, market imperfections must be dealt with by institutions other than the law of 
contract. Contract law is not the right avenue for improving wealth utilities since the only tool 
judges can use within the law of contract is enforcing contract terms. Enforcing contract 




Whereas this idea of fairness rarely ever forms the basis of the Shariah law of contract, we 
have seen that such ideas have never diminished in English contract law. Some judges as well 
as scholars still insist that the classical notion of sanctity of contract is the best way to 
achieve contractual justice. Supporters of the utilitarian approach to fairness believe that 
regulation of fairness under the law of contract should be focused on the process rather than 
the substance of the contract. This is different to the approach taken by the supporters of the 
distributive function of the law of contract (or those who believe that contractual autonomy 
should be fairness-oriented). The latter approach supports the view that achieving fairness 
through the law of contract should not be focused only on the process of contract but must 
also be concerned with the substance of the transaction.  The extent to which procedural and 
substantive fairness are reflected by Shariah and English law is highlighted next.  
 
There is no broad line of differentiation between the two types of fairness since some 
doctrines of contract regulation are based on both substantive and procedural aspects. For 
example, the doctrines of undue influence and inequality of bargaining powers have 
procedural and substantive aspects in their formation.  Nevertheless, we will rely here on the 
dominant aspect of the doctrine (where the claim starts from).  A claim under the doctrine of 
undue influence is invoked when there is issue with the process of the contract. By contrast, a 
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claim under the doctrine of inequality of bargaining  powers starts when there is an imbalance 
between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Thus, the latter is regarded as a 
substantive doctrine and the former is regarded as procedural. Such differentiation is useful to 
highlight the ideological biases of the law and the way fairness is understood under both legal 
systems. 
  
7.1.1 Procedural fairness 
 
In both legal systems contract obligations are voluntary based on mutual consent. Duress is 
an essential equity doctrine by which the law ensures that the consent is voluntary and real.  
Duress is generally regarded as a defect affecting consent in contract and therefore the 
validity of the consent. Common law duress in its historical form involves actual or 
threatened violence to the person. It was closely associated with the legal control of criminal 
and tortuous conduct. The essential elements of duress were established as early as the mid-
thirteenth century.
1022
 Early analysis of duress focused on the act of coercion itself and its 
effect on the victim in inducing fear. The concept of duress in common law used to be a very 




The practice of common law duress in England has developed a wider scope with regard to 
contractual freedom. Duress is no longer restricted to actual or threatened physical violence 
to the person but includes the threat to seize another’s property or to damage it,
1024
 in addition 
to mere economic duress. Economic duress consists of using superior power in an 
‘illegitimate’ way in order to coerce the other contracting party to agree to a particular set of 
terms.
1025
 Furthermore, the focus of the doctrine has turned to the wrongfulness of the 
threatened conduct rather than the consequences to the coerced party.
1026
  It includes unlawful 
threats and lawful threats which are used to support unlawful demands.
1027
 However, the 
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Shariah duress somewhat resembles the classical common law duress.  Duress is generally 
regarded as a defect affecting consent in contract and therefore the validity of the consent. 
Shariah duress is invoked where there is injury to the victim or one of his relatives or damage 
to property. The approach of Shariah towards duress consists of both subjective and objective 
elements. The formation of fear in the victim’s mind when she feels she is being left without 
any choice is an essential requirement for Shariah duress. However, the doctrine is restricted 
in that the threat must be immediate and serious with respect to the injury to person or one of 




A second doctrine of procedural justice is undue influence. Under the English law the 
equitable doctrine of undue influence operates to release parties from contracts that they have 
entered into as a result of being influenced by the other party. Undue influence is presumed 
where there is a trust relationship between the parties. Generally, it seems that the court 
would allow release based on undue influence if the claimant’s decision was made by 




The modern approach to undue influence in English law requires wrongful conduct on the 
part of the defendant. Generally, it is observed that most cases of undue influence contain 
such an element of ‘wrongful’ conduct, in the form of an act of exploitation or taking 
advantage of the claimant’s vulnerability.
1031
 Transactions that amount to undue influence are 
the kind of transaction that claimants would not have entered into under normal 





The Shariah law of contract stands against all forms of advantage-taking and exploitation. 
Nevertheless, no similar procedural doctrine is admitted.
1033
 It seems that Shariah law does 
not give as much attention as English common law to procedural justice.  Duress is the only 
procedural doctrine of equity under the Shariah law of contract. Moreover, the doctrine is 
only linked to criminal conduct and cannot be invoked based on mere economic pressure. 
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Even though the doctrine adopts a subjective perspective by acknowledging the formation of 
fear in the victim’s mind, the doctrine is restricted by the objective requirements that the 





The English law of contract has noticeably paid much more attention to procedural fairness 
than the Shariah law of contract. This is perhaps due to the fact that Shariah law is involved 
more in setting the substance of the contract, whereas English common law is reluctant to 
acknowledge substantive fairness. The two procedural doctrines of fairness have been 
developed in modern times to create more limitations within the law of contract. The 
development of the two doctrines represents the main modern changes in the 
acknowledgment of contractual fairness in English law. Contractual freedom is restricted by 
the relatively new development of the doctrine of economic duress and the stress on ‘wrong 
doing’ as the basis for the two doctrines.  This involves restriction of the substance of the 
contract since the two doctrines are invoked when there is imbalance between the counter-
values of contract.
1035
 Nevertheless, the basis of the two doctrines remains procedural since it 
cannot be invoked unless there is something wrong with the process by which the contract 
was concluded. As a result, it intervenes into the substantive fairness of the contract in a very 
limited sense. 
 
7.1.2 Substantive fairness  
 
At first glance, it seems that the two legal systems are based on very distinct ideological 
bases. On the one hand, the English law of contract is traditionally bound by a strict freedom 
of contract that has been softened in modern times to ‘wealth maximisation’ and 
‘cooperation’. The Shariah law of contract is bound by a restrained freedom of contract and 
reflects ideas of fair distribution. While the English law has gone through some sort of 
transformation in modern times, there has hardly been any change in the Shariah law of 
contract at least in relation to its basis and general conceptions. The extent to which two 
relevant jurisdictions regulate substantive fairness is outlined next. 
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7.1.2.1 Shariah law and substantive fairness  
 
The Shariah law of contract is one that is heavily regulated for the purpose of securing a fair 
and equitable deal for everyone. Fairness in Shariah is a ideal that is accepted and directly 
promoted. Intervention into parties’ autonomy to fix the balance of the contractual relations is 
completely accepted by Shariah law. It is even noticed that the law has been occasionally 
‘over-regulated’ for this reason. Overprotection of such values has led at times to the creation 
of very strict rules. Some legal thoughts presented in this research reflected this very strict 
approach. For example, the conservative approach with regard to the issue of parties’ 
autonomy under the doctrine of shurut (ancillary conditions).
1036
  An approach in support of 
having very limited contractual freedom, which arose from the fear that allowing individuals 
to freely arrange the effect of their contractual relationships (according to their whims), 
generates the risk of having imbalanced economical relations.
1037
 Another example is found 
in the requirement of the existence of subject matter. Many legal thoughts have required that 





In modern days, the Saudi court still does not hesitate to intervene into the substance of the 
contract. Contractual relations are not regarded as sacred as under English law. The Saudi 
court will intervene on a case-by-case basis to review the fairness of the substantive aspects 
of the contract. A major concern of the court is to ensure the case in hand is fair and 





Justice in Shariah means the prohibition of all forms of advantage-taking. This is reflected by 
the principles of the equality of counter-values and transparency and has been implemented 
through multiple doctrines. The exchange of unequal quantities of similar fungibles is 
prohibited under the doctrine of riba that is meant to prohibit excessive inequality between 
the exchanged values.
1040
 The equality of the exchanged values is further protected by the 
doctrine of just price. A just price is the price of the equivalent, which is the ‘rate at which 
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people sell their goods and which is commonly accepted as equivalent for it and for similar 




The doctrine of gharar regulates certainty of contract. It ensures that transactions are free 
from unexpected and future inequality. It also aims to allocate responsibility and risk equally 
between the parties.
1042
 Certainty is further enhanced by the doctrine of mandatory disclosure 
under which all information that could affect the value of the subject matter must be 
disclosed, especially any defect known to the buyer.
1043
 Under the doctrine of unfair 
exploitation, the need and vulnerability of the contracting parties is protected from being 
exploited by the superior party, the stress is on charging an unjust price.
1044
 However, two 
issues that are related to substantive acknowledgment of fairness call for explanation: (1) the 
requirement of good faith and (2) the differentiation between commercial and consumer 
transactions. These are addressed below. 
 
7.1.2.1.1 Good faith requirements of Shariah Law 
 
Although substantive fairness of contract is regulated under the Shariah law of contract, there 
is no specific Shariah rule that enforces a general duty of good faith under the law of contract. 
Obviously fairness and equity are generally promoted by the spirit of the law. For example, 
according to the principle of ehsan, individuals are encouraged to enhance and strengthen 
their relationship with each other. Market actors are encouraged to go beyond their legal 
agreements by being generous, forgiving and tolerant.
1045
 Furthermore, honouring trust is 
encouraged when it is assumed by the counter-party.
1046
 This resembles the explanation by 
Sir Thomas Bingham of the meaning of the doctrine of good faith as a principle of fair and 
open dealing’ that requires ‘playing fair,’ ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting  one’s cards face 




Nevertheless, the way the Shariah law of contract deals with perceived unfairness is material. 
Other than cases of fraud, when a claim regarding an unfair deal is brought to court the judge 
                                                          
1041
 Ibn-Taimiyah, Majmoua Fatawa, vol 29 (n 551) 254 
1042
 See sections 3.6.2.2 and 3.8.3 
1043
 Alalaili(n 561) 355 
1044
 See section 3.8.5 
1045
 Ali (n 915) 202  
1046
 Alalaili (n 561) 355 
1047
 Intterfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433,439 
245 
 
will look at the material facts rather than the intention of the superior party. This approach 
has been obvious in the way the Saudi court approaches perceived unfairness. The court tends 
to look at the balance of the relation rather than the intention of the superior party. It does not 
make a difference to the court whether or not the superior party was acting in good faith or 
not as long as the transaction was found to be unbalanced or unfair. Accordingly, it might be 
misleading to claim such general requirement under the Shariah law of contract unless 
carefully qualified and viewed in a way that gives effect to its specific nature.  
 
7.1.2.1.2 Commercial and consumer contract separation of Shariah law 
 
For all of the reasons that have been mentioned throughout the research especially in chapter 
four,
1048
 the separation between consumer and commercial contracting is a theme in the 
current state of contract law. The separation between the two relates to the modern need to 
serve the special nature of each contract scheme. The English law of contract follows this 
theme. Different sets of rules are regulated for consumer and commercial transactions that 
arguably follow from very distinct ideological grounds. By contrast, Shariah law is unified. 
Legal principles under the law of contract are applicable to all contractors. It does not make a 
difference whether the transaction was concluded between consumer and trader or between 
two traders; the same sets of rules are applicable to all transactions. 
 
A large proportion of this research has been devoted to testing the viability of consumer 
protection under the Shariah law of contract. The discussion has revealed that ideas 
underlying consumer protection fit perfectly with the general theory of the Shariah law of 
contract. The proposed formula for consumer protection presented in the previous chapter 
employs some rules of Shariah. Most of these rules were originally set in abstract for the 
benefit of all contractors and both parties. This means that not only the consumer benefits 
from the protection offered by the law of contract but also the supplier. For example, both 
would have the right to benefit from the cancellation right. This is different from modern 
consumer protection laws that are focused on correcting the consumer’s position; the cooling-
off period under the English law is set for the benefit of consumer only.  Furthermore, in 
relation to commercial transactions, efficiency might be a point against Shariah law. It is 
generally noticed that the Shariah law of contract is sometimes heavily regulated, it has even 
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occasionally become ‘over-regulated’ for the purpose of preserving fairness. Such restrictive 
regulation, although generally beneficial for consumers, might at times be an obstacle to 
commercial transactions that require speed and flexibility.  
  
This research upholds that it would in the public interest to have some sort of line of 
differentiation between commercial and consumer relations.
1049
 It is not sufficient to have 
consumer protection within the law of contract, there needs to be some line of separation 
between the two sets of rules.  Being bound by the same set of rules even if consumer values 
are well protected could cause irritation to both consumer and commercial transactions.  
Pursuing justice by the Shariah law of contract should not hinder human development 
(commercial exchange in this case).  
 
Two points are suggested here on which to differentiate between commercial and consumer 
regulation: (1) the variation between the legal thoughts of the schools; and (2) the doctrine of 
unfair exploitation in the following sense. On different occasions throughout the research we 
have seen that the pursuit of justice has led at times to the creation of very conservative legal 
thought. These conservative rules might become a burden to commercial dealing. However, 
less restrictive legal thoughts do usually exist in parallel to the restrictive rules.  It is very 
difficult to categorise the legal schools of Shariah into conservative and less conservative 
categories sense there is no clear pattern. The same school on one occasion may offer a very 
restrictive legal opinion could reach a less restrictive opinion on another. 
 
We suggest the employment of the variation within the legal thoughts of the schools for the 
separation between commercial and consumer transactions.
1050
 This could be done by 
adopting the least restrictive rules for commercial relations and the most restrictive ones for 
consumer relations. It is noteworthy here that modern scholars tend to prefer the least 




The most obvious example concerns judicial opinions in relation to parties’ autonomy.
1052
 
While the three schools of jurisprudence adopt a restrictive position in relation to the doctrine 
of shurut (ancillary condition), the Hanbali school adopts a more liberal one. According to 
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the Hanbali school, parties to a contract have the freedom to ‘decide as they wish the content 
of their judicial acts and determine the effects on the condition that these effects are not 
contrary to public order and morals’.
1053
 The Hanbali position is the more favourable one for 




The difference between judicial opinions could be employed for the purpose of drawing a line 
between commercial and consumer contracting. For example, it would be useful to have a 
restrictive parties’ autonomy in relation to consumer contracts. Nevertheless, such a 
restrictive position would be against commercial needs. Thus, it might be viable to adopt the 
conservative position in relation to consumer relations and the most liberal opinion on 
commercial contracting. Such an action needs close consideration. 
 
Another factor that could serve the separation between commercial and consumer regulation 
is the doctrine of unfair exploitation within the Shariah law of contract. The unfair 
exploitation doctrine has been referred to several times in this research.
1055
 In its essence the 
doctrine is meant to protect contractors who are in need or in vulnerable situations. It 
therefore represents a potential ground for many consumer measures and consequently 
enhances the separation of commercial and consumer law. For example, the discussion of the 
matter of information provision with regard to Shariah, in the previous chapter, revealed that 
the application of the doctrine potentially leads to the creation of a specific duty of 
disclosure.
1056
 A seller who is dealing with a person in need is under an obligation not only to 
disclose all material information but also to disclose the real value of the subject matter.  The 
doctrine of unfair exploitation has the potential to be employed as a matter of analogical 
deduction ‘qias’
1057
 to form the basis of many consumer rules. Qias is s a jurisprudence 
methodology that involves the application of a ruling on a similar case where the law is 
silent.  The doctrine of unfair exploitation could be expanded on this basis to form a ground 
for consumer regulation where needed. 
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7.1.2.2 English law and substantive fairness 
 
The way the English law regulates substantive fairness is neither as certain as procedural 
fairness nor as direct as it is regulated by Shariah law. A major cause is that, while there is 
much discussion about values protected under the English law due to this ideological battle, 
Shariah law is bound by a single rigid ideology that is not subject to change. Classical law of 
contract is based on the assumption that free dealing is fair dealing.
1058
 Justice is enforced in 
a contract by ensuring that the process by which the contract was concluded has been freely 
agreed upon.
1059
A transformation is said to have taken place in the late nineteenth century 
with the doctrine of laissez-faire falling out of favour.
1060
  The alleged transformation of the 
law is understood to have been reflected in the adoption of values of fairness and cooperation.  
Notions of inequality of bargaining power, unconscionability, reasonableness and good faith 




The inequality of bargaining powers is invoked as a starting point for the differentiation 
between consumer and commercial transactions.
1062
 Furthermore, the idea of relative 
bargaining powers is employed in the statutory regimes which regulate exclusion clauses 




The notion of reasonableness seems to stand at the core of modern law of contract.
1064
 
Reasonableness is widely employed in the contemporary law of contract. It is imposed by 
legislation on several occasions and has a great effect in the rules and doctrinal formation of 
the modern law. The most obvious example is the test of reasonableness imposed by 




In recent years, good faith has been frequently invoked and wide range of literature is 
devoted to discussion of the principle of good faith. The English court has shown some 
willingness to acknowledge the principle of good faith by the law of contract.
1066
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Furthermore, the notion of good faith is employed in the statutory regimes.
1067
 A contract can 
be ruled out based on unconscionability if there is evidence of ‘taking advantage’ of a 
disadvantageous party. Yet, the courts’ requirement of unconscionability is difficult to satisfy 




Nevertheless, these notions of substantive fairness are best described as supplementary rather 
than limiting notions, which soften the rigidity of the law. Despite the alleged transformation 
of the law, intervention into the substance of contract to fix the balance of the contractual 
relation remains minimal. Intervention is mainly limited to procedural doctrines of undue 
influence and duress, and the intervention by the reasonableness test is limited to exclusion 
clauses. This indicates that the sanctity freedom of contract is softened but still dominant. 
Although there is a movement towards the creation of a general doctrine of fairness by 
English common law, such movement has been hampered. At one point, the idea that fairness 
should be a condition of the validity of the contract prevailed in the courts. This was later on 




The current state of the English law of contract in relation to substantive fairness brings about 
the next question: does the rejection of a general doctrine of substantive fairness (outside 
consumer transactions) by the English courts negate the idea that fairness is relevant to 
contract validity? This question is addressed next. 
 
7.1.2.2.1 The effect of the rejection of a general doctrine of substantive fairness in 
English law 
 
We have seen that the English law of contract has rejected the development of a general 
doctrine of substantive fairness. By contrast, substantive fairness is promoted and protected 
under the consumer theory. One might question why the English law would accept that 
contract fairness is relevant in one case (consumer transactions) but not relevant in the other 
case (commercial transactions). This obviously brings in the ideas discussed under the 
                                                          
1067
 For example the duty to act in good faith under the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 
1993 (SI 1993/3053) and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083) 
1068
 Poole (n 60) 574-9 
1069
 See sections 2.1.1.5.3, 2.3.7 and 2.4 
250 
 
rationale of consumer protection including inequality of bargaining power, market failure and 




There is an assumption in this situation that commercial contractors are always contracting at 
arm’s length and of equal bargaining positions. But what if this proves not to be the case? For 
example when a small and newly established company is contracting with a large powerful 
company, it would be hard to imagine that they are contracting from equal positions. Why 
would make the law ignore such inequality whilst acknowledging it in relation to consumers?  
In other words, how does the law ensure that contracting commercial parties are equal? 
 
However, it is observed that English courts in fact only reject the name of doctrine but not 
contractual fairness itself.
1071
 Even though courts avoid the admission that fairness is a 
relevant consideration within contract validation, fairness is still evaluated under the guise of 
other doctrines.
1072
 McKendrick indicates that as easy as it seems for an English judge to rule 
against common principles of fairness, a judge will ‘think hard and long before ruling against 




Waddams observes that even though courts try to show commitment to the freedom of 
contract, relief is everyday given against agreements that are unfair, inequitable, unreasonable 
or oppressive.
1074
 Atiyah has rejected the idea that contract regulation is still concerned only 
with procedural unfairness or the bargaining process and not with the substance of the 
contract. He says that fairness is protected by courts even without the assistance of statute. It 
is also widely acknowledged that judges tend to give effect to their sense of justice through 
constructing contracts or implying terms.
1075
 Paterson explains that the fairness notions 
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without doubt will continue to be implied into the law of contract regardless of whether the 
court is prepared or not to recognise a general duty of fairness. This includes the promotion 
of duties of loyalty to the contract by precluding parties from engaging in dishonest, 
uncooperative, opportunistic or irrational behaviour that would undermine their commitment 




At this point one may be confused as to the approach of the modern law of contract towards 
fairness of exchange. On one hand, fairness and cooperation are important values that are 
indicative of the modern transformation of the law of contract. On the other hand, the law 
seems reluctant to adopt a general doctrine that protects the fairness of deals. The tendency of 
the English law of contract to shy away from commitments to explicit principles of fairness 
raises questions about its commitment to protecting the fairness of contract. How do the 
English courts respond to the adversarial values of the law of contract? Or more precisely 
how do they respond to inequality of bargaining power and unfairness in contracts?  
 
A. English law approach to protecting contractual fairness 
 
The modern law of contract acknowledges the fact that contractors hardly negotiate from 
even bargaining positions. To respond to this fact without causing the contract institution to 
collapse, a corrective approach has been followed.
1077
 For example, situational monopoly is 
regulated by the doctrine of economic duress to protect commercial contractors who are 
being put under pressure to renegotiate a contract.
1078
 
   
As long as the measures employed are taken to be corrective, the institution of contract will 
remain based on free and informed consent. Modern corrective intervention is taken to be a 
restatement of classical contract law and the freedom of contract. Brownsword explains this 
point in relation to the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power, which could read either as 
plaintiff-sided or defendant-sided. It could be defendant-sided in the sense that the stronger 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cases that are based on traditional procedural doctrines such as undue influence and duress, substantive fairness 
considerations were taken into account by the court, in this regard he cites the English court decisions in Lloyds 
Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB. 326, Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255 and Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 
WLR 24. See Atiyah ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’(n 58) 12-7 
1076
 Paterson (n 345); Paterson made this opinion in  relation to the principle of good faith in the light of Yam 
Seng see section 2.3.6.2 
1077
 Brownsword, Contract Law (n 3) 88-92 
1078
 Ibid  
252 
 
party has taken unfair advantage of the weaker party and plaintiff-sided in the sense that the 
weaker party has not given a free and informed consent to the transaction.
1079
 As long as the 
measures taken are understood to be plaintiff-sided, the doctrine could be viewed as a 
restatement of the ideal of freedom of contract. By contrast, if it were to be defendant-sided, 
it would mean that it is concerned with fairness and militating against unconscionable 
advantage-taking. The modern law then, according to Brownsward, ‘is taking on a major 




In order to respond to these demonstrated problems of unfairness, Sir Thomas Bingham 
explains that the English law of contract has ‘developed piecemeal solutions.’
1081
 Honest 
behaviour in contract is achieved without adopting a general doctrine but rather through ‘the 
adaptation of specific rules that, in particular context, make honesty the best policy’.
1082
 To 
some, the English approach serves well enough the way it is.  McKendrick points out that the 
refusal to adopt a general doctrine could be taken as evidence of strength in the law. 
According to him, the English law manages to serve in other ways what different legal 
systems pursue through a general doctrine of morality.  For example, in dealing with the 
events occurring after the formation of the contract that have the effect of rendering the 
performance of a contract impossible, illegal or impracticable, English law responds through 
the distinct doctrine of frustration. By contrast, German law has to resort to the doctrine of 
good faith to regulate the matter. Thus, it does not make sense to McKendrick to abandon a 





B. Is it time for reconstruction? 
 
Atiyah has argued that the ‘basic conceptual apparatus’ of the English law reflects the 
situation in the nineteenth century rather than the contemporary moment. These values reflect 
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liberal traditions of belief in the value of the rights of the individual. Nonetheless, Atiyah 
argues that current values of society contradict what used to be admirable in the nineteenth 




It is preferable that fairness is dealt with directly by a doctrine that makes an explicit ground 
for it, rather than covertly through the manipulation of technical rules. Indeed, trying to 
achieve fairness in the absence of a general doctrine produces incoherent outcomes, leaving 
judges unable in some situations to achieve justice. The answer could be to adopt a general 





Dealing with the matter explicitly by adopting a general principle (or principles), according to 
Trebilcock, would serve the ends of constructive judicial law-making as well as rational 
independent analysis and the evaluation of the aptness of legal rules. He argues that it would 
even be cost efficient, because it gives guidance to other parties in their actions, through rules 
that have some generality of application. He explains that ‘decisions that are ostensibly 





So, what would it take for the English law to adopt a general doctrine of fairness? Perhaps the 
first obstacle to the creation of a doctrine is the question of defining the idea of fairness of 
exchange and indeed whether the idea of fairness in exchange is itself a theoretically 
defensible idea.
1087
 Moreover, the issue of how to define the limitation on the freedom of 
contract doctrine is the most difficult to resolve.
1088
 The problem has been raised both by 
judges and legal scholars.
1089
 The issue was concisely stated by Treitel, who explains that the 
alleged principle is very wide and not well defined. According to him, English courts, unlike 
American courts, have no intention of taking the matter far to give clarity to the law. Thus, 
the matter is better left to Parliament.
1090
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Different approaches have been suggested in this regard. Trebilcock takes the position that in 
order to have an effective instrument that tackles contractual unfairness, the adopted doctrine 
‘needs to be sharp in its focus, conceptually sound and explicit in its policy underpinnings, 
and operational in terms of both the process of judicial inquiry it envisages and the remedial 
instruments available to a court to abate objectionable phenomena.’
1091
 Treitel on the other 
hand, focuses only on the substantive side of the matter, suggesting that to have a sufficiently 
formalised doctrine we need to define what amounts to an unfair outcome. Thal rejects 
Treitel’s proposal, and instead proposes a procedural approach. His view is that the only way 




Brownsword emphasises the importance of having a specific moral reference point. 
According to him there are two principle options for such a reference point: (1) the standards 
of fair dealing recognised by the community of which contracts are most proximately a part; 
(2) the standards of fair dealing that would be prescribed by the ‘best’.  Though, the latter 
option looks difficult to justify either in terms of the practical legitimacy of judicial decisions 
or in terms of their theoretical justification. He sees a tendency in the English law of contract 
towards adopting morality doctrines to reflect the expectations associated with good practice 




Atiyah on the other hand, acknowledges the fact that courts are giving effect to their sense of 
justice in construing contracts or implying terms. He rightly explains that ideas of fairness 
and customary behaviour interact. When a judge implies a term to give effect to his sense of 
justice rather than the intention of the parties’, his sense of justice derives in part from 




This research upholds the conclusion that the English law of contract should deal with 
substantive fairness of contract directly and clearly through the adoption of a general 
principle. The fear that the institution of contract would collapse and the uncertainty 
regarding a moral reference point should not be an excuse to remain bound by values that no 
longer reflect society. Continuing to serve justice disguisedly and indirectly in addition to 
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being costly and lacking clarity restricts proper development of the law. It would be much 
more efficient, clear and simple to militate against unconscionable advantage-taking rather 
than correcting the wrongdoing when it occurs. Furthermore, when the issue is dealt with 
directly and clearly through an accepted doctrine mentoring the judicial practice will become 
more practicable. A sense of justice is always derived from customary behaviour. Thus, 
allowing judicial intervention both in relation to the process and substance of the contractual 
relation is likely to reflect societal values.  
 
7.1.2.2.2 Consumer protection and substantive fairness 
 
The discussion of this research has shown that the law does in fact serve substantive fairness 
to a large extent.  Although the general principles of English contract law are reluctant to 
adopt a formal doctrine of contractual fairness in order to avoid intervening into parties’ 
autonomy, the situation is different in consumer contracting. In other words, while the 
common law of England is still reluctant to intervene into parties’ autonomy, statutes are 
making enormous interventions into consumer contract. Under consumer law contractual 
justice is an accepted and promoted value. Although the relationship between consumers and 
suppliers is deemed to be contractual, the modern law of consumer contract operates in a 
quite distinct way from the classic notions of individual autonomy and legal non-





Introducing the consumer experience of English law illustrates a tendency towards   
preserving contractual justice. The modern consumer scheme represents a domination of 
contractual relations. Protecting fairness in the field of consumer contracting brings 
significant fairness to society. In spite of their ideological differences, this brings the 
regulations of Shariah and English law in line to a large extent. The previous chapter on the 
viability of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract outlines many similarities 
between the general law of Shariah contract and the English law of consumer protection. 
Some of the legal techniques that are employed by the Shariah law of contract for the 
protection of contractual fairness in general resembles the legal techniques that are designed 
to protect consumer interests under English law. For example, the condition of the counter 
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values in the contract of sale under Shariah law is very similar to the imposed terms by the 
CRA 2015 in consumer contracts.
1096
 However, there are two points related to consumer 
protection under English law that call for explanation: the European influence on English law 
and fair price regulation. These two issues will be addressed below. 
  
7.1.2.2.3 European influence on English law 
 
We have seen that a good deal of consumer protection in England is a mere implementation 
of EU Directives. As a result, one could say that the current status of consumer protection 
does not reflect the position of the English law. Indeed, it is arguable that the English law is 
still under the impression that substantive fairness is not relevant to contract. This is evident 
from the fact that the English law resists a development of a single doctrine of contractual 
fairness. Arguably, over time there may be a decrease in consumer protection after the exit 
from the EU when the UK is no longer obliged to satisfy European requirements. However, 
in addition to the facts invoked before in relation to commercial and economic factors
1097
 , it 
seems that the European law has influenced the legal thinking of the English law in a way 
that is not likely to diminish any time soon. A major reason for this is that the 





Although imposing the Directives into national law might be successful in bringing 
harmonisation, it has the ability according to Twigg-Flesner to disrupt the ‘unity of domestic 
law’. While rules of such Directives might sometimes reflect existing law, they also at times 
introduce novel rules to the English system.
1099
 A EU Directive could then introduce ideas 
that are not familiar to national judges or that contradict the general conception of the law. 
Nevertheless, ideas which seemed novel at the beginning could merge with the law in a more 
unified way. The most notable example of this is the concept of good faith in contracting.
1100
 
The notion of good faith was rarely invoked by the English common law of contract. Yet, as 
a matter of implication of EU Directives, the English law now includes an obligation to 
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contract in good faith, for example the duty to act in good faith under the Commercial Agents 
(Council Directive) Regulations 1993
1101




While English lawyers remain ‘suspicious’ of the idea that parties should act in good 
faith
1103
, the concept has started to become familiar in English courts. As a result, even 
though the English law of contract does not impose a general duty to act in good faith courts 
occasionally uphold the good faith requirement, which represents hospitality to change.
1104
  
This is taken to be an indication that good faith is likely to be recognised in the future.
1105
 
Judges and scholars of English law have become familiar with the doctrine of good faith and 
its role in regulating contract. Thus, it might be only a matter of time before the adoption of 
the good faith requirements by the English common law. Therefore, it is possible to say that 
although consumer protection in England originally came from a European movement, it has 
gained acceptance in England. Furthermore, it has become part of the English law and even 
to some extent has changed legal thinking on contract law. 
 
7.1.2.2.4 Just price regulation  
 
Determination of the price is a core consideration for any contractual relation. It would be 
very difficult to assess the fairness of a certain contract distinctly aside from price 
consideration. This is simply because it is not possible to judge how balanced the relationship 
is without knowing how much each party is getting in return for what he is giving. A related 
issue is addressing what amounts to a fair price. Under the Shariah law of contract, a just 
price is the equivalence price. The price of the equivalent is the ‘rate at which people sell 
their goods and which is commonly accepted as equivalent for it and for similar goods at that 
particular time and place.’ The equivalence price is a variable phenomenon, determined by 
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the forces of supply and demand and affected by the will and desire of people concerned.
1106
 
This is more or less the same as the market price. 
 
By contrast, under the general conception of English contract law consideration need not be 
adequate.
1107
 Moreover, price in consumer contracts is excluded from being subject to the test 
of fairness under section 64 (1) of the CRA 2015 (as a core term). The discussion of the 
fourth chapter on consumer protection under English law has indicated a high level of 
consumer protection. However, the exclusion of the price from the test of fairness is a major 
factor in holding down the level of protection.  
 
Although the effect of excluding price from the test of fairness is now softened under the 
CRA 2015 section 64 (2) where only ‘transparent and prominent’ price terms are excluded 
from the test of fairness, this also means that there is less regulation of price fairness. Even 
though the requirements of transparency and prominence minimise the charging of unfair 
hidden costs, there is no guarantee that transparent prices are fair or reflect market price.  
 
Collins observes in relation to the requirement of significant imbalance under the fairness test 
of consumer contract that ‘the directive is concerned to establish a framework for market 
transactions which encourages traders… to supply good products at competitive price’
1108
 
This is likely to mean that when addressing a contract term the price paid becomes a relevant 
consideration. However, one would wonder why legislators would exclude the price from the 
test of fairness if the intention is to regulate it under the requirement of significant imbalance. 
Even if Collins’ theory is right, the assessment of the price under the requirement of 
significant imbalance is limited by the fact that the imbalance needs to be ‘significant’
1109
. 




Traditionally, the exclusion of the adequacy of consideration from judicial review is based on 
an assumption about rational behaviour.  It is generally believed that people only consent to 
what represents their will. This comes from the belief that the market price is what makes a 
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just or fair price.
1111
 Similar arguments are made in relation to the exception of the price as a 
core term from the test of fairness. The exclusion of price from regulation is seen as a 
compromise that is made by the legislator for the sake of contractual autonomy by leaving the 
market free to regulate price.
1112
 Howells and Wilhelmsson point out that the intention behind 
the exclusion of the core terms (price and main subject matter) by the Directive was to be 
cautious not to intervene into ‘anything resulting directly from the contractual freedom of the 
parties’.
1113
 Moreover, it is regarded as unacceptable from the standpoint of freedom of 
contract for the trader or supplier to give the consumer the right to undo a bargain freely 
entered into on the grounds that they later regretted their original willingness to pay a given 




Such an argument does not make sense since an obvious intervention into parties’ autonomy 
has been made by the legislator on many occasions, including the implication of the quality 
of goods. It is incoherent to say that it is against the consumer’s will to supply a fair price, but 
that it is an implementation of his will to supply goods of satisfactory quality. On the 
contrary, it is of obvious benefit to the consumer to pay for as much as he gets in return, but it 
might not always be his choice to receive goods of standard quality. 
 
Perhaps it is the belief in the power of the market that has led to the exemption. Smith 
observes that although the regulation does not regard it as unfair to ‘advertise a pencil for sale 
at the non-negotiable price of £1000, it is simply a bad business’.
1115
 Indeed, it seems that the 
argument that market price is what determines the fair price is the largest challenge for 
adopting fair price regulation in English law. But, even if the market price is the only 
criterion to determine fair or just price, how does the law ensure that the agreed price reflects 
the market price?  How does the law deal with contracts when the agreed price is above the 
market price? Against traditional ideas, the price charged in the free market is always the 
market price; reality proves that market failure frequently happens.  Imperfection in the 
market occurs for many reasons and people have been proved to not always act rationally and 
consciously on the basis of information.
1116
 As a result, transparency is no solution for the 
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Therefore, the exclusion of the just price requirement from fairness considerations does not 
reflect current economic and social behaviour developments. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
make sense of why the fairness of contract term (in consumer contracting) is made relevant to 
the law but not the fairness of price, which is a core contract term of any contract. This is 
especially the case when price and terms are complementary, in the sense that a price that is 
higher or lower than the fair price may allow for terms that are more unfavourable than fair 
terms.  Indeed, it  does not make sense to exclude price from judicial review as resulting from 
parties’ autonomy when obvious intervention into parties’ autonomy has been made by the 
legislator (in consumer contracting) on many occasions including the implication to the 
quality of goods.  It is illogical to say that it is against the consumer’s will to supply a fair 
price, but it is an implementation of his will to supply goods of satisfactory quality. By 
contrast, it is of obvious benefit to the consumer to pay as much as he gets in return, but it 
might not always be his choice to get goods of standard quality. Thus, this research upholds 
the enforcement of a requirement of just price by the English law of contract especially in 





7.2 Justice norms 
 
Speaking about the role of contract in pursuing justice and allocating resources leads to the 
question of justice norms. In general terms, most of modern debates on the normative justice 
of contact theories advocate either corrective justice (based on right) or distributive justice 
(welfare distribution).
1119
 The concept of distributive justice has been mentioned several 
times in this research.
1120
 Aristotle in the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics defines 
distributive justice (dianemetikon dikaion) as ‘the distribution of honour or money or any of 
other things divisible among those who share in the regime’.
1121
 Various conceptions of 
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distributional justice have been attached to socialist concerns.
1122
 Three commonly suggested 
norms of distribution have been illustrated in the previous chapter. These are the need norm, 




Socialists generally agree, according to Ogus, on the general theme of pursuit of equality 
through the abolition of advantages of power, privilege and wealth. In addition this also 
involves ensuring individuals’ access to resources that enable them to participate equally and 
fully in the community.
1124
 Corrective justice (diorthotikaion dikaion) on the other hand is 
contrasted with distributive justice. Corrective justice plays a corrective role in private 
transactional relations to maintain equality.
1125
 The concern here is to illustrate the extent to 
which Shariah and English law reflect both norms of justice. 
 
Both legal systems refer to corrective and distributive norms to differing degrees. The general 
theory of English contract law tends to deal with unfairness correctively. This is apparent 
from the fact that the law prefers to deal with injustice without imposing a general 
requirement that contract must be fair. The previous section explains that although the 
English law of contract does not impose a general doctrine of contractual fairness, it deals 
with perceived cases of injustice correctively. There is no evidence that the general theory of 
English contract is yet serving a distributional function in the sense of setting standards to 
move wealth from one group to another. By contrast, distributive justice is a major cause of 
intervention in consumer contracting. Under consumer theory, distribution is made for the 





On the other hand, the Shariah law of contract serves a distributional function on the bases of 
‘equity’ and ‘need’ norms.
1127
 The equity norm involves the matching of ‘inputs’ with 
‘return’ or contributions with ‘rewards’. This reflects the fundamental principle of Shariah 
that counter-values must be equivalent.  The ‘need’ norm of distributive justice is also 
manifest in Shariah law of contract on several occasions, including the doctrine of unfair 
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The corrective norm of justice is occasionally referred to by the Shariah law of contract when 
speaking about contractual remedies represented in the ‘corrective scheme of option’. 
Therefore, we could say that the Shariah law of contract serves distributive justice through 
the illegality doctrines (riba, gharar, just price, unfair exploitation and mandatory disclosure) 
whereas defect is dealt with by corrective measures (option of defect, option of description, 




Yet, it might be appropriate to address here the argument made by Hassan against this 
research conclusion that the Shariah law of contract serves distributive justice. Hassan asserts 
that the Shariah law of contract serves corrective justice.
1130
 He argues that distributive 
concerns are served under Shariah legal traditions outside the institutions of contract. It is 
made under other institutions which are meant to ensure just and equitable circulation. The 
most important mechanism of wealth distribution is Zakah, which is the payment given 
annually to the poor and the needy. The list includes many other mechanisms of social wealth 




The role of contract is then, according to Hassan’s theory, to make sure that the result of 
distribution is achieved.  This is made through corrective justice, he suggests, which ensures 
the maintenance of equality so that after a transaction is concluded parties come out neither 
richer nor poorer than they were before. Hassan refers to corrective justice as explained by 
Aquinas who uses the term ‘commutative justice’ to refer to what Aristotle called ‘corrective 
justice.’ According to Aquinas, commutative justice is a form of corrective justice which is 
not limited to correction. Conversely, corrective justice (commutative justice) requires that 
the exchange performances be of equivalent value in the sense that contractors should come 
out of the contracting agreement with the same level of wealth they had before entering into 
the contract.
1132
 Thus, corrective justice in contract ensures that the performance exchanged 
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by the parties are of equal value,
1133
 which according to Hassan agrees with the general 




However, Hassan bases his thesis on an over-estimation of the Shariah principle of 
equivalence of counter-values. To say that the contracting parties should come out of the 
contracting agreement with the same level of wealth they had before is the same as saying 
that profit making is prohibited by Shariah. It is very difficult to imagine a contract scheme 
where legitimate profit is discarded. Thus, the prohibition of advantage-taking should not be 
interpreted to mean that profit making is disallowed. This leads to the question of how profit 
is earned under Shariah law. 
 
Just profit or the profit of the equivalent is a normal profit that is usually earned in a 
particular type of trade without harming others. Profit is generally permitted until it becomes 
abnormal or exploitive.
1135
 Under Shariah philosophy, profit must be earned; it requires a 
combination of property and labour for the purpose of development. Profit is, accordingly, 
associated with a real effort that constitutes validity of investment for the purpose of 
allocating resources. The profit of Shariah is therefore, a quest profit which includes effort 
and mobility of resources that serves economic value. 
 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
 
At first glance Shariah and English laws of contract seem to have very distinct approaches as 
to intervention into parties’ autonomy. The two legal systems rest on very distinct ideological 
bases. While contracts under Shariah rules are concluded by the principle of permissibility, 
freedom of contract is the general rule in English law.  Yet, deeper analysis of the rules of the 
two systems, especially by including English consumer protection in the picture, 
demonstrates that this is not entirely true. Furthermore, the fact that the English judicial 
system occasionally intervenes into the substance of the contract , albeit indirectly, and deals 
directly with the contractual fairness of consumer relations makes it difficult to say that 
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substantive fairness is not relevant to contract validation. This brings the rules of Shariah and 
English law considerably in line. 
 
Justice is a relative and changing phenomenon, this is why it should reflect current societal 
values. This is a point of vital importance to the development of both Shariah and English 
law.  On the one hand, the English law still insists on remaining bound by the traditional 
liberal approach, even though the liberal approach has proved incapable of coping 
conceptually with social and economic developments. The determined commitment to this 
liberal ideology has led to inconsistency in the development of the law. More fundamentally, 
it means that the law struggles to respond to current needs with an outdated theoretical 
framework. The English system needs to accept that a change of circumstances requires at 
times a change of those principles that are protected by the law.  
 
On the other hand, Shariah law consists of a wealth of neglected materials reflecting the 
needs and circumstances of many centuries ago.  Most analysis included in this research was 
guided by the classical law of Shariah from the classical period which constitutes the largest 
part of Shariah jurisprudence. For many reasons that have been mentioned throughout the 
research the development of the law has been hampered in modern times. The decline in 
Shariah during the nineteenth century has left the law with a gap, since the law has generally 
remained unchanged in its classical form. Although the jurists of the classical period created 
a significant body of material covering every aspect of the law of contract, their work 
represents their times. 
 
The most obvious cause of decline of the Shariah law of contract is related to the 
displacement of human reasoning in developing the law.
1136
 This most likely arose as a result 
of caution regarding changes to the nature of the law and being sceptical about choosing the 
right people who could oversee such a process.  Nevertheless, Shariah is more than just law 
for most Muslims; it is a system of duties that covers matters of morality as well as 
jurisprudence. To avoid the criticism that Shariah law is holding back nations who adopt it, 
restatement of the law to fit the contemporary needs of market has become a necessity. 
Indeed, the law is now under pressure to keep up with recent developments. One of the most 
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urgent needs is to adjust the law of contract to respond to the needs of consumers and 
commercial entities in the modern market. 
 
Immutability of the principles of the law should not be overestimated otherwise it is will be a 
major obstacle to the natural development of the law in relation to changing social and 
commercial circumstances. Introducing the rules of Shariah in a modern context will have an 
ever changing effect on the development of Shariah. Codification of the law could be one 




























Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis was conducted with two aims in mind. The first is to investigate the situation of 
contractual justice under the English and Shariah laws of contract. The second is to test the 
viability of consumer protection under the Shariah law of contract. Shariah and English laws 
of contract have been reviewed from classical to contemporary times with emphasis placed 
on contractual justice, equity and acknowledgment of contractual vulnerability in both legal 
systems. Notions of fairness as implemented in each of the relevant legal systems have been 
explored. The English experience of consumer protection is introduced to the research in 
order to highlight the role of the law of contract in bringing fairness and equity to society.  
The research outlines the rationales behind the regulation of consumer contracts. It also 
illustrates the extent to which intervention is made into parties’ autonomy by exploring the 
major regulation techniques of consumer protection. The theoretical and practical aspects of 
the Shariah law of contract have been tested for their capacity to provide consumer 
protection.  
 
Enforcing justice or distributive considerations into contractual relations, as well as being a 
modern tendency, was also a characteristic of medieval contract laws. The Shariah law of 
contract, as the product of the eighth century, acknowledges the distributive role of the law of 
contract and enforces fairness notions into contractual scheme. Although the medieval roots 
of the English law of contract are surrounded with controversy there is some evidence that 
substantive contractual justice is promoted by the law.
1137
 The rise of the liberal state in the 
eighteenth century had its effect on the law of contract. The English law is an example of a 
law of contract that was highly influenced by liberal ideas, and indeed still is.  The Shariah 
law of contract on the other hand, being an immutable legal system, and for many other 
reasons (social and political) was not affected by liberal movements. 
 
By the twentieth century, the direction of the English law of contract had shifted; ideas of 
social justice and cooperation were introduced into the law of contract. This movement was 
mainly the result of an increased recognition of consumer rights. This was associated with 
social and economic studies against liberal contract theory. Since the issue of consumer 
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protection is not one to be ignored in the modern world legislative intervention became 
indispensible. Legislation has enforced ideas into contract that the common law would 
require a very long time, if ever, to accept. Consumer protection is a reflection of the 
distributive function of the law of contract and social contract thinking.  Outside consumer 
protection the general law of contract was shaped by two opposing tendencies. One of which 
represents a departure from contract liberalism and the other a revival of liberalism. 
 
The Shariah law of contract did not witness any major reform in the same modern period. 
Furthermore, the law of contract was never bound by liberal notions of contract. On the 
contrary, social responsibility is reflected by the law of contract to the extent that it is 
possible to say Shariah is a law that is bound by the principle of permissibility of contract 
rather than freedom of contract.  This agrees with the modern social and economic analysis of 
the law of contract. However, the law suffers from serious issues caused mainly by 
negligence. Although the Shariah law was never abandoned in the Middle East, it remained to 
a large extent undeveloped. The law is to a large extent the same as that developed by the 
classical jurists of the eighth to tenth centuries.  The fear of changing the nature of the 
Shariah law prevented any attempt to develop and codify it. One of the major challenges for 
the Shariah law of contract is responding to the need for consumer protection.  While the 
Shariah law of contract promotes cooperation and social responsibility, it does not recognise 
the concept of the consumer, simply because the concept of the consumer was not known at 
the time of the evolution and development of the law.  
 
In chapter two, the situation of contractual justice under the English law of contract was 
explored. The discussion began with the classical period of the law of contract as forming the 
cornerstone of the contemporary law. The two primary principles of freedom and sanctity of 
contract that controlled the classical law of contract were explored. Being of an 
individualistic nature, the concept of fairness of the classical law of contract was 
procedurally-oriented. The process of transformation from the classical to the contemporary 
law of contract was outlined. Modern developments in the law of contract were traced by 
invoking the innovative notion of fairness that was introduced to the law. This included the 
notions of equality of bargaining power, reasonableness, unconscionability and good faith. 
Furthermore, modern developments of the classical equity doctrines of duress and undue 
influence were examined. The discussion focused on the evolution, meaning, effect and scope 
of these doctrines. This was done for the purpose of testing the extent to which the modern 
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law of contract serves contractual justice.  The analysis reveals that the English law of 
contract has not travelled very far in regulating the fairness of contractual relations since the 
classical period. The liberal notions of contract seem to still be dominant and the notion of 
freedom of contract is forming a serious obstacle to the development of any general doctrine 
of substantive fairness. Modern notions of fairness that have been introduced into the law of 
contract are merely supplementary notions, which soften the rigidity of the law rather than 
being limitation doctrines. 
 
Chapter three moved on to investigate the situation of contractual justice under the Shariah 
law of contract. Owing to the distinct nature of the Shariah law of contract the first part of 
this chapter was devoted to an overview of the law.  It explored the evolution of the law in 
the seventh and eighth centuries and the sources and nature of the law. It further illustrated 
the general theory of contract by addressing the ongoing debate over the existence of a 
general theory that binds the Shariah law of contract. The major limitations to contractual 
autonomy were presented by invoking the doctrine of shurut (ancillary condition).  It was 
indicated that the Shariah law of contract is a legal system that is closely regulated for the 
purpose of preserving moral principles and ethics.  This led to the conclusion that the Shariah 
law of contract is bound by the principle of permissibility of contract rather than freedom of 
contract.  Furthermore, fairness notions under the law of contract were explored. Discussion 
was focused on the meaning, effect and scope of the doctrines of duress, riba, gharar, unfair 
exploitation and just price. By doing so, the meaning and concepts of contractual justice 
under Shariah law were determined. In addition, the extent to which contractors are legally 
bound to act fairly and justly towards each other was investigated.  The discussion reveals 
that substantive fairness is a promoted and accepted value by the Shariah law of contract. 
Two primary principles distinguish the meaning of fairness under the Shariah law of contract. 
These are equality of counter-values and that profit must be a result of work of labour not a 
matter of exploitation of the needs of others.  
 
In chapter four the theoretical grounds of the consumer protection were addressed from 
economic and social perspectives. Modern thinking in support of the intervention into the 
market place was presented to rationalise consumer protection. From an economic 
perspective consumer protection is rationalised based on the idea that a free market system 
produces failure that needs to be rectified by intervening into private transactions. From a 
social justice perspective consumer protection is needed to support the distributive function 
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of the law of contract and promote fairness and cooperation in society. The discussion of this 
chapter indicated that the law of consumer protection directly intervenes into the private 
sphere of contract for the purpose of preserving the fairness of the contract and giving effect 
to the distributive function of the law of contract.  Protection of consumers by the law of 
contract was shown to be a matter of theory as well as practice. Consumer protection involves 
the promotion and enforcement of ideas of cooperation and fairness by the law of contract. 
This requires intervention into the private sphere of contract by a public authority. 
Furthermore, the legal rules of consumer protection are of a special nature in that they are set 
in order to balance the contractual relation for the benefit of the consumer rather than being 
set in the standard way for the benefit of both contracting parties. The discussion of this 
chapter serves the second aim of the research by distinguishing the main theoretical 
characteristics of consumer protection to be tested under the Shariah law of contract. 
 
Chapter five explored the consumer protection experience under English law. This chapter 
investigated the extent to which contractual justice is promoted under the consumer theory of 
contract law. The evolution of English consumer law, its main characteristics and the 
influence of European law upon were outlined. It was illustrated that the evolution of the law 
of consumer protection in the twentieth century was a departure from the classical laissez-
faire theory of contract. The major techniques of consumer protection within the law of 
contract were further explored. The relevant analysis revealed that these techniques were 
mainly designed to protect four essential values with respect to the consumer: legitimate 
expectation, free will, informed consent and fair contract terms. The discussion indicated that 
consumer protection under English law follows a theory that is distinct from the general law 
of contract. 
 
In chapter six, the question of the viability of consumer protection under the Shariah law of 
contract was addressed. In the first part of the chapter, the question was investigated from a 
theoretical perspective. It seems that the rational grounds of consumer protection agree with 
the theoretical bases of Shariah law.  The Shariah law of contract performs a distributional 
function based both on ‘equity’ and ‘need’ norms. Paternalist motives are the theoretical basis 
for a significant proportion of Shariah rules. Furthermore, public intervention into the 
marketplace has been practiced since the early days of Islam through the institution of the 
hisbah. Finally, values of honesty, fair dealing, unity and encouragement of cooperation are 
promoted by Shariah philosophy. The following section then moved on to test the practical 
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aspects of the Shariah law of contract. The discussion was guided by the modern regulations 
of the English law of consumer protection. Finally, a formula of consumer protection under 
the Shariah law of contract was offered. 
 
Chapter seven provided final remarks as to where the two relevant legal systems stand in 
relation to contractual justice. It determined that while the concept of fairness under the 
Shariah law of contract is substantively oriented, the doctrinal foundation of the English law 
of contract is still to large extent procedurally oriented. Attention was turned to certain issues 
related to the situation of contractual justice and consumer protection under Shariah or 
English law that call for explanation. It was explained that while the Shariah law of contract 
encourages fairness it does not impose a general requirement of good faith. This is because 
fairness of contractual relation under the Shariah law of contract is tested by looking at the 
material facts rather than the intention of the parties. Furthermore, it was suggested that it is 
not sufficient to have consumer protection within the law of contract, there also needs to be 
some line of separation between the two sets of rules (consumer and commercial). In this 
regard, a formula for the separation between commercial and consumer law under the Shariah 
law of contract was suggested. The discussion then moved to a discussion of issues related to 
contractual fairness under the English law of contract. It was mentioned that English courts 
are at present only rejecting the name of doctrine not fair dealing itself. Therefore, it is to the 
benefit of the English law to adopt a general doctrine of substantive fairness. It was further 
explained that the exclusion of price fairness from consumer regulation under the English law 
is holding the level of consumer protection back. Moreover, the exclusion of price from the 
fairness test does is not consistent with the overall orientation of consumer protection. 
Finally, justice norms adopted by both Shariah and English law were addressed. 
 
8.1 Outcomes and recommendations 
 
 The modern law of English contract rejects a general doctrine of substantive fairness 
but not the idea that fairness is a relevant consideration for contract validity. As a result, 
fairness is dealt with by indirectly and covertly through doctrinal manipulation. This causes 
issues of inconsistency and stands against the development of the law.  It seems to be 
primarily the fear that the contract institution would collapse without it that makes the law 
keen to preserve a liberal ideology that does not reflect current values. However, as Lord 
Devilin states ‘the true nature of common law is to override theoretical distinctions when they 
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stand in the way of doing practical justice.’
1138
 Thus, any obstacle in front of the application 
of practical fairness should be removed. The English law should respond to modern social 
and economic developments by adopting a general doctrine of substantive fairness. It should 
be recognised in the law of contract that liberalisation is no longer the best way to achieve 
justice. The creation of a doctrine of substantive fairness is a necessary development of the 
law. The introduction of a substantive doctrine would serve the consistency, efficiency and 
clarity of the law.  
 
 Although generally consumer protection under the English law supports a high degree 
of fairness, this is limited by excluding price from the fairness consideration. It would be very 
difficult to assess the fairness of a certain contract distinctly from a price consideration. This 
is simply because it is not possible to judge how balanced the relationship is without knowing 
how much each party is getting in return for what he is giving. The exclusion of a just price 
requirement from fairness considerations does not reflect current economic and social 
behaviour developments. More importantly, it does not consist with the overall orientation of 
consumer protection; it is hard to make sense of why the fairness of contract terms (in 
consumer contracting) is made relevant to the law but not the fairness of price, which is 
arguably the consumer’s most important consideration. It is of obvious benefit to the 
consumer to regulate price fairness to pay as much as he gets in return, but it might not 
always his choice to attain goods of standard quality. This research has thus upheld enforcing 
a requirement of just price by the English law of contract especially in relation to consumer 
contract. A requirement of fair price is essential if the law is to aim for maximal welfarism. 
 
 The research has revealed that the Shariah law of contract is fit both from a theoretical 
and a practical perspective to serve the aim of consumer protection. In terms of theory, all 
ideas that underpin consumer protection fit easily with the general principles of the Shariah 
law of contract and indeed most of these ideas are already acknowledged by the Shariah law 
of contract. Just like modern consumer protection regimes, the Shariah law of contract 
encourages social responsibility and care for others. This is reflected in the distributive 
function attributed to the law of contract. Public intervention into the law of contract is 
promoted by the law of contract. This is apparent from the fact that it is based on the 
principle of permissibility rather than freedom of contract. The law of contract is heavily 
                                                          
1138
 Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31,66 
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regulated for the purpose of securing a free deal for everyone in a way that excludes any 
notion of ‘caveat emptor’. From a practical standpoint, the thesis has indicated that the 
majority of values protected by modern consumer measures are to some extent reflected in 
the rules of Shariah contract law. A formula for the employment of some established rules of 
the Shariah law of contract for creating consumer protection code is proposed. This formula 
attends to the minimum consumer values necessary to offer satisfactory protection. It 
includes the protection of consumers’ informed will, voluntary consent, legitimate 
expectations and balanced contractual obligations. The research suggests that the issuance of 
a single legislation compatible with Shariah rules is likely to be the key solution to most 
consumer issues in Shariah-ruled countries. Such a code should extract the maximum benefit 
out of Shariah rules by modernising, crystallising and introducing elements of sophistication 
to the law in order to respond to modern needs. This would bring much needed elements of 
clarity and consistency to the law. The codification of consumer protection in Shariah-ruled 
countries along with the creation of a stable and clear system is likely to enhance the 
legitimacy and moderation of the practice of consumer protection. 
 
 The research has illustrated that most rules which protect contractual fairness under 
the Shariah law of contract are set in abstract, meaning they are applicable to every 
contractual relation in the same manner regardless of who the parties are. It does not make 
any difference if the contract was concluded between consumer and trader or even between 
two commercial entities. Although this serves the modern tendency towards intervention into 
marketplace, Shariah law in some occasions can be very restrictive. Thus, efficiency might be 
a point against Shariah law especially in relation to commercial transactions. This research 
argues that it would in the public interest to establish a line of differentiation between 
commercial and consumer relations. Pursuing justice by the Shariah law of contract should 
not become an obstacle to human development (commercial exchange in this case). Two 
points are suggested here on which to base the differentiation between commercial and 
consumer regulation. These are the variation between the legal thoughts of the schools and 
the doctrine of unfair exploitation 
 
 Comparing the situation of contractual justice under the two relevant jurisdictions 
suggests that achieving practical justice requires intervention into the process as well as the 
substance of the contract. Being focused on one aspect of fairness rather than the other 
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(procedural fairness in the English law and substantive fairness under the Shariah law) is 
likely to produce unjust outcomes. Furthermore, ignoring contemporary economic and social 
developments and needs is likely to produce injustice. This is because fairness is a relevant 
phenomenon that changes with time and circumstances. This is the main issue facing the 
development of both English and Shariah laws of contract. The English law of contract 
struggles in dealing with perceived injustice as a result of the determination to remain bound 
by liberal theory while ignoring changes in economic and social factors. Similarly, the 
Shariah law of contract is held back as a result of the overestimation of the immutability of 
the law.  The fear that the nature of the law is going to change is what has led to the Shariah 




8.2 Future research  
 
A further research is suggested in relation to the following issues. First of all, a formula for a 
general doctrine of substantive fairness in English law is needed. Second, there should be 
further acknowledgment of the extent to which it is possible to differentiate between the 
regulation of consumer and commercial contract under the Shariah law of contract. Third, in 
investigating the viability of consumer protection under Shariah law the discussion of the 
thesis was limited to analysing the contract of sale, therefore further research is needed to 
consider other aspects of consumer protection such as in relation to supply of services and 
product liability. Fifth, when discussing values to be protected by the Shariah law of 
consumer protection the analysis focused on four essential values, further research in relation 
to the protection of other values is suggested. Finally, a draft for the codification of the 
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